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Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games

Feige, Christian


Threshold public goods games have a large number of theoretical solutions. In the first part of this thesis, the game is therefore simplified to a comparison of only two equilibria - one that provides the good and one that does not - yielding a theoretical probability of successful provision. Later chapters examine how fairness considerations, redistribution, and threshold uncertainty affect a collective decision to provide the public good. The findings are applied to the climate negotiations.

Volltext §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000062003
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Hochschulschrift
Publikationsjahr 2016
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator urn:nbn:de:swb:90-620036
KITopen-ID: 1000062003
Verlag Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Umfang VII, 239 S.
Art der Arbeit Dissertation
Fakultät Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI)
Institut Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Prüfungsdaten 15.06.2016
Schlagwörter climate change, coordination game, equilibrium selection, public good provision, unanimous voting
Referent/Betreuer Ehrhart, K.-M.
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