KIT | KIT-Bibliothek | Impressum
Open Access Logo
§
Volltext
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-307337

Experimental Economics and Policy Design - How to Deter Cartelization, Impede Collusion and Suppress Illegitimate Behavior

Hesch, Michael

Abstract:
In this thesis, we investigate three specific policy and regulatory issues from the field of law and economics by means of economic experimentation. We first analyze the effects of excluding cartel ringleaders from corporate leniency programs. Then, we evaluate pricing behavior under a new kind of price regulation scheme along the lines of the 'Austrian rule'. Finally, we introduce an explicit role for a strategically acting authority and investigate decision-making under ambiguity.


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Statistik (ETS)
Publikationstyp Hochschulschrift
Jahr 2012
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-307337
KITopen ID: 1000030733
Verlag Karlsruhe
Abschlussart Dissertation
Fakultät Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI)
Institut Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Statistik (ETS)
Prüfungsdaten 29.10.2012
Referent/Betreuer Prof. S. Berninghaus
Schlagworte ambiguity, cartel ringleader, experimental economics, industrial organization, price regulation
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft KITopen Landing Page