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Guilt in voting and public good games

Rothenhäusler, Dominik; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora

This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and non- consequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards.

Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht
Jahr 2016
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator DOI(KIT): 10.5445/IR/1000068503
ISSN: 2190-9806
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-685039
KITopen ID: 1000068503
Verlag KIT, Karlsruhe
Umfang 37 S.
Serie Working paper series in economics ; 99
Schlagworte Moral Decision Making, Committee Decisions, Diffusion of Responsibility, Shared Guilt, Being Pivotal, Division of Labor, Institutions and Morals
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