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DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000047103
Originalveröffentlichung
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.005

Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora

Abstract:
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht
Jahr 2015
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 2190-9806
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-471034
KITopen ID: 1000047103
Verlag KIT, Karlsruhe
Umfang 31 S.
Serie Working paper series in economics ; 67
Schlagworte Auctions, Information Release, Information Partitions, Order Statistics, Stochastic Orders, Dispersion, Dispersive Order, Excess Wealth Order
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