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Now or Later? - Endogenous Timing of Threats

Berninghaus, S.K.; Güth, W.

Whereas early threats are chosen before bargaining, late threats are determined after bargaining ended in conflict. Instead of exogenously imposing the timing of threats, these are derived endogenously as in indirect evolution or endogenous timing. Based on a duopoly market, we first derive the equilibrium for all possible constellations regarding the timing of threats. Our analysis surprisingly justifies the early timing of threats as suggested by Nash (1953).

Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Operations Research (WIOR)
Publikationstyp Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Jahr 2003
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 0040-5833
KITopen ID: 1000003949
Erschienen in Theory and decision
Band 55
Heft 3
Seiten 235 - 256
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