Why is it that people who are in the possession of mobile communication devices are more inclined to check the time rather than where they are, unless – of course – they are looking for a particular destination? We think we know where we are. It seems obvious! However, we need to ask ourselves again: Where are we? The answer to this question certainly does not imply that we need to be more concerned with our geographical position, with the relation to the axes situated beneath us, but rather with how we – in connection to ourselves, to others, and to the environment – relate to place, especially since we live in a world which is certainly not fixed, but is instead transitional and indeterminable. This point of view entails that our being in this world is embedded in a ceaseless process of unforeseeable changes where we continually find ourselves in new situations which coincide with different spatial configurations – a procedure by which we transition from one state to another and reposition ourselves, both literally and figuratively.

Hence, the notion of our locale is to be found in the idea of changing positions, animated by our very being in this world. In this procedure, place (re)emerges in a continuum of shifting states which we initiate and continually animate. As a consequence, the notion of place needs to be considered as a provisional aggregate – an emerging field – embedded between the interacting conditions of stability and instability. In other words, the process by which place appears originates in the differentiating restlessness of the becoming of something and the fading away of something. Only then, between these two circumstances, may place emerge. From this point of view, place may no longer be considered as something which is defined by a permanent location, but the result of human interactions, thus dynamic and ever changing.

What we require therefore is the general insight that places result from processes; they do not possess a single, immutable identity. Instead, they are the medium through which human interaction assumes a material presence and are therefore subject to a reality that is generated and modified by the encounters, narratives, and representations of people interacting with their surrounding. Thus as we travel through this world of temporal relations, place may no longer be perceived as a permanent and pre-existing entity, but instead as a state of being.
But let us begin at the beginning. The German noun Wen ("being," OHG wesan) means in its original sense "to stay," "dwellings" and "permanence." Thus Wen refers to something permanent and steadfast like the residence, and is accordingly an abode, a site of steadfastness. Far-Eastern thought takes an entirely different approach to this concept. There the topos for the linguistic equivalent of Wen stands not for "being" but for "path." This means that, in contrast to "being," which in the Western world generally stands for permanence and closed nature, in Far-Eastern thought the "path" refers to an endless processuality and thus neither closed nature nor apparent direction. The path lacks, so to say, every trace of a "being." Just as the path in itself exhibits no definite direction, neither does the path of the wayfarer indicate any definite direction. Within this, the individual is subject to a permanent process of reorientation; since everything is determined by accident, he is caught up in an uninterrupted process of letting go and taking grasp again. Thus the traveler must again and again become involved with his surroundings. He accordingly wanders in a "non-being" and thereby resides in "non-dwelling."

This gives rise to a strange manner of traveling. Since the route of the journey is not linked to a specific destination and the path lies undetermined before the wanderer. In this, the wayfarer is free from all substantial determination. The endless processuality of the path and the ensuing disappearance of a substantial closed nature prevent anything from subsisting. The sole predefinition from which the traveler cannot remove himself is the fact that the path lacks any trace of a predetermined direction. This means that since the journey does not lead anywhere and the wayfarer immediately loses what he has attained, he accordingly does not leave behind any traces. He abides without lingering, and because the journey leads nowhere, he resides in nowhere. This in turn has the consequence that the wayfarer also no longer experiences time in the sense of a mechanically controlled clock-hand – he exists in relational terms. This means that he abides neither in the past nor in the future. He abides situationally in the here and now – in the present.

Against this background, the wanderer converts each moment of his journey into an absolutely local zone. He responds fully to the landscape, becomes one with it – a notion which Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explored in A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In their disquisition on Smooth and Striated Spaces, the authors make reference to two different types of space. Whereas in striated space the path is predetermined, in smooth space the path exists as something processual and abstract which has neither an outline nor a border. Such a path, that 'delimits nothing [...] describes no contour [...] that no longer goes from one point to another but instead passes between points [...] always declining [...] and deviating [...] changing directions' is truly an abstract line – a "line" which one certainly wanders along and wonders about. In this space, the points do not determine the course of a path, but the (third) element lying in between gives rise to the path. Whereas in a striated space the points serve to define the course of a path, inasmuch as every movement is accomplished from one point to the next one, in smooth space 'every point is a relay and exists only as a relay [...] along a trajectory' – a procedure by which the wayfarer opens himself constantly to his surrounding. He merges with it. Engaging in smooth space is therefore 'at once body based and landscape oriented.' The 'nomads make the desert no less than they are made by it,' a notion which Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty also pursued in *Phenomenology of Perception.* For him as well, the body is continuously immersed in the landscape and engaged in an open-ended dialogue with the environment.

In this process nomads are the vectors of deterritorialization in which each of them can be seen as ‘deterritorialized par excellence’. And while they move in a ‘polyvocality of directions’ in a limited visibility, they experience the surrounding landscape without any immediate distance or contour. Yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology upon which they rely, ‘like sets of relations (wind, undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the cracking ice, the tactile qualities of both).’

Following Merleau-Ponty’s point of view, the subject is therefore to be considered as a ‘mosaic of given sensation’ in which the body is inundated in a continuous stream of various visual fields, different sounds, smells, and tactile stimulations. ‘What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but a system of possible actions [...] defined by its task and situation.’

Within this scenario, the notion of place is not equivalent to a fixed location, but instead is something which is negotiated in perception as the subject interacts with the surrounding environment. For this reason, the points of orientation never remain the same. They change according to the subject, the vegetation, the amount of annual rainfall, or the respectively extant grounds. In this, directions are as much seen, heard, or felt. This means that, no matter where the nomads are ‘on the high sea or in the wind-swept desert, one listens to directions,’ feels them as much as one sees them. Smooth space is therefore filled with invisible and sonorous intensities such as wind, noise, and other forces. It is the space of immediate ‘contact, of small tactile or manual actions.’

As a consequence, one must continually find one’s own way. Since such a journey does not provide a set point of view or a distance which one can actually measure, the path can only be experienced through wandering and wondering, through actions and interactions, but most importantly through the use of one’s own individual body. Guattari and Deleuze are accordingly justified in pointing this out: ‘Voyaging smoothly is [...] a difficult, uncertain becoming.’ What remains for the wayfarer is to open himself and to respond again and again to the locally occurring signs and symbols which constantly arise around him. The space of the wanderer thus provides room for an endless exploration of one’s own local absolute – the position which one occupies at a particular moment.

Within this, individuals are forever establishing new possibilities of perceiving their environment, since by taking short cuts, selecting deviations, or improvising itineraries, they ‘privilege, transform, or abandon spatial elements.’ As Merleau-Ponty says: We do not see the world ‘behind the back of our consciousness; [...] but in front of us, as articulations of our field’ through which the itineraries of our journey are constantly changing, according to a particular moment, mood, and spatial configuration in which we find ourselves.

This form of locality, which has as a consequence an infinite sequence of arising occurrences with various orientations, accordingly no longer takes place at a determined place but is instead to be found in the endless succession of absolutely local and unpredictable events. One could say the nomad is in an ‘absolute of passage’ which is to be understood as a ‘nomadic absolute, as a local integration moving from part to part [...] [with] an infinite succession of linkages and changes in direction. It is an absolute that is one with becoming itself, with process.’

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8 Maurice Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, London 1962, see chapter “Space.”
12 Ibid., 249f.
13 Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 304 (remark 6).
15 Ibid., 371.
16 Ibid., 482.
19 According to the authors, a “nomadic absolute” exists. This “absolute,” which expresses itself in the form of a local integration, is considered to be a process of becoming, i.e. the absolute is a transition, a site which is not limited. Cf. Deleuze, Woran erkennt man Strukturalismus, 684 (remark 9).
Hence this immersing of oneself in smooth space is something complex which cannot be assimilated by the psyche without further ado, as the field in which the traveler immerses himself is infinite, as Guattari and Deleuze have pointed out. Thus the path lies before the wanderer as if invisible, and the already traversed route has already been obliterated.

While sedentary dwellers, such as those who inhabit striated spaces, travel in order to get from point A to point B, the subjects, as described by Deleuze and Guattari as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, do not simply travel in order to reach a particular destination. Like the wanderer’s journey, the path of the nomad is not to move to a particular destination. The act of wandering is to be understood here as a residing, inasmuch as the constituent elements of the wanderer’s residence are designed with respect to the respective path. This results in an unusual form of dwelling, for it breaks with that idea of home as a settled entity to which Martin Heidegger still adheres. Contrary to Heidegger’s analysis of space, the nomad – whether he sojourns on the steppe, in the desert, or upon the eternal ice – is already “at home.” This means that, instead of holding onto a settled home, the nomad is engaged in a process of continual deterritorialization in which he transforms the ground for his ongoing journey towards the unknown.

He does this inasmuch as he no longer moves towards a particular place of residence but instead dwells during the very act of movement. He is ‘the moving body, which is the bearer of an un-housed inhabitation, the very vehicle of a space without conduits or settled sites.’ 21

His “being at home” thus corresponds to a “trajectory” which is constantly engaged with the unknown. In this, he occupies a place that has the characteristic of not being there where it is sought for. One can say that it is missing at its “place;” and only something that can shift its location one can say it is missing at its place. That, however, does not imply that the notion of place is to be conceived of as something indeterminable. One can determine it, even in its shifts. It is simply not assignable. This means that even though it is always in its place, it cannot be affixed to one particular location.

Within in this procedure, place is to be regarded as a provisional aggregate – an emerging field – that is embedded between two interacting conditions, that of stability and that of instability. That means, the process by which place appears originates in the differentiating restlessness of the becoming of something and the fading away of something. Only then, between these two circumstances, can place emerge. Therefore, place is difference in itself and its existence is explicating in the process by which difference unfolds. For this reason, place is the empty location which makes it possible to engage continuously in an infinite number of both directions and orders. Thus the entire process of producing place is moved by this third element – the empty field. Without this, nothing would move. So there can be no forward motion without the empty field – the zero point. The thereby arising difference thus describes neither space nor a place, but rather the third element lying in between, the non-place. This is the field which the wayfarer occupies.

The fact that non-places are liberated from a concrete presence and are not rooted or anchored does not allow one to conclude that their existence is of a utopian character. They are real, as Michel Foucault concludes in his lecture Of Other Spaces. In this lecture, Foucault establishes the concept of “heterotopia” – in contrast to utopias which, as he points out, ‘[are] the preserve solely of things […] that in fact have no place.’ These heterotopias are the real places, he says. They are contested and inverted counter-sites. They exist outside of all other places, since they “are absolutely different from all sites that they reflect and speak about” – just like the nomads who are described by Deleuze and Guattari as existing outside of all other places as well.

However, ‘[to] make a difference, a heterotopia must possess a focus for the application of force’ – a force however, that is nowhere to be found, ‘but in the marginal location of the heterotopia itself.’ Accordingly, non-places are not phenomena that only ever find expression on the periphery. Rather, they organize themselves as contextual marginal situations everywhere. These other places are in a constant state of flux and change. They can neither be tied to

21 Casey, The Fate of Place, 307 (remark 6).
22 Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, in: Diacritics 16 (1986), 1.
23 Michel Foucault, Les heterotopias. Le corps utopique, Published in German as Die Heterotopien. Der utopische Körper, Frankfurt am Main 2005, 11.
24 Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 25 (remark 22).
25 Casey, The Fate of Place, 300 (remark 6).
a physically extant location nor ascribed to defined programmatic purposes. As a reference without an affiliation, the none-place, the interrupter, gathers the parts of a disconnected system into one grouping. Thus there no longer exists a place which comes to expression in the form of an immanent point. Instead it describes a transitory event-point (the empty field) which neither contains anything nor is contained in something. The non-place thereby embodies a transformative transit-place which not only provokes unpredictable changes, but also is responsible for their transformation or actualization. For this reason, the place is considered to be an independently acting space of transit which occupies in space a position which may be defined but not assigned. According to Foucault, it thereby paraphrases a placeless place which, for the duration of a moment, has come to the fore out of an extant order. This means that both the existence and the state of each individual place are here considered to be a provisionally arising configuration of relationships becoming manifest in different manners which, against the background of an emergent event, become perceptible as an interruption – an interruption which, according to Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, is equivalent to a critical turning-point that both breaks up and alters the continuity of an extant order, always for the purpose of opening a new field.

Seen against this background, the individual can no longer be considered to be a passenger or a traveler passing through. Rather, the individual assumes the status of a transient who, as long as he continues to interact, is in transit. Consequently every non-place is dependent upon transients. By shifting their positions, it is they who find themselves in new situations coinciding with unique spatial configurations – transitioning from one moment to another and repositioning themselves, both literally and figuratively. Thus each emergent field, as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu points out, corresponds to a ‘potentially open space of play whose boundaries are dynamic […] devoid of inventor and much more fluid and complex than any game that one might ever design.’

The field thereby corresponds to a dynamic configuration of elements which move in a reciprocal interaction between various systems. Each newly arising field develops in the disruptions which occur due to the shifting positions of the transients – a point of view subscribed to by Pierre Bourdieu as well. For him, each “action field” arises out of the interactions of the subjects, inasmuch as each field constitutes itself out of the relationships of the protagonists who have them as their immediate environment. From this perspective, every field is a relative construct by which individuals participate.

This type of field can be compared with the idea of the rhizome developed by Deleuze and Guattari. There as well, shifting of position takes place. Plateaus play an important role here. Plateaus have neither a beginning nor an end; they are to be found between things. They are the critical elements which represent a point of transition, a site in transit. This point of transition indicates the difference which weaves a connection between entities and simultaneously makes a transformation possible. Plateaus are characterized by a dispersion of events. They are not organized hierarchically and do not constitute a unity. For this process, the events are a condition sine qua non; without designating a direction, they organize and interconnect themselves in an array which is neither stable nor instable, but instead metastable.

Events are thereby part of a dynamic process whose outcome is uncertain and which brings the virtual into connection with the actual, whereby the virtual should not be understood as the “unreal” in this context.

‘It exits, one might say as a free difference or singularity, not yet combined with other differences into a complex ensemble or salient form.’

This means that the virtual does not need first to be realized but must simply be actualized, for it already possesses a transition capable of being developed. Accordingly, the virtual element (within an event)

‘is gathered, selected – let us say incarnated – it passes from one moment-event […] in order to emerge – differently, uniquely – within another.’

Events are thereby components of dynamic referential systems which constitute themselves out of a flowing multiplicity. And a world constituted out of diversity and flows comprises ‘not pre-given, ideal forms but metastable shapes floating in a river of

28 Ibid., 8.
ever-generating differences – differences ‘that [are] produced at some point along a particular flow [...] to induce a difference.’

Every event creates a difference inasmuch as it transports information and thereby summons up, between the plateaus – a transformation which is always of a “site-specific” nature. And because in that process the events do not occupy the surface but instead pass over it without ever touching it, the energy is not localized upon the surface but is linked to formation and reformation. In other words, life lives along the border of itself, along its delimitation, in the act of displacement – comparable with Ezra Park’s concept of the “marginal man.” He as well lives along a border, upon a threshold across which the most highly varied dissonances can be caused to oscillate, as Homi Bhabha has pointed out.

Thus the “marginal man” is not an individual on the periphery but a figure at the center. He is, as described in Human Migration and the Marginal Man,31 the type of person who is mobile, transitory, and not anchored. This does not mean, however, that the “marginal man” should be considered to be a “man at the edge” or a “man on the periphery,” as he is often erroneously portrayed, but instead a man “straddling the boundary.” As a person distinguished by his ambiguity, he strides through a realm that reveals few or no attributes of its past or future condition. Since this personality type fits into no particular context, he is forever located in a place which could equally be called a non-place. He thereby occupies a non-attributable place without fixed address, from which he can relentlessly assume new positions.

Apart from looking at the “marginal man” as a cultural concept, one could conclude that Park’s notion of the “marginal man” locates the “placeless place” of the subject between the two processes of consolidating the subject through self-assertion and dissolving it through assimilation. In these terms, then, “marginal man” is ‘a concept of subjectivity whose constructional principle [suggests] neither hermetic coherence nor open incoherence, but something one could describe as ‘situatively limited incoherence.’

Accordingly, as Rolf Lindner remarks, the “marginal man” can be considered as the personified carrier of a transformation and the embodiment of “modern subjectivity.”33 Thus he lives on the “subjective margins” of his own self, on the boundary of his own displacement. Consequently, those occupying the margins do not merely personify the boundary but also personify transition. Always on the move, always intent on change, they are constantly headed for new shores to forge links with their contexts. As such, the subject is analogous to the sea-borne ship described in Foucault’s study Of Other Spaces. Intended for translocation and ceaseless transition, the vessel pits itself against the infinite ocean – an ocean over which, in unflagging motion, boundaries are permanently redrawn and transgressed. And, as de Certeau observes, because these shifters never tire of charting new boundaries, they assume the role of a transgressive itinerant who ‘is the primum mobile [...] from which all the action proceeds.’

It is a similar commuting itinerant whom Gerald Raunig has in mind when he invokes the figure of Charon for his study of the aesthetics of transgression in Ästhetik der Grenzüberschreitung.36 Whereas Virgil depicts Charon in the Aeneid as a cheerless character whose task, for a small charge, is to ferry the dead in his boat across the river Acheron, the river of the underworld and the entrance to Hades, the realm of the dead, Raunig sees this ferryman as a translating entity who, like “marginal man,” ‘does not [scan] the dividing line between this world and the hereafter’37 but who opens up a space of transition or intermediary on the very boundary separating the two. This point of transit creates the difference which weaves a connection between entities and at the same time enables transformation to occur. This not only makes him the link joining the

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29 Ibid., 24.
30 Ibid., 26.
32 Michael Makropoulos/Robert Ezra, Modernität zwischen Urbani-
33 Rolf Lindner, Die Entdeckung der Stadtkultur. Soziologie aus der Erfahrung der Reportage, Frankfurt am Main 1990, 211.
two shores, but also an ‘intermediary space located within a difference.’ 38 As the scintillating protagonist dwelling between formative systems, he occupies an operative interstitial space by means of which various differences begin to oscillate in a transformative place of transit.

The subject in this process is neither here nor there, neither one nor the other. It positions itself, always subliminally, on a threshold – ‘[n]either excluded nor included […] in the fuzzy realm’ 39 of this blurred hiatus. The subject, then, is analogous to a liminal being which, as Victor Turner has written in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, is situated between positions, inhabiting a liminal space of passage, through which it repeatedly changes its positions.40

Thus the process of localization is directly linked here to the presence of a subject and its relationship to its immediate environment. Like Charon, the subject takes up a mediating role between various intensities. It translates, literally “carries over,” inasmuch as it takes up fragments of its surroundings in passing, even while leaving others unnoticed. It inhabits a liminal space of passage through which it repeatedly marks, transforms, and negotiates new positions within an existing framework.

This is how we arrive at such strange journeys. Instead of relying on a fixed point in space, the wanderer travels in the absence of anchoring points by converting each moment along his journey into an absolutely local zone, a non-place. There, in this nowhere, is the travelers’ place of residence. And since their homes are tailored to match their passage, their ‘elements of […] dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory that is forever mobilizing them.’ 41 Therefore place is always present wherever the transients set their “souls.” Thus every place is situated at a particular point in space, but not in an attributable location. In other words, the subjects are always in their place, but they cannot be tied to any specific location. It is for this reason that the individual also has the capacity, over and over again, to connect with his context in a space which encompasses as many directions as it does orders. As a result, this kind of “roaming” means that each occurrence is both unpredictable and a matter of chance. The individual is therefore subject to a permanent process of reorientation: Since everything is determined by accident, he is caught up in an uninterrupted process of letting go and taking grasp again. No individual is able to evade this dynamic of change, the development it engenders, and its transience. Being entangled with place involves being continually immersed in its initiation, in the process of becoming:

’We shall not cease from exploration
And at the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.’42

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38 Ibid., 109.
40 The term ‘liminal’ is derived from the Latin *limen* and means “threshold,” also implying transition across a boundary from one state to the next.