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Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation

Müller, Michael; Puppe, Clemens

Abstract:
We study a model in which agents with single-peaked preferences can participate in a costly voting procedure to determine the value of a one-dimensional variable. We show that, for all positive participation cost and all profiles of individual preferences, there exists a (generically) unique equilibrium with (at most) one single participant whenever the voting mechanism is strategy-proof, anonymous, and responsive in the sense that the outcome reacts to a unanimous move of the votes of all agents in the same direction.

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Volltext §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000105911
Veröffentlicht am 18.02.2020
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht/Preprint
Publikationsjahr 2020
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 2190-9806
KITopen-ID: 1000105911
Verlag KIT, Karlsruhe
Umfang 14 S.
Serie Working Paper Series in Economics ; 138
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