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Two Ways to Satisfy (and No Way to Satisfy Utilitarians)

Zinke, Alexandra

Abstract (englisch):

Preference utilitarianism holds that an action is morally good iff it maximizes overall preference satisfaction. In
principle, there are two ways to satisfy preferences: either you alter the facts such that they fit the subject’s pref-
erences, or you change the subject’s preferences such that they fit the facts. While standard preference utilitari-
anism focuses on the first strategy, the present paper will explore the prospects and limits of the second strategy.
I will firstly argue that there are cases in which it seems morally right to aim at preference satisfaction by prefer-
ence change, but secondly acknowledge that an action that induces a global change of preferences doesn’t neces-
sarily seem morally right. The real philosophical challenge is to distinguish those cases where altering a subject’s
preferences is morally right from those where it isn’t. The paper ends with a skeptical outlook on the possibility of
justifying the distinction on purely preference-utilitarian grounds.

Verlagsausgabe §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000138086
Veröffentlicht am 28.09.2021
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Fakultät für Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften (GEISTSOZ)
Publikationstyp Proceedingsbeitrag
Publikationsjahr 2021
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISBN: 978-3-7315-1108-3
KITopen-ID: 1000138086
Erschienen in Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. Ed.: M. Schefczyk; C. Schmidt-Petri
Veranstaltung 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS 2018), Karlsruhe, Deutschland, 24.07.2018 – 26.07.2018
Verlag KIT Scientific Publishing
Seiten 325-333
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