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Guilt in voting and public good games

Rothenhäusler, Dominik; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora


This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and non- consequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards.

Volltext §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000068503
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht/Preprint
Publikationsjahr 2016
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 2190-9806
KITopen-ID: 1000068503
Verlag Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Umfang 37 S.
Serie Working paper series in economics ; 99
Schlagwörter Moral Decision Making, Committee Decisions, Diffusion of Responsibility, Shared Guilt, Being Pivotal, Division of Labor, Institutions and Morals
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