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Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games

Feige, Christian

Abstract: Threshold public goods games have a large number of theoretical solutions. In the first part of this thesis, the game is therefore simplified to a comparison of only two equilibria - one that provides the good and one that does not - yielding a theoretical probability of successful provision. Later chapters examine how fairness considerations, redistribution, and threshold uncertainty affect a collective decision to provide the public good. The findings are applied to the climate negotiations.


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Hochschulschrift
Jahr 2016
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator DOI(KIT): 10.5445/IR/1000062003
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-620036
KITopen ID: 1000062003
Verlag Karlsruhe
Umfang VII, 239 S.
Abschlussart Dissertation
Fakultät Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI)
Institut Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Prüfungsdaten 15.06.2016
Referent/Betreuer Prof. K.-M. Ehrhart
Lizenz CC BY 3.0 DE: Creative Commons Namensnennung 3.0 Deutschland
Schlagworte climate change, coordination game, equilibrium selection, public good provision, unanimous voting
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