Tacit Collusion in Oligopolies and Regulated Industries
Abstract:
Preventing tacit collusion is a key objective of regulatory and antitrust authorities. In order to determine what facilitates implicit coordination among competing firms, this thesis investigates principle characteristics of oligopolistic markets with respect to their propensity to collude tacitly. The main features are (i) strategic interactions of few competitors, (ii) multimarket contact between those firms, and (iii) vertically related upstream and downstream markets.
| Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT | Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften – Institut für Informationswirtschaft und Marketing (IISM) |
| Publikationstyp | Hochschulschrift |
| Publikationsjahr | 2016 |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Identifikator | urn:nbn:de:swb:90-595878 KITopen-ID: 1000059587 |
| Verlag | Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) |
| Umfang | VII, 380 S. |
| Art der Arbeit | Dissertation |
| Fakultät | Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI) |
| Institut | Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften – Institut für Informationswirtschaft und Marketing (IISM) |
| Prüfungsdaten | 20.5.2016 |
| Schlagwörter | tacit collusion; experiment; oligopoly competition; multimarket contact; regulation |
| Referent/Betreuer | Krämer, J. |