Black-Box Wallets: Fast Anonymous Two-Way Payments for Constrained Devices

Abstract: Black-box accumulation (BBA) is a building block which enables a privacy-preserving implementation of point collection and redemption, a functionality required in a variety of user-centric applications including loyalty programs, incentive systems, and mobile payments. By definition, BBA+ schemes (Hartung et al. CCS ’17) offer strong privacy and security guarantees, such as unlinkability of transactions and correctness of the balance flows of all (even malicious) users. Unfortunately, the instantiation of BBA+ presented at CCS ’17 is, on modern smartphones, just fast enough for comfortable use. It is too slow for wearables, let alone smart-cards. Moreover, it lacks a crucial property: For the sake of efficiency, the user’s balance is presented in the clear when points are deducted. This may allow to track owners by just observing revealed balances, even though privacy is otherwise guaranteed. The authors intentionally forgo the use of costly range proofs, which would remedy this problem.

We present an instantiation of BBA+ with some extensions following a different technical approach which significantly improves efficiency. To this end, we get rid of pairing groups, rely on different zero-knowledge and fast range proofs, along with a slightly modified version of Baldimtsi-Lysyanskaya blind signatures (CCS ’13). Our prototype implementation with range proofs (for 16 bit balances) outperforms BBA+ without range proofs by a factor of 2.5. Moreover, we give estimates showing that smart-card implementations are within reach.

Keywords: Mobile Payments, Customer Loyalty Programs, Incentive Systems, Black-Box Accumulation

1 Introduction

A variety of applications such as mobile payments, toll collection, or loyalty and incentive programs follow the same basic principle: certain types of points are collected and redeemed. From a user’s perspective this should be done in a privacy-preserving way. The operator requires protection against any kind of frauds. This basic functionality has been formally captured by [21, 24], where a general building block called BBA(+) for privacy-preserving point collection is presented. BBA+ is a framework where users create a token (a wallet) and then use it to collect or spend points. It offers strong privacy guarantees. For example, transactions are unlinkable, even though privacy is otherwise guaranteed. The authors intentionally forgo the use of costly range proofs, which would remedy this problem.

Unfortunately, the instantiation of BBA+ given in [21] comes with some drawbacks: one is its reliance on Groth–Sahai zero-knowledge proofs [20], which require a large amount of computations in pairing groups and all other building blocks to also work in this setting. This leads to slow performance on weak hardware and makes it unsuited for usage on smart cards, where even with a dedicated co-processor for pairing-based operations [36], evaluation of a pairing takes about 160 ms and multiplication in $G_2$ about 100 ms (for the Fp254BNb and Fp254n2BNb curves). For point collection/redemption the user has to compute $\approx 100$ multiplications in $G_2$ alone, which already takes 10 s.

BBA+ also requires spending operations to reveal the current balance. This may allow the system operator to track a (anonymous) user by just observing balances in spending operations. In the end, this may even help to identify this user. So, while the privacy guarantees ensure that nothing but the balance is leaked, this may not be enough. This attack on user privacy is especially relevant in scenarios where a user spends...
points (much) more often than he collects them, such as mobile payments. To protect from this attack, range proofs, e.g. [10], could be used. That is, instead of revealing the balance, a ZK proof of sufficient funds is performed. Since range proofs are expensive and would make BBA+ impractical, especially with the techniques used in [21], the authors refrained from using them.

1.1 Our Contribution

Using the Commit-then-Blind-Sign Principle.
In BBA+, tokens (wallets) consist essentially of (a commitment to) balance, serial number, and a signature (on the commitment). In an interaction, the serial number is revealed, the signature verified, the balance updated, and a new signature (on the updated commitment) is issued. Reuse of a serial number indicates double spending. To achieve authenticity of wallets and prevent tampering, the signature is used. To attain unlinkability, BBA+ cannot send the signature in the plain, as this would link the interaction with the one which issued the signature. The solution in [21] is to prove possession of a valid signature (on a randomized commitment) in zero-knowledge. One may call this the “commit-sign-prove” principle. Our approach is different: We use a blind signature, so that a newly issued signature is unknown to the issuer, and can later be shown in the plain. This “commit-then-blind-sign” principle also simplifies our construction and security proofs. To this end, a suitable signature scheme without pairings is needed. To the best of our knowledge the only existing scheme [5] satisfying our requirements is only known to be secure under sequential executions. We need security under concurrent executions, and thus present a slight modification of [5] and prove EUF-CMA security in the generic group model. Under sequential security, only one protocol may run at any time. This is a nonsensical assumption for a distributed system such as BBW, so we allow malicious users to attack by running several executions concurrently, arbitrarily interleaved. Security in this setting is harder to achieve.

Pairing-free. Our protocol does not rely on pairing groups. While pairing groups are used to construct many primitives, most notably the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [20] used in [21], they require extra structure. This extra structure has led to recent improvements in finding discrete logarithms in those groups (c.f. [7, 26]), necessitating the use of larger parameters to maintain $\approx 128$ bit security, resulting in slower algorithms. Additionally, the fastest currently known elliptic curves (for example FourQ [15]) use techniques for fast scalar-point multiplication that are not applicable to pairing groups. Moreover, evaluating pairings is expensive. Thus, when targeting constrained devices, it is useful to avoid the need for pairing groups.

Range Proofs. When a user spends points, BBA+ discloses the current balance in the clear, which opens possible attacks on privacy. We implement efficient range proofs (Bulletproofs [10]), which show in zero-knowledge that a user has sufficient funds.

Removing the Trapdoor. Defining the legitimate balance of a wallet/token requires a way to link transactions to that wallet, but transactions need to be unlinkable. To solve this dilemma, Hartung et al. [21] introduce a trapdoor only known to a trusted third party which allows to track users. This trapdoor is only intended for definitional purposes but knowledge of it eliminates any privacy guarantees. We define a new property called simulation-linkability, and show how to circumvent the need for such a trapdoor by relying on interactive proof systems, where standard rewinding techniques replace the trapdoor. Thus, linkability is possible only within the security proof, but not in reality where rewinding users is not possible.

Attributes. Our construction allows embedding of attributes into tokens. This can be used for different purposes. For example, it is possible to embed an expiration date into all tokens. If tokens are valid for, say 6 months, then double-spending information for older tokens can safely be deleted, keeping the database small. This may also be used to limit the amount of damage that can be inflicted through double-spending a stolen token. Other use cases include embedding of discounts or age verification, for example children or senior pricing, in pre-payment systems.

Implementation. To evaluate the suitability of our construction for use on constrained devices, we implemented our BBW instantiation and measured execution times on a smartphone. For 16-bit balances, we estimate a run-time of 122 ms on the user side (without communication). For the system side, we measure a run-time of 182 ms, which, considering that the system side may use more powerful hardware, is good enough. The total communication is about 4 KB. We also provide estimations for smart cards based on the number of multiplications required, where only 68 are needed for 16-bit ranges. This results in approximately 4 s for 256-bit curves on the MultOS 4.3.1 card and 1.5 s for a card with co-processor for ECC operations.

Compared to BBA+, point collection is 5.6 times faster while transmitting half as much data. Spending points
is 6 times faster when performing range proofs for 16 bit values, and needs roughly a quarter of the communication of BBA+ (with 16 bit range proofs). This makes our scheme well suited for privacy-preserving pre-payment systems on constrained devices such as smartphones or wearables and provides a step towards privacy-preserving wallets on smart cards.

Finally, we note that 16 bit are already enough for many applications. For example, the EU limited anonymous payments to 150 EUR [25].

1.2 Further Related Work

Intuitively, the problem of anonymous point collection seems to be solvable using (transferable) e-cash. Hartung et al. [21] already argued why this does not work though: Roughly speaking, in traditional offline e-cash, e.g. [13], withdrawing a coin is identifying and coins cannot be transferred, thus the accumulator can neither execute the withdraw protocol with the user nor transfer coins it withdrew itself from the bank. Using transferable e-cash such as [6] where anonymous and un-linkable transfers of coins is possible (under certain assumptions), the accumulator could withdraw coins and transfer them to the user. However, an impossibility result by Canard and Gouget [14] implies, that if the issuer, accumulator, and verifier collude, transactions can be linked. Additionally, users would be free to transfer coins arbitrarily among each other, allowing for pooling of points which is not desired in certain applications.

In [32] a privacy-preserving prepaid system for public transportation is constructed. However, payment is done by first paying the maximum possible transportation fee and then getting a refund based on the actual ride taken, where the possible refund values are encoded in the system parameters. While this might be practical in the case of public transportation with only a small amount of different prices, it cannot be extended to a general two-way payment system.

Besides BBA+, which we already discussed, [30] implements an anonymous and un-linkable incentive scheme called uCentive. However, the scheme targets a simpler scenario than we do: points are not accumulatable and double-spending detection is done online. Moreover, security and privacy protocols are stated only informally and no proofs are given.

In [5] Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) are presented, a building block for anonymous credentials equipped with attributes. ACL does not provide a two-way payment system, but may be used as building block for one. However, security is only guaranteed for sequential interactions, a limitation not practical for real-world scenarios. Their scheme has been implemented on a smart card [22] and shown to be fairly practical.

Dimitriou [17] constructed an efficient privacy-preserving point accumulation scheme based on ACL. However, security is based on informal claims which do not reflect the capabilities of real-world adversaries. Problems stemming from concurrent executions are ignored, as made evident by the use of the signature scheme of [5] which is only sequentially secure. Additionally, spending points reveals the user’s identity.

In [23] a privacy-preserving system for toll collection is built based on BBA+. In their system, users accumulate debt while driving and pay at regular intervals. The authors extend BBA+ to address the challenges posed by real-world interactions in this scenario, such as broken or lost user hardware. Interestingly, they avoid the need for range proofs by following a post-payment instead of a pre-payment approach. Their scheme is still based on Groth–Sahai proofs and thus pairing groups.

Lastly, privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies such as Dash [1] and ZCash [2, 33] provide another way of anonymous two-way payments. However, these require a reliable online connection, while our scheme explicitly allows offline transactions. Furthermore, Dash comes without formal security and privacy definitions, while in ZCash transactions are only confirmed after several minutes, which makes them unsuitable for time-sensitive scenarios, such as paying in a store using one’s smartphone. Additionally, using cryptocurrencies it is again possible for users to transfer and pool funds among themselves, which is not desired in certain applications.

1.3 Paper Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some cryptographic assumptions and informally describe cryptographic building blocks used. Section 3 describes the BBA+ scheme as introduced by Hartung et al. [21], and Section 4 describes our modifications to address weaknesses of BBA+. In Section 5 we detail how we instantiated our construction, while Section 6 explains the signature scheme used. Finally, in Section 7 we provide and discuss performance metrics obtained by implementing our construction on a smartphone.
2 Preliminaries

We use the common notation to describe cryptographic protocols and define their security. By \( n \), we denote the security parameter. For two functions \( f(n) \) and \( g(n) \) we write \( f \approx g \) if \( |f - g| \leq \text{negl}(n) \) for a negligible function \( \text{negl}(n) \). We use additive notation for (commutative) groups of prime order \( p \). Group elements are always denoted by upper case letters, scalars (i.e. elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)) by lower case letters.

2.1 Assumptions

Definition 2.1 (Group Generator). A group generator is a PPT algorithm \( g \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n) \) that on input of a security parameter \( 1^n \) outputs the description of a cyclic group \( G \) of prime order \( p \) with \( |p| = n \) and generator \( G \).

Definition 2.2 (Discrete Logarithm Assumption). We say the DLOG assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp if the advantage \( \text{Adv}_\text{SetupGrp}^{\text{DiscLog}}(n) \) defined as

\[
\Pr \left( (G, G, p) \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n); x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; X = xG; \quad x' \leftarrow A(G, G, X); x'G = X \right) \quad \text{is negligible in } n \text{ for all PPT algorithms } A.
\]

Definition 2.3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption). We say the DDH assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp if the advantage \( \text{Adv}_\text{SetupGrp}^{\text{DDH}}(n) \) defined as

\[
\Pr \left( (G, G, p) \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n); x, y, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; \quad X = xG, Y = yG, Z_0 = xyG, Z_1 = zG; \quad b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow A(G, G, X, Y, Z_b); b = b' \right) \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{is negligible in } n \text{ for all PPT algorithms } A.
\]

2.2 Building Blocks

For formal definitions of the building blocks used, see Appendix A.

Homomorphic Commitments

A commitment scheme allows the committing party to commit (using \( \text{Com} \)) to some message \( m \) from some message space \( \mathcal{M} \) while keeping it secret. At a later point, \( m \) can then be revealed together with a “proof” that it has indeed been fixed during the committing step (verifiable using \( \text{Open} \)). Homomorphic commitments allow adding of commitments in a way that allows opening of the result to the sum of the original messages.

Signatures

A signature scheme allows a signer (with a public and a secret key) to sign (using \( \text{Sign} \)) a message \( m \) with his secret key so that anyone with knowledge of his public key can verify (using \( \text{Verify} \)) that \( m \) was indeed signed by the signer and has not been modified since. For privacy-preserving protocols, signatures with additional protocols \( \text{BlindSign} \) and \( \text{BlindVerify} \) for blind signature issuance and verification can be used. Recall that EUF-CMA security is the standard security notion for signatures. It asserts an adversary, which is given a signing oracle which signs any messages of its choice, cannot produce a signature on a “fresh” message (of its choice).

Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

A zero-knowledge (ZK) proof allows a prover to convince someone (called the verifier) of the truth of a statement (usually membership in some NP language) without revealing any information beside the validity of the statement. A ZK proof of knowledge (PoK) convinces the verifier that not only the statement is true, but also the prover “knows” a witness for it (again without revealing any information about the witness). We use the notion of witness-extended emulation introduced by Groth and Ishai [19] to formalize knowledge of the prover.

3 BBA+ Description

Hartung et al. [21] introduced a generic building block for privacy-preserving point collection called BBA+. BBA+ allows anonymous and unlinkable collection and redemption of points, while ensuring users can’t over- or under-claim their balance, and preventing users from trading points among themselves. It also supports offline double-spending detection, avoiding the need of a permanent connection to some centralized database.

On a high level, the BBA+ framework involves three types of parties:

A Trusted Third Party (TTP) generates the common reference string, together with a trapdoor that allows linking of transactions, once to setup the system. It does not need to interact with anyone afterwards.

Operators of the system can be divided into three roles: the Issuer (\( I \)) responsible for issuing new tokens to users, the Accumulator (\( AC \)) from which points are collected and the Verifier (\( V \)) to whom points can be spent. All operators have to trust each other and in
particular share the same secret key. Additionally, the operators operate a shared central database in which they store double-spending information. Connection to this database does not have to be permanently available, as double-spending can be detected after-the-fact when inserting values into this database: spending the same token twice results in two transactions with the same serial number, and if two such transactions are detected, it is possible to retrieve the identity of the misbehaving user (together with a proof thereof).

**Users** have a token (piggy-bank) with which they want to collect points. They are in possession of a public and secret key. The public key is used to identify the user in the system, and is assumed to be bound to some kind of physical ID (e.g. passport, social security number, etc.). It is assumed that ensuring uniqueness of keys and verifying the physical ID is done out-of-band before interacting with the BBA+ protocols. To become a participant of the scheme, a user performs the token issuing protocol with the issuer, during which knowledge of the secret key corresponding to the claimed identity is proven. Then, a user can use this token to accumulate points by running the Add protocol with the accumulator and spend these points by running the Sub protocol with the verifier. (For more intuitive notation, we use Add and Sub instead of Acc and Ver as in [21].)

**Definition 3.1 (BBA+ Scheme [21]).** A BBA+ scheme consists of PPT algorithms Setup, IGen, UGen, deterministic polynomial time algorithms UVer, IdentDS, VerifyGuilt and interactive protocols Issue, Add and Sub. At the core of the scheme lies a token \( \tau \), containing a unique serial number \( s \) and the balance \( w \in \mathbb{V} \). It is bound to the owner’s identity (i.e. the user’s public key).

**Setup:** The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter \( n \) and outputs a common reference string \( \text{crs} \) and a trapdoor \( \text{td} \). IGen(\( \text{crs} \)) generates a key pair \((PK_U, sk_U)\) for the issuer, which is also shared with the accumulator and verifier. UGen(\( \text{crs} \)) generates a user key pair \((PK_I, sk_I)\). UVer, given a user key pair \((PK_I, sk_I)\), a token \( \tau \) and a balance \( w \) outputs a bit \( b \) indicating whether \( \tau \) is a valid token with balance \( w \) owned by the user with public key \( PK_U \).

**Token generation:** The protocol Issue is executed between a user \( U \), given his own key pair \((PK_U, sk_U)\) and \( PK_T \); and the issuer \( I \), given \( PK_I \) and the issuer key pair \((PK_I, sk_I)\). Upon successful execution, \( U \) outputs a token \( \tau \) with initial balance 0 for the key pair \((PK_I, sk_I)\). Both \( U \) and \( I \) additionally output a bit \( b_U/b_I \) that indicates whether they accept the run.

**Collecting points:** To collect points, the protocol Add is executed between user \( U \) with token \( \tau \) containing serial number \( s \) and balance \( w \) and the accumulator \( AC \) on common input \( v \) (the amount of points to be collected). At the end of the protocol, \( U \) outputs an updated token \( \tau^* \) (with balance \( w + v \)) while \( AC \) outputs a double-spending tag \( dstag \) containing \( s \). They additionally again output a bit \( b_U/b_{AC} \) indicating whether they accepted the run.

**Redeeming points:** To spend points, the Sub protocol is executed between a user \( U \) and a verifier \( V \). It has the same inputs and outputs as Add, with the exception that the current balance is also part of the common input (i.e. the verifier learns the user’s balance in the clear). This allows the verifier to ensure that the user has a sufficient balance to spend the desired amount of points, or can be used in a post-payment system to clear the accumulated debt.

**Detection of double-spending:** Using the same token twice results in two transactions with the same serial number. At regular intervals (or whenever an online connection is available), operators insert the double-spending tags generated through the Add and Sub protocols into the central database. While doing so, for each inserted tag \( dstag \) they check whether the serial number \( s \) of it is already contained in the database. If this is the case, the corresponding double-spending tag \( dstag' \) is retrieved from the database and IdentDS(\( dstag, dstag' \)) is used to identify the offending user: IdentDS, given two double-spending tags, returns the public key \( PK_U \) of a user together with a proof of guilt \( \pi \) or returns an error \( \perp \). In following legal action, VerifyGuilt can then be used to convince a judge (or anyone else) of the misbehavior: VerifyGuilt, given a user public key \( PK_U \) and a proof of guilt \( \pi \) outputs a bit \( b \) indicating whether the user with public key \( PK_U \) is guilty of double-spending.

The BBA+ scheme comes with strong security and privacy guarantees, which can be divided in the system side and the user side: Security for the system side consists of three goals:

1. Tokens can only be created and used in the name of their legitimate owners (owner-binding).
2. A given user cannot claim more (or less) points than he has collected up to that point, unless an old version of a token is presented (balance-binding)
3. Users presenting old versions of their token can be identified after the fact (double-spending detection)

Security for the user side consists of two goals:

1. Users should have the privacy guarantee that their transactions are anonymous and cannot be used for tracking (privacy-preserving)
2. Nobody should be able to forge a proof that a user has committed a double-spending (false-accusation protection)

To formally define what it means to use a token in the name of someone and what the amount of points a user has collected is, a way to link individual transactions to the owner of the token is required. In BBA+, this is achieved by having the TTP generate a trapdoor which allows linking of transactions to individual users. More formally, they defined a property called 'trapdoor linkability' which requires that all transactions result in some linking information which can be used, together with the linking trapdoor, to identify the corresponding user via a deterministic algorithm ExtractUID.

In their security experiments formalizing above goals, an adversary \( A \) may concurrently interact with an honest issuer, accumulator, and verifier an arbitrary (bounded by the polynomial run-time) number of times. The adversary, playing the role of the user, may behave dishonestly and not follow the corresponding protocols. In order to formalize this adversarial setting, Hartung et al. [21] defined oracles the adversary may query:

**Definition 3.2 (Oracles).**

\( \text{MalIssue}(\text{PK}_U) \) lets the adversary initiate the Issue protocol with an honest issuer \( I \), provided that there is no pending MalIssue call for \( \text{PK}_U \) and \( \text{PK}_U \) has also not been used in a successful call to MalIssue before. \( \text{MalAcc}(v) \) is used by the adversary to initiate the Add protocol with \( AC \) for input \( v \). \( \text{MalVer}(v, w) \) is used by the adversary to initiate the Sub protocol with \( V \) for inputs \( w \) and \( v \).

We say that a call to an oracle is successful if the honest party represented by the oracle accepts the run (i.e. the accept bit \( b_T/b_{AC}/b_V \) is 1).

Then they defined owner-binding, which states that a token bound to some user public key \( \text{PK}_U \) can only be obtained with knowledge of the corresponding \( \text{sk}_U \) and that tokens used during Add/Sub must be bound to a public key for which the Issue protocol has been performed.

Next, they require that, unless double-spending occurred, a user cannot claim a different balance than the exact sum of points collected up to that point:

**Definition 3.3 (Balance-Binding).** A trapdoor-linkable BBA+ scheme is called balance-binding if for any PPT adversary \( A \) in the experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{bb}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n) \) from Figure 1 the advantage of \( A \) defined by

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{bb}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n) := \text{Pr}^{\text{real}}_{\text{Exp}^{\text{bb}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n)} - \text{Pr}^{\text{ideal}}_{\text{Exp}^{\text{bb}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n)}
\]

is negligible in \( n \).

**Experiment \( \text{Exp}^{\text{bb}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(c_{\text{rs}}, t, d) \),** \( \text{Setup}(1^n), (\text{PK}_U, \text{sk}_U) \leftrightarrow \text{IGen}(c_{\text{rs}}) \)

\( b \leftrightarrow \text{MalIssue} \text{MalAcc} \text{MalVer} \text{(PK}_U) \)

The experiment outputs 1 if \( A \) made a successful call to MalVer with extracted user public-key \( \text{PK}_U \) such that

- all successful MalIssue/MalAcc/MalVer calls produced unique token version numbers
- the claimed balance \( w \in V \) does not equal the sum of previously collected accumulation values \( v \) for \( \text{PK}_U \), i.e.

\[
w \neq \sum_{v \in V_{\text{PK}_U}} v
\]

where \( V_{\text{PK}_U} \) is the list of all accumulation values \( v \in V \) that appeared in previous successful calls to MalAcc or MalVer for which \( \text{PK}_U \) could be extracted using ExtractUID.

**Fig. 1. Balance-binding experiment.**

Since they desired their system to be offline (i.e. without the need of a permanent connection to some centralized database), users cannot be prevented from using the same token twice. Thus, they require that a user doing so is detected, revealing his identity and providing a proof that he did cheat which can be verified by anyone.

User security is defined using the real/ideal world paradigm. In the real world, the adversary interacts with oracles implementing the real user protocols. In the ideal world, the adversary interacts with a simulator. The simulator has to play the role of the oracles, but without receiving any private user information. To this end, it is given access to a simulation trapdoor for the crs. It is then demanded that no PPT adversary can distinguish between the real and the ideal world. For an in-depth explanation of the different oracles used see [21].

**Definition 3.4 (Privacy-Preserving).** A BBA+ scheme is privacy-preserving if there exist PPT algorithms SimSetup and SimCorrupt as well as interactive PPT algorithms SimHonIssue, SimHonAdd and SimHonSub that receive no private user input, such that for all PPT adversaries \( A = (A_0, A_1) \) in the experiments from Figure 2, the advantage \( \text{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n) \) of \( A \) defined by

\[
\left| \text{Pr}_{\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-real}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n)} = 1 \right| - \text{Pr}_{\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-ideal}}_{\text{BBA}+,A}(n)} = 1 \right| \quad (2)
\]

is negligible in \( n \).

Lastly, false-accusation protection guarantees that users cannot be framed for a double-spending they did not commit.
Fig. 2. Real/Ideal world privacy experiments

For formal definitions of owner-binding, double-spending detection and false-accusation protection see Appendix B.

4 From BBA+ to BBW

Several shortcomings of the BBA+ scheme, as described in Section 3, were discussed in the introduction. To recall, it relies on Groth–Sahai (GS) zero-knowledge proofs [20] together with pairing-based cryptographic primitives. Since the protocol is interactive anyway, we can replace GS proofs with more efficient interactive proofs, namely Sigma protocols [29]. Now we are not bound by the constraints of GS proofs anymore, in particular, pairing-free instantiations become possible.

Another drawback of BBA+ was the need to reveal the current balance to spend points, as this can impact real-world privacy guarantees. Hartung et al. consider range-proofs to ensure a sufficient balance as a solution, but refrain from using them due to poor performance. We introduce a balance space \( \mathbb{V} = \{0, \ldots, 2^{l-1}\} \) (which is sufficiently small to avoid problems caused by overflows, e.g. \( 2|\mathbb{V}| < |\mathbb{F}_p| \)). We employ Bulletproofs [10], which are very efficient range-proofs compatible with our existing zero-knowledge proofs.

The security guarantees of BBA+ require a method to define the correct balance of a user for the security proof, while still ensuring user privacy. Hartung et al. [21] solve this by introducing a trapdoor that allows to completely abolish privacy, which is only known to a trusted third party (and thus available in the security proofs, but assumed to not be used in the real world). Through our use of interactive zero-knowledge protocols, we can make use of a technique called rewinding to achieve the same result, without the need of a trapdoor. Rewinding denotes the process of running an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) to receive some output and then rewind \( \mathcal{A} \) to some previous state to let it re-run with the same randomness but different input (e.g. zero-knowledge challenge). While this is possible during security proofs (where black-box access to the program of an adversary is assumed), it is not possible in the real world, where it is not possible for a system operator to re-set the user’s hardware. Formally, we introduce a new property for BBA+ schemes, called simulation linkability which replaces trapdoor linkability introduced in [21]. As a side effect, since our common reference string is indeed only a common random string, and there is no trapdoor anymore, it is possible to set up our scheme without a trusted third party by generating the crs for example through evaluating a cryptographic hash function on e.g. the timestamp during initialization. Note also that, unlike in BBA+, a misbehaving TTP that leaks information on how the crs was generated (including e.g. the discrete logarithms of the elements in the crs) to the operator does not impact user privacy (though leaking this information to users allows them to claim arbitrary balances and attributes).

Another drawback of BBA+ that hinders deployment in the real world is the need to store double-spending tags forever. We solve this problem by adding attributes to the token that can be revealed during Add and Sub interactions. Their main use is to define validity periods for tokens, which allows to discard double-spending tags after the validity period expired. Additionally, they allow for efficient verification of other attributes the user may have, such as discounted prices for students or age-verification for purchases (such as alcohol). This allows checking of the required attributes once during token generation (by e.g. checking a student card or passport) instead of for each transaction, removing the need to show identifying documents. We want to note though that care has to be taken when choosing the possible attributes, as they might allow linking of users if chosen poorly. In our envisioned scenarios, either the majority of users share the same attributes (e.g. there are only 2 validity periods in use at any given time) or the attributes are already clear from the context (e.g. to be able to buy alcohol, the user must be above the legal age). The user learns (during token creation) which attributes will be part of his token and during each interaction chooses which attributes will be revealed (outside of our protocol), and needs to not accept attributes that would violate his privacy. As a concrete example, we propose validity periods of six months, ending every three months, so new tokens are always valid for between three and six months (depending on how close to
To collect points, the protocol run.

serial number is executed between a user and the key pair \( \tau \). Both \( \tau \) and outputs a common reference string \( \text{crs} \).

Definition 4.1 (BBW Scheme). A BBW Scheme consists of PPT algorithms Setup, IGen, UGen, deterministic polynomial time algorithms UVer, IdentDS, VerifyGuilt and interactive protocols Issue, Add and Sub. At the core of the scheme lies a token \( \tau \) that contains a unique serial number \( s \), the tokens balance \( w \in \mathbb{V} \) and some attribute(s) \( \text{attr} \) and is bound to the owner’s identity (i.e. the user’s public key).

Setup: The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter \( n \) and outputs a common reference string \( \text{crs} \). IGen(\( \text{crs} \)) generates a key pair \( (PK_U, sk_U) \) for the issuer, which is also shared with the accumulator and verifier. UGen(\( \text{crs} \)) generates a user key pair \( (PK_{\mathcal{U}}, sk_{\mathcal{U}}) \). UVer given a user key pair \( (PK_{\mathcal{U}}, sk_{\mathcal{U}}) \), a token \( \tau \), attribute \( \text{attr} \) and balance \( w \) outputs a bit \( b \) indicating whether \( \tau \) is a valid token with public attribute \( \text{attr} \) and balance \( w \) owned by the user with public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \).

Token generation: The protocol Issue is executed between a user \( U \), given some attribute \( \text{attr} \), his own key pair \( (PK_{\mathcal{U}}, sk_{\mathcal{U}}) \) and \( PK_{\mathcal{I}} \); and the issuer \( I \), given \( PK_{\mathcal{I}} \), the same attribute \( \text{attr} \) and the issuer key pair \( (PK_{\mathcal{I}}, sk_{\mathcal{I}}) \). Upon successful execution, \( U \) outputs a token \( \tau \) with initial balance \( 0 \) and public attribute \( \text{attr} \) for the key pair \( (PK_{\mathcal{U}}, sk_{\mathcal{U}}) \). Both \( U \) and \( I \) additionally output a bit \( b_{\mathcal{U}} / b_{\mathcal{I}} \) that indicates whether they accept the run.

Collecting points: To collect points, the protocol Add is executed between a user \( U \) with token \( \tau \) containing serial number \( s \), balance \( w \) and public attribute \( \text{attr} \) and the accumulator \( \mathcal{A} \) on common input \((\text{attr}, v)\) (the public attribute of the token and the amount of points to be collected). At the end of the protocol, \( U \) outputs an updated token \( \tau^* \) (with balance \( w + v \)) while \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs a double-spending tag \( \text{dstag} \) containing \( s \). They additionally again output a bit \( b_{\mathcal{U}} / b_{\mathcal{A}} \) indicating whether they accepted the run.

Spending points: To spend points, the Sub protocol is executed between a user \( U \) and a verifier \( V \). It has the same inputs and outputs as Add, except that the new balance \( w^* \) is computed as \( w^* = w - v \). Additionally, the user proves (in zero-knowledge) that \( w \geq v \) holds.

Detection of double-spending: IdentDS, given two double-spending tags, returns the public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \) of a user together with a proof of guilt \( \pi \) or returns an error \( \bot \). VerifyGuilt given a user public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \) and a proof of guilt \( \pi \) outputs a bit \( b \) indicating whether the user with public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \) is guilty of double-spending.

To remove the need of the trapdoor for ExtractUID, we formally define what it means for a scheme to be simulation-linkable. The main difference to trapdoor-linkable is that there is no need for a trapdoor but the algorithm is allowed to fail with negligible probability.

For some fixed \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n) \) \( \mathcal{T}^\text{Add}_{n,\text{crs}} \) denotes the set of transcripts (including \( \mathcal{A} \)'s output) resulting from any Add protocol run accepted by \( \mathcal{A} \) with any (potentially malicious) party, and \( \mathcal{T}^\text{Sub}_{n,\text{crs}} \) analog for \( \mathcal{V} \).

Definition 4.2 (Simulation-Linkability). A BBW scheme is called simulation-linkable if it satisfies the following conditions:

Completeness: Let \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), \((\text{crs}, t_d) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n) \) and \( tr \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Add}_{n,\text{crs}} \). Then there exist inputs \( PK_{\mathcal{U}}, sk_{\mathcal{U}}, \tau, w \) and random choices for an honest user \( U \) and honest accumulator \( \mathcal{A} \) such that an Add protocol run between \( U \) and \( \mathcal{A} \) with these inputs and random choices leads to the same transcript \( tr \). The same holds for all \( tr \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Sub}_{n,\text{crs}} \) with respect to \( \mathcal{Sub} \).

Extractability: There exists a PPT algorithm ExtractUID that, given two related transcripts \( tr_1, tr_2 \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Add}_{n,\text{crs}} \) (or \( \mathcal{T}^\text{Sub}_{n,\text{crs}} \) resp.) produced by the interaction of a honest user \( U \) with public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \) and the honest accumulator \( \mathcal{A} \) (or honest verifier \( \mathcal{V} \) resp.) outputs the public key \( PK_{\mathcal{U}} \). Two transcripts \( tr_1, tr_2 \) are called related if they are identical up to the point where the zero-knowledge challenge is sent, and then contain different challenges and different responses.

Additionally, there exists an expected PPT algorithm GenerateTranscripts that, given access to a transcript oracle \( O = \langle \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{V} \rangle \) (or \( O = \langle \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V} \rangle \) resp.) outputs two related transcripts \( tr_1, tr_2 \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Add}_{n,\text{crs}} \) (resp. \( tr_1, tr_2 \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Sub}_{n,\text{crs}} \)) with overwhelming probability. GenerateTranscripts is allowed to rewind \( O \) and resume with fresh randomness for \( \mathcal{A} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{V} \)).

Remark 1. Since ExtractUID only receives transcripts \( tr_1, tr_2 \in \mathcal{T}^\text{Add}_{n,\text{crs}} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{T}^\text{Sub}_{n,\text{crs}} \)), and completeness in above definition requires that any such transcript can be produced by an honest user, the output of ExtractUID is well defined even for malicious users \( U^* \).
We note that our version of ExtractUID only outputs the user’s public key with overwhelming probability (instead of always, as is the case for trapdoor linkability). Thus, it is necessary to extend all security experiments: the adversary additionally also wins if he is able to perform a successful interaction for which ExtractUID fails to output the public key. Additionally, for user privacy, the ideal world oracles now need access to the user attributes where needed, but the oracle for Sub does not receive the balance anymore. The formal definitions are lengthy and can be found in Appendices D.3 and D.4.

Remark 2 (Modeling privacy for attributes). Recall that modeling user security via the real/ideal paradigm ensures that a real-world adversary learns no more than an ideal-world adversary. However, if a (desired) privacy property does not hold in the ideal world, then neither need it hold in the real. Thus, we must assume that attributes are used in a privacy-preserving manner. Uniquely identifying attributes do not contradict real/ideal world security. However, due it is sufficient to study the impact of attributes on privacy in the ideal world. The impact on privacy is highly dependent on the setting. Thus, it has to be carefully analyzed individually for every application of BBW. In Section 4, we outlined some acceptable usage, such as children, adult, senior pricing earlier where a “physical world” adversary must learn the attributes anyway. Similarly, sensible implementations of expiration dates should preserve privacy, because at any time, a large portion of users share the same expiration date.

5 Instantiation

Recall that a token contains a signature on (a commitment to) the balance, serial number and some other values, which is verified in a transaction. Then to modify the balance, a new signature on (a commitment to) the updated balance and a new serial number is formed. To provide correctness on the one hand, and user privacy on the other hand, ZK proofs are used to hide sensible information while proving that the new commitment is formed correctly. Thus, to instantiate our scheme, we need to find a suitable and efficient zero-knowledge proof system and a suitable signature and commitment scheme. We have one algorithm SetupGrp that outputs the description of an elliptic curve group $G$ of prime order $p$ with generator $G$ which is then used by all building blocks.

As already mentioned, for efficiency reasons we make use of sigma protocols for our ZK proofs. We make use of the generalized definition of a sigma protocol by Maurer [29] which is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. We extend it by replacing the challenge with a Blum coin-toss to achieve perfect composable zero-knowledge as proposed by Damgård [16]. To do so, we use the Pedersen commitment scheme for messages of length 1 (a single element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$). We refer to this commitment scheme as $C_{\text{PK}}$ in the following. Maurer’s scheme allows proofs of knowledge for preimages of group-homomorphisms (where the homomorphism may depend on the statement being proven). We consider homomorphisms $\Phi: \mathbb{A} \to \mathbb{B}$, where $\mathbb{A}$ and $\mathbb{B}$ are of the form $\mathbb{G}_{\mathbb{A}} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbb{B}}^2$.

To prove that $w \geq v$ in the Sub protocol, we use range proofs. A range proof is a ZK proof that the content of a commitment lies within a given interval. We prove that $w = v \in V$, which is equivalent to $w \geq v$ as long as $|\mathbb{Z}_p| > 2|V|$. We use Bulletproofs [10] to implement the range proof, referred to as RP in the following.

For commitments, we make use of the Pedersen multi-commitment scheme, referred to as PC in the following, which allows to commit to a vector $m^t$ of messages in a single group element. Choosing a signature scheme poses the greatest challenge: the running time of the scheme is dominated by verifying signatures (both in zero-knowledge and on the user side to ensure correct token creation). We need a signature scheme that allows signing of committed messages (i.e. signing a group element) and verification of such signatures in an unlinkable way. Additionally, both during the process of obtaining a signature as well as during verification, it must be possible to prove, in zero-knowledge, statements involving the content of the signed message. The latter requirement severely restricts the class of possible signature schemes. While structure-preserving signatures obviously fulfill our requirements, they rely on pairings. Normal blind signature schemes (without pairings) usually do not allow to (efficiently) prove statements about the content of the signed message (for example due to the use of a cryptographic hash function whose output is then signed). The same problem arises when using normal signatures to get a signature on a commitment and then prove knowledge of both the commitment and the signature in zero-knowledge (which satisfies unlinkability), as again the use of a hash-function on the message prevents efficient zero-knowledge proofs containing the content of the message. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11, 12] introduced a class of signatures commonly referred to as CL-
type signatures intended for usage in privacy-preserving protocols. CL-type signatures consist of a commitment scheme and a signature scheme and come with efficient (interactive) protocols to obtain signatures on committed messages and to prove knowledge of a signature in zero-knowledge, which are exactly the properties we require. Unfortunately, known CL-type signatures rely on either RSA groups ([11]) or pairings ([12, 31]). Thus, we decided to adapt the blind signature scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [5] into a CL-type signature scheme. Since the authors only provided a proof for sequential security of their blind signature protocol (where the adversary must finish one interaction with the signer before he is allowed to start a new one), while we require concurrent security for our scheme (as it is implausible to assume an adversary cannot interleave protocol executions in a distributed setting as targeted by us), we also provide a proof of concurrent security in (interactive) protocols to obtain signatures on commitment messages and to prove knowledge of a signature in zero-knowledge, which are exactly the properties we require.

5.1 Instantiating BBW

The scheme is summarized in Figures 3 and 5 to 7. In the following, we explain the details of the algorithms and protocols. Whenever a ZKPoK is conducted between parties, the verifying party aborts and outputs ⊥ if it does not accept the proof.

**Setup:** Setup, run by the trusted third party, generates a suitable group and the common reference string crs for the scheme, which consists of a common reference string crscom for the commitment scheme PC and a common reference string crspok for the zero-knowledge scheme Z that is used in Issue, Add and Sub.

IGen generates a key pair for the system operator, which simply consists of a key pair for the signature scheme S. UGen generates a key pair for a user, consisting of a secret key sku (a random element in Zp), and a public key PKu = skuG, which is used as the users identity.

**Token generation:** The protocol to issue new tokens is shown in Figure 5. A token consists of a random serial number s ∈ Zp, a balance w ∈ V, the users secret key sku ∈ Zp, and the double-spending information u1 ∈ Zp, together with a valid signature σ (under the issuers public key PKU) on the message m := ⟨s, w, sku, u1⟩. To ensure the serial number s is indeed random, it is chosen jointly by the user and the issuer (making use of the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme PC).

To obtain an initial token, the user forms a commitment C′ on (s′ ∈ Zp, 0, sku, u1), where s′ ∈ Zp is his random share of the serial number and u1 ∈ Zp, with initial balance 0. He then performs a zero-knowledge proof P1 with the issuer to prove knowledge of the secret key corresponding to his public key PKu, knowledge of the content of the commitment C′ and to ensure that the balance is 0. The issuer verifies the zero-
knowledge proof, then chooses $s'' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, uses the homomorphic property of PC to generate a commitment $C$ on $(s' + s'', 0, \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{U}}, u_1)$ and then engages in an interaction of the protocol BlinderSign of $S$ to sign the tuple $(s' + s'', 0, \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{U}}, u_1)$ with his private key $sk_{\Sigma}$. Finally, after receiving the signature through BlinderSign, the user verifies that it is valid.

**Collecting points:** To collect points, the Add protocol described in Figure 6 is used. In the protocol, $\mathcal{A}C$ starts by choosing a random value $u_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sending it to $U$, which then computes the second part of the double-spending tuple $(s, t)$ as $t = \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{U}}u_2 + u_1$. The user then prepares a new token by again forming a commitment $C'$ on $(s', w, \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{U}}, u_1')$, where $s', u_1' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ are new random values, while $w$ is the same as in his existing token. The user then sends $C'$ and $t$ together with the serial number $s$ contained in his token to the accumulator and performs the ZKPoK P2 with $\mathcal{A}C$ to prove knowledge of a valid token and correct computation of $t$ and $C'$. After verifying the proof, $\mathcal{A}C$ adds his share $s'' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ to the new serial number as well as the amount of points collected $v$ to the balance in $C'$ (again using the homomorphic property of PC). Then the user and $\mathcal{A}C$ again perform the BlinderSign protocol to sign the new tuple $(s' + s'', w + v, \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{U}}, u_1')$. Finally, the user again checks that the resulting token is valid and contains the correct new balance.

**Spending points:** The protocol Sub works mostly the same as Add, with the difference that $v$ is subtracted from the balance and P3 contains a range proof that $w - v \in \mathbb{V}$.
5.2 Security of BBW

In the security games (see Section 3 as well as appendix B), the adversary engages in multiple, possibly concurrent and arbitrarily interleaved ZK arguments. We show by hybrid argument that this does not affect the possibility to extract witnesses from those arguments.

Theorem 5.1 (Extraction). If P1, P2 and P3 have witness-extended emulation, there exists an expected PPT extractor \( \mathcal{E}^* \) that has overwhelming probability for extracting witnesses for all successful calls to MallIssue, MalAcc and MalVer made by an PPT adversary \( A \) in the security games.

The idea in the proof is to extract one witness at a time and only view oracle calls except the one for which the witness is being extracted as part of the adversary. This is possible since we do not rely on extracted information during interaction with the adversary, but only to determine whether the adversary was successful. For the full proof, see Appendix D.1.

In the following, we refer to an interactive protocol between an honest party and a (possibly) malicious party as complete if for every transcript \( tr \) of a transaction that results in the honest party accepting, there exists inputs and random choices for honest parties so that an interaction between them results in the same transcript.

Theorem 5.2 (Simulation-Linkability). If BBW and S are correct, P2, P3 and BlindSign are complete and P2 and P3 have witness-extended emulation, BBW is simulation-linkable (Definition 4.2).

Theorem 5.3 (System Security). If BBW is simulation-linkable, the premises of Theorem 5.1 and the DLOG assumption in G hold, PC is additively homomorphic and binding and S is EUF-CMA secure, then BBW is owner-binding (Definition B.1), balance-binding (Definition 3.3) and ensures double-spending detection (Definition B.2).

For the proofs, see Appendix D.3. Owner-binding wrt. Issue is a straightforward reduction to CDH. For owner-binding wrt. Add/Sub, we show that any adversary able to win the game with non-negligible probability can be used to break EUF-CMA security of S. The proof for balance-binding closely follows the one in [21]. Equivocation of Pedersen commitments does not have to be considered explicitly anymore as it is covered by EUF-CMA security. Instead of building a graph based on signed commitments, a graph based on the unique serial numbers can be built. Then it can be shown that an adversary successfully attacking balance-binding can be used to break EUF-CMA security of S.

Theorem 5.4 (User Security). If P1, P2 and P3 are composable zero-knowledge and PC is equivocable, then BBW is privacy-preserving, and if additionally the DLOG assumption holds in G, it is secure against false accusation of double-spending.

The proof is largely the same as in [21]. For details, see Appendix D.4. We make use of the simulation trapdoor (i.e. the equivocality trapdoors of the commitment scheme) to step-by-step remove private input from the oracles until we are left with the ideal-world oracles that do not receive any private input. The main difference to [21] is that the signature \( \sigma_1 \) is sent to the adversary during the protocol, and replacing it by a simulated one relies on the DDH assumption to be indistinguishable (see Appendix C.2).

The proof for false-accusation protection is straightforward and the same as in [21].

6 Signature Scheme

Starting from the signature scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [5], we construct a CL-type signature scheme: Messages of arbitrary but fixed length \( l \) are first committed into a single group element using Pedersen commitments and then signed.

The scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya (called ACL) is a blind signature with attributes, where efficient ZK proofs regarding the attributes are possible. It is based on the blind signature scheme of Abe [3] and a blinded variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme: Given a Pedersen commitment \( C \) on \( m \) (with opening information \( d \) and an additional generator \( Z \) that is part of the crs), \( C' = (\gamma Z, \gamma C) \) is also a commitment on \( m \) with opening information \( (d, \gamma) \). Additionally, \( C' \) and \( C \) are unlinkable (without knowledge of \( \gamma \)) under the DDH assumption. Below, we refer to this variant of Pedersen commitments as PCB.

We interpret these “attributes” as the message, which then allows for efficient ZK proofs regarding the message. The resulting scheme works roughly as follows. The signer has a real public key \( PK \) (of which he knows the corresponding secret key \( sk \)) and a “tag” public key
Z (generated by a trusted party or by applying a cryptographic hash function to his public key, so that nobody knows the corresponding secret key). To sign a message \( m \), a blinded Pedersen commitment \( C' = (Z_1, Z_2) \) is created (using the tag public key \( Z \)). A signature then consists of a non-interactive (via the Fiat–Shamir transformation) ZKPoK, proving knowledge of either the secret key \( sk \) or the discrete logarithms of \( Z_1 \) and \( Z_2 \) (which are not known to anyone). This construction allows for efficient ZK proofs involving \( m \).

To obtain blind signatures, a user sends \( C \) (together with a ZKPoK of the opening to \( m \)) to the signer, who then interactively performs the ZKPoK to \( m \). To obtain the challenge, the user queries the hash function (after applying appropriate blinding factors). This results in a signature that is unlinkable to any information received by the signer during signing.

**Definition 6.1.** Our CL-type signature scheme consists of algorithms **Setup**, **SimSetup**, **KeyGen**, **Sign** and **Verify**:

- **Setup**(\( gp, l \)): Generates a common reference string \( \text{crs}_{\text{com}} = (H_0, \ldots, H_l) \leftarrow \text{PC.Setup}(gp, l) \), samples random \( Z, H \rightarrow Z_p \) and chooses a hash function \( H : \{0,1 \}^* \rightarrow Z_p \). Outputs \( \text{crs} = (gp, H, Z, H, \text{crs}_{\text{com}}) \).

- **SimSetup**(\( gp, l \)): Generates a common reference string \( (\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, \text{td}_{\text{com}}) \leftarrow \text{PC.SimSetup}(gp, l) \), samples random \( z, h \leftarrow Z_p \), computes \( Z = zG \), \( H = hG \) and chooses a hash function \( H : \{0,1 \}^* \rightarrow Z_p \). Outputs \( \text{crs} = ((g, H, Z, H, \text{crs}_{\text{com}}), (z, h, \text{td}_{\text{com}})) \).

- **KeyGen**(crs): Samples random \( sk \leftarrow Z_p \) and computes \( PK = skG \). Outputs \( (PK, sk) \).

- **Sign**(crs, sk, m): Sets \( C = \text{PC.Com}(\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, m; 0) \). Then samples random \( u, r_1, r_2, r_3, \gamma \leftarrow Z_p \) and computes \( A = uG, B_1 = r_1G + cC, B_2 = r_2H + c'(Z - C), B_3 = u'Z \) and sets \( e = H(Z, Z_1, A, B_1, B_2, B_3) \). Then computes \( c = e - e', r = u - cr, r' = u_3 - e' \) and outputs \( \sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) where \( \sigma_1 = (Z, C, r, e, r', r_1', r_2', r_3') \) and \( \sigma_2 = (0, 1) \).

- **Verify**(crs, PK, m, \( \sigma \)): Parse \( \sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) where \( \sigma_1 = (Z, C, r, e, r', r_1', r_2', r_3') \) and \( \sigma_2 = (d, \gamma) \). Check that \( Z \neq 0 \). \( \text{PCB.Open}(\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, m, (Z, C), \sigma_2) = 1 \) and \( \text{Verify}_1(\text{crs}, \text{PK}, \sigma_1) = 1 \), where **Verify** outputs 1 if \( Z = rG + c\text{PK}, B_1 = r_1G + c'\tilde{C}, B_2 = r_2H + c'Z - \tilde{C} \) and \( B_3 = u'Z \) it holds that 

\[ e + e' = H(Z, C, A, B_1, B_2, B_3) \]

and 0 otherwise.

The scheme additionally consists of two interactive protocols for obtaining blind signatures and verification of signatures in zero-knowledge:

**BlindSign:** The user first computes a commitment \( (C, d) \leftarrow \text{PC.Com}(\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, m) \) on his message \( m \). Then he sends \( C \) to the signer and performs a ZKPoK \( \Pi_1 \) of \( m \) and \( d \) such that \( \text{PC.Open}(\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, m, C, d) = 1 \). If the signer accepts the proof, they then engage in the interactive signing protocol to generate a blind signature.

See Figure 8 for the description of the interactive signing protocol.

**Remark 3.** Modifications detailed above are mainly regarding notation and to remove the blind message and
thus allow the EUF-CMA security definition and do not change ACL on a technical level.

**Theorem 6.2.** Above signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure in the combined generic group and random oracle model.

Note that since \texttt{BlindSign} contains a ZKPoK of the message \(m\), the set of messages that have been signed using the oracle for \texttt{BlindSign} is well defined, and thus EUF-CMA security is applicable. In the generic group model introduced by Shoup [35], the adversary operates on the group through a group oracle that allows computation of the group law, inversion and checking for equality. The adversary only receives random identifiers of group elements he either receives as input or computes through use of the oracles. See Appendix C.1 for the proof.

We additionally require that issuing and verification of signatures through \texttt{BlindSign} and \texttt{BlindVerify} is unlinkable. More precisely, the signer/verifier should learn nothing from the interactions that allows him to link the signature verified during \texttt{BlindVerify} to a particular interaction of \texttt{BlindSign}. Note that unlinkability only holds between signing and verifying, engaging the verifying protocol twice for the same signature is linkable.

**Theorem 6.3.** The protocol \texttt{BlindSign} is perfectly blind if \(\Pi_1\) is composable perfect zero-knowledge, \(\text{PC}\) is perfectly hiding and \(\mathcal{H}\) is a random oracle. It additionally allows for extraction of the signed message if \(\Pi_1\) has witness-extended emulation.

**Theorem 6.4.** The protocol \texttt{BlindVerify} is composable zero-knowledge if \(\Pi_2\) is composable zero-knowledge, \(\text{PCB}\) is hiding, the DDH assumption holds in \(\mathcal{G}\) and \(\mathcal{H}\) is a random oracle. It additionally has witness-extended emulation if \(\Pi_2\) has witness-extended emulation.

For the proofs see Appendix C.2.

### 7 Performance Evaluation

We evaluate the performance of BBW by measuring execution times and network payload of a practical implementation. Since data transmission times largely depend on external factors and the instantiation scenario, we exclude them from our measurements and instead provide estimates based on NFC with its maximum transmission speed of 424 kbit/s.

Evaluation is done on a modern smartphone featuring a Snapdragon 845 (4 × 2.8 GHz & 4 × 1.77 GHz) and running Android 9. The implementation was done in C++17 and employs the RELIC toolkit v0.5.0, an open source library with support for elliptic curve arithmetic [4], for underlying group operations.

In order to compare the performance of BBW with BBA+ we also implemented BBA+ with support for 16-bit range proofs as described in [21] and measured execution times on the same platform.

Note that a modern smartphone represents a particularly strong device in embedded computing. To obtain performance estimations for smart cards (or other low-end micro controllers), we count the number of multiplications done and estimate the execution time based on the performance of a dedicated ECC coprocessor [36] and the MultOS card. Note that this coprocessor was designed for fast pairing execution and was thus optimized for Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves. Although the authors also supplied performance estimates for Curve25519, their processor does not make use of the special form of Curve25519 that would allow for faster arithmetic. A dedicated coprocessor for either Curve25519 or FourQ curves [15] should result in much faster implementations, especially as FourQ curves can achieve significantly higher performance than Curve25519 [28].

#### 7.1 Implementation Details

To obtain small group elements (and thus minimize network payload) and fast computation times, we chose to use the elliptic curve Curve25519 ([8, 9, 27]) which provides 128 bit of security. For the range proofs in the \texttt{Sub} protocol we employ Bulletproofs by Bünz et al. [10]. The authors first construct a protocol with linear data transmission size and then extend it to provide logarithmic data size at the cost of additional prover computation time. We implemented both variants for both 16 and 32 bit ranges, referring to the variant with linear data size as \texttt{Sub}_l,lin and to the logarithmic variant as \texttt{Sub}_l,log in the following, where \(l\) denotes the size of the range. We suggest to use 16 bit on weak devices and 32 bit on smartphones (if needed).

#### 7.2 Evaluation

Table 1 shows our measurement results. The evaluation was performed utilizing a single CPU core and results are averaged over 1000 individual executions.
Table 1. Performance measurements of BBW and BBA+ on our smartphone platform and lower-bound estimations for smart cards

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>User BBW</th>
<th>BBA+</th>
<th>System BBW</th>
<th>BBA+</th>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

The resulting estimated lower bounds in G, we can estimate a lower bound for the execution time on other platforms. Note that we restrict our estimations to the user side, as the backend is expected to be notably more powerful. Furthermore, as these estimations are solely based on the number of point multiplications, execution times of concrete instantiations would be higher due to the remaining computations and I/O. The dedicated coprocessor by Unterluggauer and Wenger [36] takes 23 ms for a multiplication on Curve25519. On a MultOS 4.3.1 card, point multiplication on ≈250 bit curves takes 61 ms [18]. The resulting estimated lower bounds for execution time of BBW are shown in Table 1. It is worth noting that, although the MultOS card does not employ a dedicated coprocessor, the execution time is only increased by a factor of less than 3.

7.3 Discussion

Our evaluation shows that, although the logarithmic variant of Sub results in less transmitted data, the overhead in execution time is tremendous. While this may not be an issue on the smartphone, as 1s for 32-bit ranges might be an acceptable waiting period for users, more than 5.8 s or even 15.4 s for just 16-bit ranges as in our estimations for smart cards is unacceptable. Therefore, we favor the linear variant, as the penalty of transmitting the additional data is easily outweighed by the processing time saved. Regarding the smartphone, this reduces the computation time of the user to only 170 ms for Sub<sub>32</sub>,lin. On more constrained devices, using the linear variant and l = 16 results in promising execution times, i.e. close to 1.5 s for Sub on [36], which may be acceptable depending on the scenario. Note that Sub without range proofs takes approximately as long as Add, and thus less than 1 s on [36].

Comparing our implementation with the performance of BBA+, we see improvement in all areas. Regarding transmitted data, the Issue protocols are roughly equal, while for Add the transmitted data was reduced from 4208 B to 1745 B. The most notable difference is in Sub, where the amount of transmitted data was reduced from 14368 B when supporting only a 16-bit range proof, to 5039 B for Sub<sub>32</sub>,lin, i.e., supporting a 32-bit range proof. Regarding execution time and the favorable linear variant of Sub, BBW is faster in every protocol. Especially Sub<sub>32</sub>,lin is more than four times as fast as Sub in BBA+ despite supporting 32-bit range proofs, and still twice as fast as Sub without any range proofs (where execution time is the same as in Add). Additionally, our scheme also offers a significantly faster system-side, enabling the use of weaker hardware in operator terminals (such as subway turnstiles).

Regarding practical implementations on smart cards, possible problems might arise from the amount of RAM required (which we did not optimize for on our smartphone implementation) and bad connectivity using NFC in passive mode. As almost all multiplications are fixed-point, storing pre-computation tables would allow for more efficient algorithms. However, this requires such tables for every element in the common ref-
reference string, which requires somewhat large amounts of permanent storage.

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References

A Formal Instantiations of Building Blocks

A.1 Commitment Scheme

Definition A.1 (Non-interactive commitment scheme). The triple $(\text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Open})$ is called a non-interactive commitment scheme for message space $M$ with group setup $\text{SetupGrp}$ if the following holds:

Completeness: For all $g_p \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(k)$, all $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(g_p)$ and all $m \in M$ and $(C, d) \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{crs}, m)$ it holds that $\text{Open}(\text{crs}, m, C, d) = 1$

Perfectly Hiding: For all (unbounded) adversaries $A$

$$\Pr \left[ g_p \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(k); \text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(g_p); (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow A(\text{crs}); b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; (C, d) \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{crs}, m_b); A(\text{crs}, C) = b \right] = \frac{1}{2}$$

Binding: For all PPT adversaries $A$

$$\Pr \left[ g_p \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(k); \text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(g_p); (C, m, d, m', d') \leftarrow A(\text{crs}) ; m \neq m' \land \text{Open}(\text{crs}, m, C, d) = 1 \land \text{Open}(\text{crs}, m', C, d') = 1 \right] \approx 0$$

The commitment scheme is called additively homomorphic if the message space $M$ is an additive group and it has an algorithm for adding commitments such that the resulting commitment can be opened to the sum of the messages.

It is called equivocable, if knowledge of a trapdoor allows opening of commitments to arbitrary messages and existence of the trapdoor cannot be detected.

We use Pedersen multi-commitments:

Definition A.2 (Pedersen Multicommitments). The Pedersen multi-commitment scheme is given by:

$$\text{Setup}(g_p, l) \text{ samples } x_1, \ldots, x_l \leftarrow Z_p^* \text{ and returns } \text{crs} := (H, H_1, \ldots, H_l) := (G_1, x_1G_1, \ldots, x_lG_1) . \text{SimSetup}(g_p, l) \text{ works as Setup}(g_p), \text{ but sets } \text{td} := (x_1, \ldots, x_l) \text{ as trapdoor, and returns } (\text{crs}, \text{td}).$$

$$\text{Com}(\text{crs}, m) \text{ where } m = (m_1, \ldots, m_l) \text{ samples } d \leftarrow Z_p^* \text{ and returns } (C, d) := (dH + \sum_{i=1}^l m_iH_i, d).$$

$$\text{SimCom}(\text{crs}) \text{ returns } (C, d) := (dH, d), \text{ where } d \leftarrow Z_p^* .$$

$$\text{Open}(\text{crs}, m, C, d) \text{ where } m = (m_1, \ldots, m_l) \text{ returns } 1 \text{ if } dH + \sum_{i=1}^l m_iH_i = C \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise.}$$

$$\text{CAdd}(C_1, C_2) \text{ returns } C_1 + C_2.$$

$$\text{DAdd}(d_1, d_2) \text{ returns } d_1 + d_2.$$

$$\text{Equiv}(C, d, m, \text{td}) \text{ returns } d' = d - \sum_{i=1}^l m_i x_i \text{ where } m = (m_1, \ldots, m_l) \text{ and } \text{td} = (x_1, \ldots, x_l).$$
Definition A.3 (Blinded Pedersen Commitment). For the blinded Pedersen commitment, Setup adds another element \( Z \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \setminus \{0\} \) to the common reference string, and Com calculates the commitment \((\gamma Z, \gamma C)\) as described above. The unveil information consists of \((d, \gamma)\).

Theorem A.4. If the DLOG assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp, the Pedersen multi-commitment scheme is an equivocal, additively homomorphic non-interactive commitment scheme and the blinded variant is an equivocal non-interactive commitment scheme.

A.2 Signatures

Definition A.5 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme (with setup SetupGrp and message space \( \mathcal{M} \)) is a triple \((\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\) which satisfies correctness: \( \forall gp \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n), (PK, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(gp)\), \( \forall m \in \mathcal{M} \): \( \text{Pr}[\text{Verify}(PK, m, \text{Sign}(sk, m)) = 1] = 1 \)

It is called EUF-CMA secure if for all PPT adversaries \( A \) with access to a signing oracle \( S_{sk} \) we have

\[
\Pr \left[ \frac{gp \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n); (PK, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(gp); (m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow A_{S_{sk}}(PK): m^* \notin Q^*_{A}\wedge \text{Verify}(PK, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \right] \approx 0
\]

where \( Q^*_{A} \) is the set of all messages \( m \) for which \( A \) did an oracle query.

A.3 Zero-Knowledge

Definition A.6 (ZKPok). For a polynomial time decidable ternary relation \( R \) we define the group-dependent language \( L_{gp} \) as the set of \( x \) for which there exists \( w \) with \((gp, x, w) \in R\). We call \( w \) a witness for \( x \).

An interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge consists of PPT algorithms Setup, SimSetup, ExtSetup and interactive PPT algorithms \((P, V)\) called the prover and the verifier. By \( tr = \langle P(x), V(y) \rangle \) we denote the public transcript produced by the interaction between \( P \) and \( V \), ending with \( V \) either accepting or rejecting.

Moreover, we require the following properties:

Perfect completeness: For all \( gp \leftarrow \text{SetupGrp}(1^n),\ crs \leftarrow \text{Setup}(gp), (x, w) \in L_{gp}: \langle P(x, w), V(x) \rangle = 1 \).

Composable Zero-Knowledge: There exists a simulation trapdoor and a PPT algorithm called the simulator that, when given the simulation trapdoor, can simulate the prover without access to a witness for any PPT verifier \( V^* \) when given black-box access to \( V^* \) in a way that even an adversary that generates the statement to be proven is and also given the simulation trapdoor has only negligible advantage in deciding whether transcripts are produced by the simulator or an actual interaction between \( P \) and \( V^* \). Additionally, existence of the trapdoor must be undetectable from the crs.

Witness-Extended Emulation There exists an expected PPT extractor \( E \) that when given access to a transcript oracle of the interaction of a prover \( P^* \) with the verifier \( V \) produces a transcript indistinguishable from one obtained from a real interaction between \( P^* \) and \( V \), and if the transcript is accepting also outputs a valid witness \( w \). Note that this also implies soundness.

We extend the generic sigma protocol introduced by Maurer [29] with a Blum coin-toss to achieve concurrent zero-knowledge:

Definition A.7 (Modified Zero-Knowledge Protocol). Our modified ZK scheme is given by:

- Setup\((gp)\) generates \( crs \leftarrow C_{ZK}.\text{Setup}(gp) \) and outputs \( crs_{pok} = crs \).
- SimSetup\((gp)\) generates \( (crs, td) \leftarrow C_{ZK}.\text{SimSetup}(gp) \) and outputs \( (crs_{pok}, td_{pok}) = (crs, td) \).
- The interactive \( ZKPok \) for \( x \): \( \Phi(x) = Z \) is performed roughly as follows:
  - \( P \) picks a random \( k \leftarrow \Lambda \), computes \( T = \Phi(k) \) and sends \( T \) together with a commitment on his half of the challenge to \( V \).
  - \( V \) randomly picks his half of the challenge and sends it to \( P \).
  - \( P \) computes the challenge \( c \) from the two halves, sets \( r = k + cx \) and sends \( r \) together with the opening of his challenge half to \( V \).
  - \( V \) computes \( c \) and checks that \( \Phi(r) = T + cZ \) holds.

Theorem A.8. The protocol in Definition A.7 is an argument for the relation \( R_{gp} \) with \((gp, Z, x) \in R \leftrightarrow \Phi(x) = Z \). It has composable perfect zero-knowledge if \( C_{ZK} \) is equivocable and witness-extended emulation if \( C_{ZK} \) is binding.

Composable perfect zero-knowledge follows from equivocability of \( C_{ZK} \) (see [16]), the proof for witness-extended emulation is straightforward.

Definition A.9 (Bulletproof Range Proof). The Bulletproof range proof scheme consists of an PPT algorithm Setup and an interactive protocol RangeProof between a prover \( P \) and a verifier \( V \).

\( \text{Setup}(gp, l) \) generates a common reference string \( crs_{rp} \) for the range \([0, 2^l]\).
RangeProof. The prover \( P \) with inputs \((\text{crs}_{\text{rp}}, v, r, C)\) convinces the verifier \( V \) with inputs \((\text{crs}_{\text{rp}}, C)\) that \( C = \text{Com}(v; r) \) and that \( v \in [0, 2^l - 1] \).

For details on how the interactive proof is performed, see [10].

**Theorem A.10.** The range proof in Definition A.9 has perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge and witness extended emulation. If the challenge is replaced by a Blum coin toss, it has perfect composable zero-knowledge.

For the proof see [10, Cor. 2] and [16] for composable zero-knowledge.

**B Formal Definitions of BBA+**

**Definition B.1** (Owner-Binding). A trapdoor-linkable BBA+ scheme is called owner-binding if for any PPT adversary \( A \) in the experiments \( \text{Exp}_{\text{ob-issue}}^{\text{ob-issue}}(n) \) and \( \text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{ob-browser}}(n) \) from Figure 9 the advantages of \( A \) defined by

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{ob-issue}}(n) := \Pr\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{ob-issue}}^{\text{ob-browser}}(n) = 1\right]
\]

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBA+}}(n) := \Pr\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{ob-browser}}(n) = 1\right]
\]

are negligible in \( n \).

**Definition B.2** (Double-Spending Detection). A trapdoor-linkable BBA+ scheme ensures double-spending detection if for any PPT adversary \( A \) in the experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{BBA+}}(n) \) from Figure 10 the advantage of \( A \) defined by

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBA+}}(n) := \Pr\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{BBA+}}(n) = 1\right]
\]

is negligible in \( n \).

**Fig. 9.** Owner-binding experiments for Issue and Add/Sub

**Fig. 10.** Double-spending detection experiment.

**Definition B.3** (False-Accusation Protection). A trapdoor-linkable BBA+ scheme ensures false-accusation protection if for any PPT adversary \( A = (A_0, A_1) \) in the experiment \( \text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{facp}}(n) \) from Figure 11 the advantage of \( A \) defined by

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBA+}}(n) := \Pr\left[\text{Exp}_{\text{BBA+}}^{\text{facp}}(n) = 1\right]
\]

is negligible in \( n \).

**Fig. 11.** False accusation protection experiment

**C Proofs for the Signature Scheme**

**C.1 Proof of EUF-CMA Security**

We make use of the following Lemma:

**Lemma C.1** (Schwartz [34]). Let \( p \) be prime and let \( t \geq 1 \). Let \( F(x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X_1, \ldots, X_k] \) be a nonzero polynomial of total degree \( d \). Then for random \( x_1, \ldots, x_k \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), the probability that \( F(x_1, \ldots, x_k) = 0 \) is at most \( \frac{d}{p} \).

**Proof of Theorem 6.2.** First note that because the Pedersen commitment scheme is binding and the user performed a proof of knowledge of \( m \), the message being signed during BlindSign is well-defined.\(^1\)

\(^1\) And since the adversary had to compute the commitment, the message \( m \) can be obtained from the queries to the group oracle.
In the generic group model, the adversary is only allowed black-box access to the group. More precisely, group elements are identified by uniformly random chosen handles from \( \{0, 1\}^n \). The adversary receives handles for the group elements in his input and is given access to oracles to compute the group law and inversion that take identifiers and return an identifier for the result.

As a first step, we modify the group oracle as follows: The oracle keeps a list of the handles (random bitstrings) the adversary receives and the internal representation of that group element. Internally, group elements are represented by polynomials \( F_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X_1, \ldots, X_k] \). The generator \( G \) is represented by the constant polynomial 1 and the public key \( PK \) is represented by the constant polynomial \( sk \) (where \( skG = PK \)). For each element \( H, Z, H_0, \ldots, H_l \) of the common reference string a new indeterminate \( X_H, X_Z, X_{H_0}, \ldots, X_{H_l} \) is introduced and the element is represented by the polynomial \( X_i \) for the correspondent indeterminate. When the adversary queries the group law oracle on two elements \( F_i, F_j \) the resulting group element is represented as \( F_k = F_i + F_j \), and when he queries the group inversion oracle on \( F_i \), the resulting group element is represented by \( F_k = -F_i \). If \( F_k \) is already in the list, the corresponding handle is returned, otherwise a new one is chosen at random. After the adversary finished and outputted his solution, a random \( x := (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^k \) is chosen and all polynomials are evaluated at \( x \). During interaction, whenever a random group element is chosen (including cases where a random scalar \( s \) is chosen and the group element is computed by \( sY \) for some group element \( Y \)) a new indeterminate \( X_i \) is introduced and the element is represented as above. Whenever non-random group elements are computed, the oracle addition/inversion is used.

More precisely, during the \textit{BlindSign} protocol, the adversary receives group elements \( A_i, B_{1,i}, B_{2,i} \). The \( A_i \) are again represented by a polynomial in a newly introduced indeterminate \( X_i \), while \( B_{1,i}, B_{2,i} \) are represented by polynomials in existing indeterminates (and depend on the group element \( C_i \), the adversary supplied).

If two distinct polynomials \( F_i, F_j \) evaluate to the same group element, a simulation failure occurs and we abort, otherwise this is indistinguishable to the real experiment. We call this event \( F_{G} \). Note that for an adversary performing \( q_{sign} \) queries to the group oracle and engaging in \( q_{sign} \) signing protocols, there exist at most \( 5 + l + q_{G} + 3q_{sign} \approx q_{G} + 3q_{sign} \) polynomials \( F_i \) in at most \( 3 + l + q_{sign} \approx q_{sign} \) indeterminates \( X_j \). Note also that the polynomials \( F_i \) are of degree either 0 or 1, as for \( F_k = F_i + F_j \) it holds that the degree of \( F_k \) is at most the larger of the degrees of \( F_i \) and \( F_j \), and polynomials inserted otherwise are of degree 0 or 1. Then it follows from Lemma C.1 that the probability of two polynomials \( F_i \) and \( F_j \) in \( q_{sign} \) indeterminates to be equal on random \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{q_{sign}} \) is at most \( \frac{1}{p} \), and as there are at most \( \left( q_{G} + 3q_{sign} \right) \) pairs of polynomials, we have

\[
\Pr[F_{G}] \approx \left( \frac{q_{G} + 3q_{sign}}{2} \right) \frac{1}{p}
\]

Then observe that an adversary has two options to come up with a valid signature:

1. For a given signature on message \( m \) obtained through interaction with the signing oracle, open the commitment \((\hat{Z}, \hat{C})\) part of the signature to a different message \( m' \).
2. Generate a fresh signature by computing some group elements via the group oracle and some non-group data that arbitrarily depends on the responses to the group and random oracles.

For simplicity, we first assume that no hash collisions occur, i.e., there are no queries \( q_1, q_2 \) to the random oracle \( H \) so that \( H(q_1) = H(q_2) \). Should two such queries occur, we abort. We call this event \( F_{H} \) (hash collision). Since \( H \) is a random oracle, for an adversary performing \( q_{H} \) queries to \( H \), we have

\[
\Pr[F_{H}] \approx \left( \frac{q_{H}}{2} \right) \frac{1}{p}
\]

Regarding (1), note that \((\hat{Z}, \hat{C})\) uniquely defines \( C \): For the adversary to be able to open the blinded commitment, he must supply some \( \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) so that \( \gamma Z = \hat{Z} \) and \( \gamma C = \hat{C} \). Two different openings \( d, d' \) to different messages \( m \) and \( m' \) for \( C \) result in two different polynomials \( F \) and \( F' \) with coefficients \( m, d \) and \( m', d' \) that both evaluate to \( C \). This constitutes a simulation failure as described above and is thus already contained in \( F_{G} \).

For (2), the adversary needs to forge the ZKPoK, i.e., come up with group elements \( \hat{Z}, \hat{C} \) and values \( \hat{c}, \hat{c'}, \hat{r}_1, \hat{r}_2, \hat{r}_3 \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) for which \( \hat{c} + \hat{c'} = H(\hat{Z}, \hat{C}, \hat{A}, \hat{B}_1, \hat{B}_2, \hat{B}_3) \) holds for \( \hat{A} = \hat{r}G + \hat{c}PK \), \( \hat{B}_1 = \hat{r}_1G + \hat{c}'C \), \( \hat{B}_2 = \hat{r}_2H + \hat{c'}(\hat{Z} - \hat{C}) \) and \( \hat{B}_3 = \hat{r}_3Z + \hat{c'}\hat{Z} \).

We call the first part of the ZKPoK (knows \( sk \) such that \( skG = PK \), corresponding to \( \hat{c} \)) the key side and the second part (knows \( (x_1, x_2, \gamma) \) such that \( x_1G = \hat{C}, x_2H = (\hat{Z} - \hat{C}), \gamma Z = \hat{Z} \), corresponding to \( \hat{c'} \)) the message side.

Now for the key side, observe that the adversary only receives non-group elements of the form \( r_i = a_i + c_i sk \) with new random \( a_i \) each time, and \( a_i \)
and \( sk \) otherwise are only accessed through the group oracle, whose output is statistically independent of \( a_i \) and \( sk \), and thus \( r_1 \) is statistically independent of \( sk \). Thus, the probability to output some \( A \in \mathbb{G} \) and then for \( \tilde{c} \) dependent on \( A \) successfully compute \( \tilde{r} \) for which it holds that \( A = \tilde{r}G + \tilde{c}PK \) is at most \( \frac{q_G}{2^n} \), where \( H(\tilde{c}) \) is the entropy of \( \tilde{c} \).

For the message side, following equations must hold:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{B}_1 &= \tilde{r}_1^1 G + \tilde{c} \tilde{C} \\
\tilde{B}_2 &= \tilde{r}_2^1 H + \tilde{c} (\tilde{Z} - \tilde{C}) \\
\tilde{B}_3 &= \tilde{r}_3^1 Z + \tilde{c} \tilde{Z}
\end{align*}
\]

(9) \hspace{1cm} (10) \hspace{1cm} (11)

Now, we view the group elements \( A \) uses as multivariate polynomials \( F_i(X_1, \ldots, X_l) \) and rewrite the equations as

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{r}_1^1 &= F_{\tilde{B}_1} - \tilde{e} F_{\tilde{C}} \\
\tilde{r}_2^1 X_H &= F_{\tilde{B}_2} - \tilde{e} (F_{\tilde{Z}} - F_{\tilde{C}}) \\
\tilde{r}_3^1 X_Z &= F_{\tilde{B}_3} - \tilde{e} F_{\tilde{Z}}
\end{align*}
\]

(12) \hspace{1cm} (13) \hspace{1cm} (14)

So, after evaluating the polynomials at \( x \) chosen uniformly random as mentioned above, equation (12) holds if either \( F_{\tilde{B}_1} \) and \( F_{\tilde{C}} \) are both constant or only with probability \( \frac{q_G}{2^n} \), where \( H(\tilde{e}) \) is the entropy of \( \tilde{e} \). Similarly, equation (14) holds if \( F_{\tilde{Z}} \) and \( F_{\tilde{B}_3} \) are both of the form \( r_1 X_Z \) or again only with probability \( \frac{q_G}{2^n} \). For equation (13) to hold, both \( F_{\tilde{B}_2} \) as well as \( F_{\tilde{Z}} - F_{\tilde{C}} \) need to be of the form \( r_1 X_H \), otherwise it again only holds with probability \( \frac{q_G}{2^n} \). But as \( F_{\tilde{Z}} = r_1 X_Z \) and \( F_{\tilde{C}} = r_j \), it cannot hold that \( (F_{\tilde{Z}} - F_{\tilde{C}}) = r_k X_H \). Thus, the probability that equations (12) to (14) are simultaneously satisfied is at most \( \frac{q_G}{2^n} \), and the probability that both the key-side and the message-side are simultaneously satisfied is at most

\[
\frac{q_G}{2^n} \frac{q_G}{2^{n-H(\tilde{c})}} = \frac{q_G^2}{2^{n-H(\tilde{c})}}.
\]

Since it has to hold that \( \tilde{c} + \tilde{e} = c \) and \( H(\tilde{c}) \approx n \) since \( H \) is a random oracle and it holds that \( H(\tilde{c}) = H(\tilde{c} + \tilde{e}) \leq H(\tilde{c} + \tilde{e}) \leq H(\tilde{c}) + H(\tilde{e}) \) we have that \( H(\tilde{c}) + H(\tilde{e}) \geq n \) and thus the probability of (2) is at most

\[
\frac{q_G^2}{2^n}.
\]

(15)

So to conclude, the probability of an adversary to succeed in forging a signature is at most the sum of 1 and 2 and the failure events \( F_{\tilde{C}} \) and \( F_H \). So from (7), (8) and (15) we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{A, euf-cma}}(n) \leq \frac{q_G^2}{2^n} + \left( \frac{q_G^2 + 3q_{\text{sign}}}{2} \right) \frac{1}{p} + \left( \frac{q_H}{2} \right) \frac{1}{p},
\]

which is negligible in \( n \) since \( q_G, q_H \) and \( q_{\text{sign}} \) are polynomials in \( n \), while \( p \approx 2^n \).

### C.2 Proofs of Blindness/Zero-Knowledge

**Proof of Theorem 6.3.** The only information that is sent outside the composable perfect zero-knowledge proof \( \Pi_1 \) is \( C = \text{PC.Com}(m; d) \) which is statistically independent of \( m \) as \( \text{PC} \) is perfectly hiding and \( e \), which is statistically independent of \( m \) because \( H \) is a random oracle. Extraction of the signed message directly follows from witness-extended emulation of \( \Pi_1 \).

**Zero-Knowledge Verification**

First note that because \( C \) is uniquely defined by \((\gamma Z, \gamma C) \) and \( C \) was sent to the signer, the protocol only achieves computational zero-knowledge (learning \( C \)) during this interaction allows linking the signature to a signing interaction, thus we need to treat \( C \) as part of the witness). We follow the proof of blindness in [5].

**Proof of Theorem 6.4.** The user sends the following information to the verifier: \( \tilde{Z} = \gamma Z, \tilde{C} = \gamma C, \tilde{r} = r+1, \tilde{c} = c+t_2, \tilde{r}_1 = \gamma \tilde{r}_1 + t_3, \tilde{r}_2 = \gamma \tilde{r}_2 + t_5, \tilde{c}' = c'+t_4, \tilde{r}_3 = u'_3 + c'\gamma \).

The \( t_i \) have all been chosen uniformly at random by the user, thus \( \tilde{r}, \tilde{r}_1, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{c}', \tilde{c} \) and \( \tilde{r}_3 \) are all statistically independent of the values \( r, r_1, r_2, c, c' \) sent by the signer. Additionally, it holds that \( \tilde{r}G + \tilde{c}X = \tilde{A}, \tilde{r}_1^1 G + \tilde{c} \tilde{C} = \tilde{B}_1 \) and \( \tilde{r}_3^1 Z + \tilde{c} \tilde{Z} = \tilde{B}_3 \), as \( \tilde{A}, \tilde{B}_1, \tilde{B}_3 \) are statistically independent of \( A, B_1, B_2 \). Finally, \( \tilde{c} + \tilde{c}' = \epsilon \) is statistically independent of \( e = \epsilon - t_2 - t_4 \). Thus, it remains to show that any adversary that can link \( \tilde{Z}, \tilde{C} \) to \( C \) can be used to solve the DDH problem.

First note that there are two types of signatures a simulator might output: \( \sigma = (\tilde{Z}, \tilde{C}, \tilde{r}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{r}_1, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{c}', \tilde{r}_3) \) is correct if there exists \( \gamma \) such that \( \tilde{Z} = \gamma Z \) and \( \tilde{C} = \gamma C_i \) for some interaction \( i \) with the signer and the signature verifies. The signature \( \sigma \) is fake if no such \( \gamma \) exists (but it still verifies). It is easy for the simulator to output a fake signature with control over the random oracle: it picks random \( \tilde{Z}, \tilde{C} \sim \mathbb{G}, \tilde{r}, \tilde{r}_1, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{c}', \tilde{r}_3 \sim \mathbb{Z}_p \) and programs the random oracle so that the signature verifies.

Now, observe that an adversary able to successfully distinguish between a correct and a fake signature (with non-negligible advantage \( \epsilon \)) can be used to solve the DDH problem. We construct a reduction \( \mathcal{B} \) as follows:

The reduction \( \mathcal{B} \) gets as input a DDH instance \((g, A, B, D)\). Then \( \mathcal{B} \) then sets \( Z = A, H = cG \) and \( H_0, \ldots, H_l \to e_0 A, \ldots, e_l A \) for randomly chosen \( e_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \). Then \( \mathcal{B} \) constructs the signature as \( \tilde{Z} = D + kD \) for random \( k \sim \mathbb{Z}_p \), chooses all other values at random and programs the random oracle as explained above. (Note that as \( \mathcal{B} \) knows the discrete logarithms
of \( H_0, \ldots, H_t \) and thus knows \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) for honestly generated commitments \( C \) so that \( C = kA \). If \((gp, A, B, D)\) is a DH-tuple, then it holds that \( A = aG, B = bG \) and \( D = abG \), and thus \( \hat{Z} = D = bA = bZ \) and \( \hat{C} = kD = kbA = bC \) is identically distributed as a correct signature. Conversely, if \((gp, A, B, D)\) is not a DH-tuple, then \((\hat{Z}, \hat{C})\) is a fake signature. Thus, \( B \) outputs “DH” if \( A \) outputs “real” and “random” otherwise.

\[ \]

D Proofs for BBW

D.1 Extraction

\[ \]

Proof of Theorem 5.1. We consider an adversary \( \mathcal{A} = \text{MalIssue, MalAdd, MalSub} \) that stopped after interacting \( q \) times with the three oracles, where \( q \) is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter.

For any successful interaction with one of the oracles (from the oracle's point of view) we extract a witness for the argument used in the interaction in the following way: We fix the randomness of \( A \) and that of all oracles. Then, starting with the interaction for which the ZKPoK was completed last, we iteratively extract witnesses one-by-one: For the interaction we want to extract, we supply the extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) of the corresponding ZKPoK with a transcript oracle \( \mathcal{O} \) of all messages part of the ZKPoK. Due to the witness-extended emulation property and since the interaction was successful and thus the first transcript produced is accepting, \( \mathcal{E} \) outputs a witness with overwhelming probability in expected polynomial time.

We repeat this step for every successful oracle interaction, of which there are at most \( q \). This results in an extraction algorithm \( \mathcal{E}^* \) with expected runtime \( q \cdot t \) where \( t \) is the expected runtime of \( \mathcal{E} \). Since \( \mathcal{E} \) has expected polynomial runtime and \( q \) is bounded by a polynomial, the resulting runtime is expected polynomial. As the probability for successful extraction is overwhelming for each interaction and the amount of interactions is bounded by \( q \), the probability that all witnesses are successfully extracted is overwhelming.

D.2 Simulation-Linkability

We start with the requirement of P2, P3 and BlindSign being complete:

Lemma D.1. P2 and P3 are complete.

Lemma D.2. The protocol BlindSign to obtain blind signatures is complete.

Proof of Lemma D.1. We prove Lemma D.1 for P2, the proof for P3 works analog. A transcript for P2 is of the form \( tr = (\pi_1, c, \pi_2) \) where \( \pi_1 = (T, C_Z) \) and \( \pi_2 = (c', d_Z, r) \). Since \( tr \) is accepting, it holds for the group homomorphism \( \Phi: A \rightarrow B \) used in P2 and the statement \( Z \) that \( \Phi(r) = T + (c + c')Z \), as well as \( C_Z, \text{Open}(c', C_Z, d_Z) = 1 \).

\( c', d_Z \) and \( C_Z \) are part of the protocol, and the honest prover \( \mathcal{P} \) can choose the same values. Since \( Z \) is in the image of \( \Phi \) and \( \Phi \) is a homomorphism, it follows that \( T \) is also in its image. Thus, there exists (at least one) \( x \in A \) for which it holds that \( \Phi(x) = Z \). Then, for fixed \( c, c' \) and \( x \), there exists \( k \in A \) such that \( r = k + (c + c')x \) and \( \Phi(k) = T \). Hence, the honest prover \( \mathcal{P} \) with witness \( x \) and randomness \( k, c', d_Z \) interacting with the honest verifier \( \mathcal{V} \) with randomness \( c \) produce the same transcript \( tr \).

Proof of Lemma D.2. A transcript for BlindSign is of the form \( tr = (tr_Z, (A, B_1, B_2), e, (c, r, c', r_1, r_2)) \) where \( tr_Z \) is a transcript of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the opening of the commitment \( C \) given as common input to the user and signer. With the same argument as in the proof of Lemma D.1 this zero-knowledge protocol is complete and there exist suitable inputs and random choices for the honest user \( \mathcal{U} \) that lead to the same transcript \( tr_Z \). All messages sent by the signer only depend on the common input \( C \), his own random choices and the message \( e \), so as long as there are inputs for the honest user that lead to the same value of \( e \), the resulting interaction leads to the same transcript \( tr \). \( e \) is calculated as \( e = t_2 - t_4 \), where \( e \) is the output of \( \mathcal{H} \) on values depending on \( t_2 \) and \( t_4 \), so there need to exist values for which \( \mathcal{H} \) outputs \( e + t_2 + t_4 \). As \( G \) is cyclic with prime order, every group element is a generator. Thus, independent of the choices of \( t_2 \) and \( t_4 \), there exist values for \( t_1, t_3 \) and \( t_5 \) so that \( \alpha, \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \) can be any element from \( G \). Since \( H \) is a random oracle, for some fixed values of \( \zeta, \zeta_1 \) and \( \mu \), the output of \( H(\zeta, \zeta_1, \alpha, \beta_1, \beta_2, \mu) \) is still uniformly random, and thus there exist suitable choices for \( t_1, \ldots, t_5 \) so that \( H(\ldots) = e + t_2 + t_4 \) (as there are \( p^3 \) possible values for \( (\alpha, \beta_1, \beta_2) \) but only \( p \) possible values for \( H(\ldots) \)).

Now we can show that our scheme is indeed simulation-linkable:

Proof of Theorem 5.2. Completeness: We need to show that any accepting transcript could be produced
by interaction of an honest user $U$ with an honest accumulator $\mathcal{AC}$/verifier $V$ when given suitable inputs and randomness. More precisely, we need to show that for all values part of an accepting transcript, there exist inputs and random choices for $U$ and $\mathcal{AC}/V$ that result in these values being part of the transcript.

A transcript for Add has the form $tr := (u_2, (s, t, C', \sigma_1), tr_{P2}(C', u', s'), tr_{BlindSign})$. For $tr_{P2}$ by Lemma D.1, and for $tr_{BlindSign}$ there exist suitable inputs and random choices by Lemma D.2. $s$ is part of the token and chosen uniformly at random during honest token generation, so any value of $s$ can be part of a token given as input to $U$. $t$ is calculated as $t = sk_U u_2 + u_1$, so for any user secret key $sk_U$ and any value $u_2$ sent by $\mathcal{AC}/V$, there exists a value $u_1$ that results in $t$, which is also chosen uniformly at random during honest token generation and can thus be part of the input token. $C'$ is a Pedersen commitment on some message $m'$. As Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding, there exists a random choice $d'$ for any message $m'$ so that $C'$ is a commitment on $m'$ with opening information $d'$. $\sigma_1 := (\zeta, \zeta_1, \rho, \omega, \rho_1', \rho_2', \omega', \mu)$ is part of a valid signature $\sigma := (\sigma_1, \sigma_2 := (d, \gamma))$. Since $P2/P3$ have witness-extended emulation (and are thus sound), we have that $\gamma = \gamma Z$ and $\zeta_1 = \gamma C$ for some commitment $C$ (note that this fixes the choice of $\gamma$). Then, as above, there exists a random choice $d$ for any message $m$ so that $C$ is a commitment on $m$ with opening information $d$. Now, as the signature basically consists of a (non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir transformation) sigma-protocol zero-knowledge proof, with the same argument as in the proof of Lemma D.1 there exist suitable inputs and random choices for which $\sigma_1$ is produced.

**Extractability:** Since $P2$ and $P3$ have witness-extended emulation, there exists an extractor $E$ for them. Extraction for $\Sigma$-protocols is achieved by first getting enough related transcripts and then supplying them to an algorithm KnowledgeExtractor that outputs the witness. It is thus possible to construct GenerateTranscripts and KnowledgeExtractor from $E$ and implement ExtractUID by running KnowledgeExtractor to receive a witness $x$ containing the user secret key $sk_U$ and then computing and outputting $PK_U = sk_G G$.

**D.3 System Security**

We first state the slightly modified formal definitions for security.

**Definition D.3 (Oracles).** The adversary in the following security games is given access to the following oracles.

- MallIssue($PK_U$) lets the adversary initiate the Issue protocol with an honest issuer $I$ provided that there is no pending MallIssue call for $PK_U$ and $PK_U$ has also not been used in a successful call to MallIssue before.
- MalAdd$(attr, v)$ is used by the adversary to initiate the Add protocol with honest $\mathcal{AC}$ for input $v \in V$.
- MalSub$(attr, v)$ is used by the adversary to initiate the Sub protocol with honest $V$ for input $v \in V$.

**Definition D.4 (Owner-Binding).** A simulation-linkable BBW scheme is called owner-binding if for any PPT adversary $A$ in the experiments $\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{issue}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n))$ and $\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{add-sub}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n))$ from Figure 12 the advantages of $A$ defined by

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{issue}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) := \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{issue}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) = 1]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{add-sub}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) := \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{add-sub}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) = 1]$$

are negligible in $n$.

![Fig. 12. Owner-binding experiments for Issue and Add/Sub](image)

**Definition D.5 (Balance Binding).** A simulation-linkable BBW scheme is called balance-binding if for any PPT adversary $A$ in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{bb}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n))$ from Figure 13 the advantage of $A$ defined by

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{bb}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) := \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{bb}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) = 1]$$

is negligible in $n$.

**Definition D.6 (Double-Spending Detection).** A simulation-linkable BBW scheme ensures double-spending detection if for any PPT adversary $A$ in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{dsd}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n))$ from Figure 14 the advantage of $A$ defined by

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{dsd}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) := \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{bb}}^{\text{dsd}}(\mathcal{BBW}_A(n)) = 1]$$

is negligible in $n$. 
The proof for owner-binding wrt. Owner-Binding is a series of games.

Proof of owner-binding wrt. Add/Sub. We proceed in a sequence of games.

**Game 1** is the real experiment.

In **Game 2**, if ExtractUID fails for any call to MalAdd or MalSub, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_1$ (ExtractUID failed).

In **Game 3**, when $A$ finished running, we use the extractor $E^*$ from Theorem 5.1 to extract witnesses for all zero-knowledge proofs. More precisely, for each call to MalIssue, we extract a message $m' := (s', w = 0, sk_U, u_1)$ and store a record $(PK_U, m', m^* := (s' + s'', w = 0, sk_U, u_1))$, where $PK_U$ is the user public key for which MalIssue was called and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number.

For each call to MalAcc or MalVer we extract a message $m' := (s', w, sk_U, u'_1)$ and a message $m := (s, w, sk_U, u_1)$ together with a valid signature $\sigma$ and store a record $(PK_U, m, m, m^* := (s' + s'', w + v, sk_U, u'_1))$, where $PK_U$ is the public key extracted by ExtractUID and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number and $v$ the amount of points collected/redeemed. If extraction of any witness fails, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_3$ (forged signature).

In **Game 4** we check for each extracted message $m$ if there exists a previous call to MalIssue, MalAdd or MalVer for which our record contains $m^*$ with $m^* = m$, i.e. if every message for which $A$ proves knowledge of a signature has indeed been signed by the experiment. If this is not the case for any call, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_2$ (double-spending).

We split the proof of Theorem 5.3 in separate proofs for owner-binding, double-spending detection and balance-binding.

**Owner-Binding**

The proof for owner-binding wrt. Issue is a straightforward reduction to the CDH problem.

**Proof of owner-binding wrt. Add/Sub.** We proceed in a series of games.

**Game 1** is the real experiment.

In **Game 2**, if ExtractUID fails for any call to MalAdd or MalSub, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_1$ (ExtractUID failed).

In **Game 3**, when $A$ finished running, we use the extractor $E^*$ from Theorem 5.1 to extract witnesses for all zero-knowledge proofs. More precisely, for each call to MalIssue, we extract a message $m' := (s', w = 0, sk_U, u_1)$ and store a record $(PK_U, m', m^* := (s' + s'', w = 0, sk_U, u_1))$, where $PK_U$ is the user public key for which MalIssue was called and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number. For each call to MalAdd or MalVer we extract a message $m' := (s', w, sk_U, u'_1)$ and a message $m := (s, w, sk_U, u_1)$ together with a valid signature $\sigma$ and store a record $(PK_U, m, m, m^* := (s' + s'', w + v, sk_U, u'_1))$, where $PK_U$ is the public key extracted by ExtractUID and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number and $v$ the amount of points collected/redeemed. If extraction of any witness fails, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_3$ (forged signature).

In **Game 4** we check for each extracted message $m$ if there exists a previous call to MalIssue, MalAdd or MalVer for which our record contains $m^*$ with $m^* = m$, i.e. if every message for which $A$ proves knowledge of a signature has indeed been signed by the experiment. If this is not the case for any call, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_2$ (double-spending).
Thus, it holds that $\mathcal{A}$ can not win this game and we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = 0$. Now, let us discuss the failure events. $\mathcal{F}_1$ only occurs with negligible probability as BBW is simulation-linkable, so we have $\Pr[\mathcal{F}_1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$. $\mathcal{F}_2$ also only occurs with negligible probability according to Theorem 5.1, so we have $\Pr[\mathcal{F}_2] \leq \text{negl}(n)$. When $\mathcal{F}_3$ occurs, we extracted a valid signature $\sigma$ on a message $m$ that has never been signed. Thus, we can construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{EUF-CMA}}$ against the EUF-CMA security of $\mathcal{S}$ and it holds that $\Pr[\mathcal{F}_3] = \text{Adv}_{\text{S,BEUFCMA}}^{\text{euf-cma}}(n)$. Putting everything together, we have
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{ob-acc-ver}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) + \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-2}}(n) + \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-3}}(n) + \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{euf-cma}}(n) + \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{euf-cma}}(n),
\]
which is negligible since $\mathcal{S}$ is EUF-CMA secure.

**Double-Spend Detection**

**Proof.** We make use of the same sequence of games 1 to 4 as in the proof of owner-binding. Let $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = \Pr[\mathcal{E}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = 1]$ again denote the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in Game 1. We thus have that $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-d}}(n)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-d}}(n) \approx \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-1}}(n) + \text{Adv}_{\text{S,BEUFCMA}}^{\text{euf-cma}}(n)$.

Now let us again consider the success probability of $\mathcal{A}$ in Game 4:

Let $\text{PK}_U^{(1)}$, $m_1 = \langle s^{(1)}, w^{(1)}, \text{sk}_U^{(1)}, u_1^{(1)} \rangle$, $\sigma^{(1)}$ be the extracted values from the call resulting in $\text{dtag}_1 = (s, z_1)$ and $\text{PK}_U^{(2)}$, $m_2 = \langle s^{(2)}, w^{(2)}, \text{sk}_U^{(2)}, u_2^{(2)} \rangle$, $\sigma^{(2)}$ from the call resulting in $\text{dtag}_2 = (s, z_2)$ respectively, with $s^{(1)} = s^{(2)} = s$. Let also $z_1 = \langle t_1^{(1)}, u_1^{(1)} \rangle$ and $z_2 = \langle t_2^{(2)}, u_2^{(2)} \rangle$. Note that it holds that $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(1)} G$.

There are 4 ways for $\mathcal{A}$ to win:

- **Case 1** $\text{ExtractUID}$ fails to extract a $\text{PK}_U$ for either call.
- **Case 2** $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} \neq \text{PK}_U^{(2)}$.
- **Case 3** $\text{IdentDS}((\text{PK}_U^{(1)}, \text{dtag}_1, \text{dtag}_2), (\text{PK}_U, \pi))$.
- **Case 4** $\text{VerifyGuilt}((\text{PK}_U^{(1)}, \text{dtag}_1, \text{dtag}_2), (\text{PK}_U^{(1)}, \pi)) = 0$.

Case 1 can never happen, as we already ensured $\text{ExtractUID}$ successfully extracts $\text{PK}_U$ for all calls, hence $\Pr[\text{Case 1}] = 0$.

In Case 2 we have two messages $m_1^{(1)}$, $m_2^{(2)}$ that were both signed by the experiment and for which it holds that $s^{(1)} = s^{(2)}$ but $\text{sk}_U^{(1)} \neq \text{sk}_U^{(2)}$ (since $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} \neq \text{PK}_U^{(2)}$).

But $s^{(1)}$ is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ (observe that for any $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it holds that $s' \equiv s'' \pmod{p}$) and thus the probability for $s^{(1)} = s^{(2)}$ is at most $\frac{q_2^2}{p}$ where $q$ is the amount of successful calls $\mathcal{A}$ did to $\text{MalIssue}$, $\text{MalAcc}$ and $\text{MalVer}$. Hence, we have $\Pr[\text{Case 2}] \leq \frac{q_2^2}{p}$.

For Case 3, recall that we have double spending tags $\text{dtag}_1$ and $\text{dtag}_2$ with $t_1^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(1)} u_1^{(1)} + u_1^{(1)}$ and $t_2^{(2)} = \text{sk}_U^{(2)} u_2^{(2)} + u_1^{(2)}$. From the definition of $\text{IdentDS}$ it follows that $\text{IdentDS}(\text{dtag}_1, \text{dtag}_2) = (\text{PK}_U^{(1)}, \text{sk}_U^{(1)})$ if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) $\text{sk}_U^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(2)}$ (2) $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(1)} G$ (3) $u_2^{(2)} \neq u_2^{(2)}$ and (4) $u_1^{(1)} = u_1^{(2)}$.

Assume $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} = \text{PK}_U^{(2)}$ (otherwise Case 2 is satisfied). From the definition of $\text{ExtractUID}$, it follows that $\text{PK}_U^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(1)} G$, $\text{PK}_U^{(2)} = \text{sk}_U^{(2)} G$ and thus $\text{sk}_U^{(1)} = \text{sk}_U^{(2)}$. $u_2^{(2)} \neq u_2^{(2)}$ holds with probability at least $1 - \frac{q_2^2}{p}$ as both are chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ by the Accumulator/Verifier. It remains the case that $u_1^{(1)} \neq u_1^{(2)}$.

Again, as we already ensured that $m_1^{(1)}$ and $m_2^{(2)}$ were both signed by the experiment during a call to any oracle, this means there were two distinct calls that resulted in the same serial number $s$. Thus, as in Case 2, the probability for this is at most $\frac{q_2^2}{p}$. This leads us to $\Pr[\text{Case 3}] \leq 2 \cdot \frac{q_2^2}{p}$.

Case 4 can never happen due to the definitions of $\text{IdentDS}$ and $\text{VerifyGuilt}$: If $\text{IdentDS}$ outputs $(\text{PK}_U, \pi)$ (and not $\bot$), it computed $\text{PK}_U$ as $\pi G$, while $\text{VerifyGuilt}$ checks whether $\text{PK}_U = \pi G$. Thus $\Pr[\text{Case 4}] = 0$.

Hence, $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in Game 4 is $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-4}}(n) \leq \frac{3q_2^2}{p}$ and we have that
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW,A}}^{\text{game-d}}(n) \approx \frac{3q_2^2}{p} + \text{Adv}_{\text{S,BEUFCMA}}^{\text{euf-cma}}(n),
\]
which is negligible since $\mathcal{S}$ is EUF-CMA secure and $\frac{q_2^2}{p}$ is negligible.

**Balance-Binding**

This proof closely follows the proof of [21, Thm. B.5].

**Proof.** We show that an adversary cannot make us miscount his balance and that he cannot claim a higher balance than what we counted.
To achieve this, we proceed in a series of games, where the first game is the real experiment and the last game is setup such that it is impossible for the adversary to win. We show that the difference between two such games is either negligible or any adversary able to differentiate between them can be used to build an adversary against one of the building blocks.

Firstly, we now explain the different games.

**Game 1** is the real experiment.

In **Game 2**, if ExtractUID fails for any call to MalAcc or MalVer, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_1$ (ExtractUID failed).

In **Game 3**, when $A$ finished running, we use the extractor $E^*$ from Theorem 5.1 to extract witnesses for all zero-knowledge proofs. More precisely, for each call to Mallsue, we extract a message $m := (s', w = 0, s_{\text{old}}, u_1)$ and store a record $(PK_U, m, m^* := (s_{\text{old}} := s' + s'' + w = 0, s_{\text{old}}, u_1, s'''))$, where $PK_U$ is the user public key for which Mallsue was called and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number. For each call to MalAcc or MalVer we extract a message $m := (s', w, s_{\text{old}}, u_1')$ and a message $m := (s_{\text{in}} := s, w, s_{\text{old}}, u_1)$ together with a valid signature $s$ and store a record $(PK_U, m', m, s_{\text{in}}, m^* := (s_{\text{out}} := s' + s'' + w + v, s_{\text{out}}, u_1', s'''))$, where $PK_U$ is the public key extracted by ExtractUID and $m^*$ is the message for which $A$ obtained a signature, with $s''$ being the issuers random share of the serial number and $v$ the amount of points collected/redeemed. If extraction of any witness fails, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_2$ (extraction failure).

In the following we view the set of transactions as a directed graph, where each successful transaction is a vertex and there exists an edge from transaction $A$ to transaction $B$, if the serial number $s_{\text{out}}$ from $A$ is equal to the serial number $s_{\text{in}}$ of $B$.

In **Game 4** we make sure that the indegree of every vertex associated with a call to MalAcc or MalVer is at least one, i.e. every serial number $s_{\text{in}}$ that appeared in a call to MalAcc or MalVer was part of a signed token generated in a previous interaction. Let $\tilde{r}_{\text{cc}} := (PK_U, m', m := (\tilde{s}_{\text{in}}, \tilde{w}, \tilde{s}_{\text{old}}, \tilde{u}_1), \tilde{s}_{\text{in}}, \tilde{m}^* := (\tilde{s}_{\text{out}} := \tilde{s} + \tilde{s}'' + \tilde{w} + v, \tilde{s}_{\text{out}}, \tilde{u}_1', \tilde{s}'''))$ denote the record of the transaction considered. Then, the game checks for every successful MalAcc/MalVer transaction (containing $\tilde{s}_{\text{in}}$) if there exists a previous transaction whose record contains $s_{\text{out}}$ with $s_{\text{out}} = \tilde{s}_{\text{in}}$. If no such transaction exists, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_3$ (new serial number).

In **Game 5** we now make sure that the indegree of every vertex associated with a call to MalAcc/MalVer is at most one, i.e. every serial number $s_{\text{in}}$ that appeared in a call to MalAcc or MalVer has been signed in exactly one previous transaction. To do so, the game now additionally checks if there is more than one previous transaction containing $s_{\text{out}}$ such that $s_{\text{out}} = \tilde{s}_{\text{in}}$. If at least two such transactions exist, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_4$ (serial number collision).

In **Game 6** we make sure that the outdegree of every vertex is at most one, i.e. that every serial number $s_{\text{out}}$ is used as input in at most one other transaction. To do so, for every call to MalAcc or MalVer the game checks if there already exists another transaction containing $s_{\text{in}}$ with $s_{\text{in}} = \tilde{s}_{\text{in}}$ and if so aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_5$ (double spending).

In **Game 7** we now have for every MalAcc/MalVer transaction exactly one previous transaction where $\tilde{s}_{\text{in}}$ was generated and signed. We now make sure that the public key $PK_U$ in each new such transaction is equal to the public key $PK_U$ from the previous transaction. If this is not the case for the first time, the game aborts and return 0. We call this event failure event $F_6$ (miscount).

In **Game 8** we check for over-claims along the path. By now, our graph consists of unary trees, where the root of each tree represents a call to Mallsue and consecutive child nodes represent changes to the balance associated with the respective user (and we made sure that for each such tree there is exactly one user associated with the transaction, namely the one for which Mallsue was called). Now, the game first checks that for each MalVer transaction, it holds that $w \geq v$ (and thus $\tilde{w} \in \mathbb{V}$). Additionally the game checks each MalAcc transaction if for its predecessor transaction record it holds that $\tilde{w} = w + v$ and for each MalVer transaction that $\tilde{w} = w - v$. If either of these not the case for any transaction, a wrong balance has successfully been claimed and the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event $F_7$ (wrong claim).

Let $\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW}, A}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{BBW}, A}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = 1]$ denote the advantage of $A$ in Game 1. Thus, by definition,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW}, A}^{\text{game-1}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{\text{BBW}, A}^{\text{bb}}(n)$$

(18)

Note that in Game 8, if none of the failure events occurred, what has been counted as balance for $PK_U$ up to a MalVer call coincides with the claimed balance. Hence, the adversary cannot win this game and we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW}, A}^{\text{game-8}}(n) = 0$$

(19)
Since each game only differs from the previous one if the respective failure event occurred, we also have
\[
\text{Adv}^\text{game-8}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = \text{Adv}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) - \Pr\left[ \text{Exp}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1 \land \left( \bigvee_{i=1}^{7} F_i \right) \right] \tag{20}
\]

Now let us discuss the failure events.
\(F_1\) only occurs with negligible probability as BBW is simulation-linkable, thus
\[
\Pr[F_1] \leq \text{negl}(n) \tag{21}
\]
\(F_2\) only occurs with negligible probability according to Theorem 5.1, so
\[
\Pr[F_1] \leq \text{negl}(n). \tag{22}
\]
If \(F_3\) occurs, we have a serial number \(s_{\text{in}}\) that didn’t occur in previous transactions. As we assume that P2 and P3 are sound, we have the signature \(\sigma_{\text{in}}\) as part of \(\hat{r}r\), which is a valid signature for the message \(m = (s_{\text{in}}, \hat{w}, \hat{s}_kU, \hat{u}_1)\) that has not been signed by the experiment. Hence, we can construct an EUF-CMA adversary \(B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}\) against \(S\) with advantage
\[
\text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n) \approx \Pr[F_3] \tag{23}
\]
If \(F_4\) occurs, we have two previous records \(\text{rec}_1\) and \(\text{rec}_2\) both containing \(s_{\text{out}} = \hat{s}_{\text{in}}\). As \(s_{\text{out}}\) was computed as \(s' + s''\), where \(s'\) was chosen by \(A\) but \(s''\) was chosen uniformly at random from \(Z_p\) by the oracle, \(s_{\text{out}}\) is uniformly random over \(Z_p\). Thus, the probability for \(s_{\text{in}} = s_{\text{in}2}\) is at most \(\frac{q^2}{p}\), where \(q\) is the amount of successful calls \(A\) did to \(\text{MalIssue}, \text{MalAcc}\) and \(\text{MalVer}\). So we have
\[
\Pr[F_4] \leq \frac{q^2}{p} \tag{24}
\]
If \(F_5\) occurs, we have a record \(\text{rec}\) containing \(s_{\text{in}} = \hat{s}_{\text{in}}\). But due to the winning conditions of \(A\), it holds that
\[
\Pr[\text{Exp}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1 \land F_5] = 0. \tag{25}
\]
If \(F_6\) occurs, we have a previous record \(\text{rec}\) containing \(PK_U \neq \hat{PK}_U\). As we already made sure that each serial number is only part of one signed token, which in this case must be \(m = (s_{\text{out}}, w + v, \sk_U, u'_1)\) and \(PK_U \neq \hat{PK}_U\) implies \(\sk_U \neq \hat{\sk}_U\), the soundness of P2 and P3 means we have another message \(\hat{m} = (\hat{s}_{\text{in}} = s_{\text{out}}, \hat{w}, \hat{\sk}_U, \hat{u}_1')\) and valid signature \(\hat{\sigma}_{\text{in}}\) on \(\hat{m}\). As \(\hat{m}\) was never signed before, we can construct an adversary \(B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}\) against the EUF-CMA security of \(S\) with advantage
\[
\text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n) \approx \Pr[F_6] \tag{26}
\]
If \(F_7\) occurs, there are two possibilities: there exists a \(\text{MalVer}\) transaction for which \(w < v\) (\(F_{7,1}\)) or there exists a \(\text{MalAcc}\) or \(\text{MalVer}\) transaction for which \(\hat{w} \neq w + v\) (\(\hat{w} \neq w - v\) resp.) holds (\(F_{7,2}\)).
\[
\text{Adv}^\text{w-euf-cma}_{B_{\text{w-euf-cma}}}(n) \approx \Pr[F_{7,1}] \tag{27}
\]
. For \(F_{7,2}\) we again have two tokens with the same serial number that differ in another part. So with the same argument as above, we have a message \(\hat{m} = (\hat{s}_{\text{in}} = s_{\text{out}}, \hat{w}, \hat{\sk}_U, \hat{u}_1')\) and signature \(\hat{\sigma}_{\text{in}}\) on \(\hat{m}\), but \(\hat{m}\) has never been signed (as \(\hat{w} \neq w + v\)), so we can again construct an adversary \(B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}\) against the EUF-CMA security of \(S\) with advantage
\[
\text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n) \approx \Pr[F_{7,2}] \tag{28}
\]
. Thus, we have
\[
\Pr[F_7] \leq \text{Adv}^\text{w-euf-cma}_{B_{\text{w-euf-cma}}}(n) + \text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n) \tag{29}
\]
Putting everything together, we have from (19) to (26) and (29) that
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = \text{Adv}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)
\]
\[
= \Pr[\text{Exp}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1 \land \left( \bigvee_{i=1}^{7} F_i \right)]
\]
\[
+ \Pr[\text{Exp}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1 \land \left( \bigvee_{i=1}^{7} F_i \right)]
\]
\[
= \text{Adv}^\text{game-8}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)
\]
\[
+ \Pr[\text{Exp}^\text{game-1}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1 \land \left( \bigvee_{i=1}^{7} F_i \right)]
\]
\[
\leq \text{negl}(n) + \Pr\left[ \left( \bigvee_{i=1}^{7} F_i \right) \right]
\]
\[
\leq \text{negl}(n) + \text{negl}(n) + \text{negl}(n)
\]
\[
+ \text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n) + \frac{q^2}{p}
\]
\[
+ 0 + \text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n)
\]
\[
\approx \frac{q^2}{p} + \text{Adv}^\text{euf-cma}_{S, B_{\text{EUF-CMA}}}(n)
\]
which is negligible as we assumed \(S\) to be EUF-CMA secure and \(\frac{q^2}{p}\) is negligible. \(\square\)
D.4 User Security/Privacy

Again we state the slightly modified formal definitions for user privacy/security.

**Definition D.7** (Privacy-Preserving). We say that a BBW scheme is privacy-preserving, if there exist PPT algorithms $\text{SimSetup}$ and $\text{SimCorrupt}$ as well as interactive PPT algorithms $\text{SimHonIssue}$, $\text{SimHonAdd}$ and $\text{SimHonSub}$ that receive no private user input, such that for all PPT adversaries $A = (A_0, A_1)$ in the experiments from Figure 2, the advantage $\text{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$ of $A$ defined by

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) := \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-ideal}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1] - \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-real}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1]$$

is negligible in $n$.

**Definition D.8** (False-Accusation Protection). A simulation-linkable BBW scheme ensures false-accusation protection if for any PPT adversary $A = (A_0, A_1)$ in the experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{facp}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$ from Figure 11 the advantage of $A$ defined by

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{facp}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) := \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^{\text{facp}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n) = 1]$$

is negligible in $n$.

**Game 1** We set $\text{Setup}_1 = \text{Setup}$, $\text{HonIssue}_1 = \text{RealHonIssue}$, $\text{HonAdd}_1 = \text{RealHonAdd}$, $\text{HonSub}_1 = \text{RealHonSub}$ and $\text{Corrupt}_1 = \text{RealCorrupt}$ as in Figures 3 to 6. So in other words, $\text{Exp}^{\text{game-1}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$ is identical to $\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-ideal}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$.

**Game 2** We modify $\text{Setup}_2$ such that $\text{crs}_{\text{sig}}$ is not generated by $\text{S.Setup}(\text{gp})$ but instead by $(\text{crs}_{\text{sig}}, \text{td}_{\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{S.Setup}(\text{gp})$ (and thus $\text{crs}_{\text{com}}$ is generated as $(\text{crs}_{\text{com}}, \text{td}_{\text{com}}) \leftarrow \text{PC.S.Setup}(\text{gp}))$, $\text{crs}_{\text{pok}}$ is not generated by $\text{Z.Setup}(\text{gp})$ but instead by $(\text{crs}_{\text{pok}}, \text{td}_{\text{pok}}) \leftarrow \text{Z.Setup}(\text{gp})$ and $\text{crs}_{\text{rp}}$ is not generated by $\text{RP.Setup}(\text{gp})$ but instead by $(\text{crs}_{\text{rp}}, \text{td}_{\text{rp}}) \leftarrow \text{RP.Setup}(\text{gp})$.

**Game 3** We redefine $\text{HonIssue}_3$, $\text{HonAdd}_3$ and $\text{HonSub}_3$ such that the proofs done with the adversary are simulated (using the trapdoors $\text{td}_{\text{pok}}$ and $\text{td}_{\text{rp}}$ to choose the challenge beforehand).

**Game 4** We modify $\text{HonIssue}_4$, $\text{HonAdd}_4$ and $\text{HonSub}_4$ so that the commitment $C$ sent to the adversary is replaced by a commitment to $(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ and the signature $\sigma_1$ is replaced by random values for which the random oracle $H$ is accordingly programmed so the signature verifies. We also modify $\text{Corrupt}_4$ to equivocate (using $\text{td}_{\text{com}}$) the commitment $C$ (which was sent by $A$ and now is a commitment to $(s'', v, 0, 0, 0)$) to one containing random $s, \omega$ and the correct $\text{sk}_H$, $w$ and $\text{attr}$ with opening information $d$, and generate a new signature $\sigma$ by choosing random $\gamma, \omega', \rho, \rho'_1, \rho'_2, \mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, computing $\zeta = \gamma Z$, $\zeta_1 = \gamma C$, setting $\sigma = (\zeta, \zeta_1, \rho, \omega, \rho'_1, \rho'_2, \omega', \mu, d, \gamma)$ and programming the random oracle $H$ so that the signature verifies.

We also need to make sure $\text{Verifier}$ still works as expected in $\text{HonIssue}_4$, $\text{HonAdd}_4$ and $\text{HonSub}_4$. To achieve this we replace the call $\text{Verifier}(\text{PK}_Z, \text{PK}_U, \text{sk}_U, \tau, w^*, \text{attr})$ with $\text{Verifier}(\text{PK}_Z, 0_G, 0, \tau, v, 0)$.

**Game 5** We now modify $\text{HonAdd}_5$ and $\text{HonSub}_5$ so that $t$ and $s$ are chosen at random.

We note that $\text{Exp}^{\text{game-5}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$ is identical to $\text{Exp}^{\text{priv-ideal}}_{\text{BBW}, A}(n)$.

We now show that a PPT adversary $A$ cannot distinguish between games $i$ and $i+1$. By $D_i$ we denote the probability that $A$ is able to distinguish Game $i$ from Game $i+1$.

**Game 1 to Game 2** Only the $\text{crs}$ is changed and this is perfectly indistinguishable for both $\text{crs}_{\text{com}}$.
and \( crs_{\text{pk}} \) (see the zero-knowledge property of the proofs and the equivocality property of \( PC \)) Thus, we have
\[
\Pr[D_2] = 0 \quad (32)
\]

**Game 2 to Game 3** In this hop, the real zero-knowledge proofs are replaced by simulated ones. Note that the proven statements are still valid.

We introduce 2 new games: in Game 2.1, only P1 proofs are replaced by simulated ones. In Game 2.2 we also replace the proofs for P2 and in Game 2.3 additionally proofs for P3 are replaced, so Game 2.3 = Game 3.

Now assume there is an adversary \( A \) that can distinguish between Game 2 and Game 2.1. We argue by use of an hybrid argument with games Game 2.0 to Game 2.0.q = Game 2.1. In Game 2.0.j, the first \( j \) proofs for P1 are simulated, while all proofs from \( j + 1 \) to \( q \) are real. As \( A \) notices a difference between Game 2.0 and Game 2.0.q, there must be an index \( j \in [q] \) such that \( A \) can distinguish between \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-2.0.j}}(n) \) and \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-2.0.j+1}}(n) \). We can then construct an adversary \( B_{1-j} \) against the composable perfect zero-knowledge property of P1. It then holds that \( \Pr[D_{2.1}] \leq \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \text{Adv}^{zk}_{P1, B_{1-j}}(n) \), but as we assume that P1 is perfectly composable zero-knowledge, it holds that \( \text{Adv}^{zk}_{P1, B_{1-j}}(n) = 0 \) for all \( i \in [q-1] \) and thus
\[
\Pr[D_{2.1}] = 0 \quad (33)
\]

Next, consider the hop from Game 2.1 to Game 2.2. This time the proofs for P2 are also replaced by simulated ones. We argue by use of the same hybrid argument as above: in Game 2.1.j, all proofs for P1 are simulated and the first \( j \) proofs for P2 are simulated, while proofs \( j + 1 \) to \( q \) for P2 are real. Hence we have that
\[
\Pr[D_{2.2}] = \text{Adv}^{zk}_{P2, B_{1-j}}(n) = 0 \quad (34)
\]

The same argument can also be done for the hop from Game 2.2 to Game 2.3 and so to conclude we have
\[
\Pr[D_3] \leq \Pr[D_{2.1}] + \Pr[D_{2.2}] + \Pr[D_{2.3}] = 0 \quad (35)
\]

**Game 3 to Game 4** The difference in Game 4 is that all the commitments and signatures are replaced. We first argue about replacing the commitments: Assume there is an adversary \( A \) that can distinguish between \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-3}}(n) \) and \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-4}}(n) \). We argue by use of an hybrid argument with games Game 3.0 to Game 3.q = Game 4. In Game 3.j, the first \( j \) commitments are replaced by simulated commitments while all commitments from \( j + 1 \) to \( q \) are real. As \( A \) notices a difference between Game 3.0 and Game 3.q, there must be an index \( j \in [q] \) such that \( A \) can distinguish between \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-3.j}}(n) \) and \( \text{Exp}_{BBW, A}^{\text{game-3.j+1}}(n) \). We can construct an adversary \( C \) against the equivocality of \( PC \) that internally runs \( A \) and simulates the oracles. \( C \) has the same advantage in the equiv-exp as \( A \) in distinguishing games 3.j and 3.j + 1, so
\[
\text{Adv}_{PC, C}^{\text{equivocality}}(n) = \Pr[D_{3,j+1}] \quad (36)
\]

But as \( PC \) is equivocal, we have that \( \text{Adv}_{PC, C}^{\text{equivocality}}(n) = 0 \) and thus \( \Pr[D_{3,j+1}] = 0 \) for all \( j \in [q-1] \). For the signatures, we have the same argument, but against blindness of BlindVerify. Thus, for similarly defined games 3.j and 3.j + 1 we have
\[
\text{Adv}_{PC, C}^{\text{zero-knowledge}}(n) = \Pr[D_{3,j+1}] \quad (37)
\]

and thus overall we have
\[
\Pr[D_4] \leq q \text{Adv}_{PC, C}^{\text{zero-knowledge}}(n) \leq \text{negl}(n) \quad (38)
\]

**Game 4 to Game 5** In the last step, the values \( s \) and \( t \) are chosen at random (if the user has not been corrupted in the previous call). Thus, there are two cases to regard: in Case 1, the adversary has successfully corrupted the user PKU in the previous call and in Case 2 the previous oracle call for PKU was any other oracle than Corrupt. In Case 2, this changes nothing for the attacker, as \( u_1 \) is chosen uniformly at random in every interaction and thus \( t = sk_u u_2 + u_1 \) is a uniformly random value as any other dependency on \( u_1 \) has already been removed in the previous games. The same is true for \( s = s' + s'' \) where \( s' \) is chosen uniformly at random.

In Case 1, the adversary knows the last value of \( u_1 \) as well as \( s \) that will be used in the next interaction. As \( u_2 \) is chosen from the adversary, he can check if \( t = sk_u u_2 + u_1 \) actually holds (since he also received \( sk_u \) upon corruption) and whether the correct \( s \) is used. For this reason, in the interaction immediately following a corruption, the real user algorithm is used.

Thus, we have
\[
\Pr[D_5] = 0 \quad (39)
\]

To conclude, we have that
\[
\text{Adv}_{BBW, A}^{\text{priv}}(n) \leq D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5 \leq \text{negl}(n) \quad (40)
\]

and thus BBW is privacy-preserving. \( \square \)
**False-Accusation Protection**

*Proof.* Assume there is an adversary \( A \) that breaks false-accusation protection. Note that the oracles used in the false-accusation experiment are a subset of those used in the privacy-preserving experiment. Thus we can replace all oracles by the simulation oracles and can distinguish two cases:

Case 1 \( A \) is still able to output a valid proof of guilt \( \pi = sk_U \) with non-negligible probability. Since all simulation oracles have besides \( PK_U \) no input that is related to \( sk_U \) and are PPT, we can construct an adversary \( B \) against the DLOG experiment that gets \( PK_U \) as challenge and simulates the false-accusation game for \( A \) and outputs the proof \( A \) returns, which is the discrete logarithm of \( PK_U \).

Case 2 \( A \) is no longer able to output a valid proof of guilt. Then \( A \) can be used to create an adversary \( B \) against the privacy-preserving experiment that distinguishes between the real and the ideal game. As BBW is privacy-preserving, it holds that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\text{BBW},B}(n) \leq \text{negl}(n) \).

So to conclude, we have that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BBW},A}^{\text{facp}}(n) = \text{Adv}_{B}^{\text{dlog}}(n) + \text{negl}(n) \tag{41}
\]

which is negligible as we assumed the DLOG assumption to hold. \( \square \)