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DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000089263
Veröffentlicht am 09.01.2019

The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Szech, Nora

Abstract:
We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.


Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht
Jahr 2018
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 2190-9806
URN: urn:nbn:de:swb:90-892634
KITopen-ID: 1000089263
Verlag KIT, Karlsruhe
Umfang 46 S.
Serie Working paper series in economics ; 120
Schlagworte Information avoidance, morality, unethical behavior, social norms
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