Two Ways to Satisfy (and No Way to Satisfy Utilitarians)

Preference utilitarianism holds that an action is morally good iff it maximizes overall preference satisfaction. In
principle, there are two ways to satisfy preferences: either you alter the facts such that they fit the subject’s pref-
erences, or you change the subject’s preferences such that they fit the facts. While standard preference utilitari-
anism focuses on the first strategy, the present paper will explore the prospects and limits of the second strategy.
I will firstly argue that there are cases in which it seems morally right to aim at preference satisfaction by prefer-
ence change, but secondly acknowledge that an action that induces a global change of preferences doesn’t neces-
sarily seem morally right. The real philosophical challenge is to distinguish those cases where altering a subject’s
preferences is morally right from those where it isn’t. The paper ends with a skeptical outlook on the possibility of
justifying the distinction on purely preference-utilitarian grounds.