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DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000087358
Veröffentlicht am 12.11.2018

Information nudges and self-control

Mariotti, Thomas; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora; Wangenheim, Jonas von

Abstract:
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht
Jahr 2018
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 2190-9806
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-873585
KITopen-ID: 1000087358
Verlag KIT, Karlsruhe
Umfang 22 S.
Serie Working paper series in economics ; 119
Schlagworte Information Design, Information Nudges, Present-Biased Preferences, Self-Control
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