Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Abstract:
Threshold public goods games have a large number of theoretical solutions. In the first part of this thesis, the game is therefore simplified to a comparison of only two equilibria - one that provides the good and one that does not - yielding a theoretical probability of successful provision. Later chapters examine how fairness considerations, redistribution, and threshold uncertainty affect a collective decision to provide the public good. The findings are applied to the climate negotiations.
| Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |
| Publikationstyp | Hochschulschrift |
| Jahr | 2016 |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Identifikator | URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-620036 KITopen-ID: 1000062003 |
| Verlag | Karlsruhe |
| Umfang | VII, 239 S. |
| Abschlussart | Dissertation |
| Fakultät | Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI) |
| Institut | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |
| Prüfungsdaten | 15.06.2016 |
| Referent/Betreuer | Prof. K.-M. Ehrhart |
| Schlagworte | climate change, coordination game, equilibrium selection, public good provision, unanimous voting |