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DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000059587

Tacit Collusion in Oligopolies and Regulated Industries

Horstmann, Niklas

Preventing tacit collusion is a key objective of regulatory and antitrust authorities. In order to determine what facilitates implicit coordination among competing firms, this thesis investigates principle characteristics of oligopolistic markets with respect to their propensity to collude tacitly. The main features are (i) strategic interactions of few competitors, (ii) multimarket contact between those firms, and (iii) vertically related upstream and downstream markets.

Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Informationswirtschaft und Marketing (IISM)
Publikationstyp Hochschulschrift
Jahr 2016
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-595878
KITopen-ID: 1000059587
Verlag Karlsruhe
Umfang VII, 380 S.
Abschlussart Dissertation
Fakultät Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI)
Institut Institut für Informationswirtschaft und Marketing (IISM)
Prüfungsdaten 20.5.2016
Referent/Betreuer Prof. J. Krämer
Schlagworte tacit collusion; experiment; oligopoly competition; multimarket contact; regulation
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