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Originalveröffentlichung
DOI: 10.1109/ICC.2010.5501977
Scopus
Zitationen: 11

Quantitative Analysis of the Sybil Attack and Effective Sybil Resistance in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Jetter, O.; Dinger, J.; Hartenstein, H.

Abstract:
Current peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are vulnerable to a variety of attacks due to the lack of a central authorization authority. The Sybil attack, i.e., the forging of multiple identities, is crucial as it can enable an attacker to control a substantial fraction or even the entire P2P system. However, the correlation between the resources available to an attacker and the resulting influence on the P2P system has yet not been studied in detail. The contributions of our paper are twofold: i) we present an approach for assessing the actual threats of Sybil attacks and ii) we propose a new distributed approach to limit the impact of Sybil attacks effectively. Therefore, we conduct a thorough quantitative analysis of the Sybil attack w.r.t. the resource requirements to operate Sybil nodes and we investigate the quantitative influence of Sybil nodes on the overall system. Our study focuses on distributed hash tables (DHTs), in particular Kademlia which is very popular and for instance used in BitTorrent. We ran extensive Internet measurements within the BitTorrent DHT to determine the actual required resources to operate nodes. To evaluate ... mehr


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Telematik (TM)
Steinbuch Centre for Computing (SCC)
Publikationstyp Proceedingsbeitrag
Jahr 2010
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISBN: 978-142446404-3
ISSN: 0536-1486
KITopen-ID: 1000018131
Erschienen in 2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2010; Cape Town; South Africa; 23 May 2010 through 27 May 2010
Verlag IEEE, Piscataway (NJ)
Seiten Art. Nr.: 5501977
Serie IEEE International Conference on Communications
Nachgewiesen in Scopus
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