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A New Security Notion for PKC in the Standard Model: Weaker, Simpler, and Still Realizing Secure Channels

Beskorovajnov, Wasilij 1; Gröll, Roland 1; Müller-Quade, Jörn 2,3; Ottenhues, Astrid 2,3; Schwerdt, Rebecca 2,3
1 FZI Forschungszentrum Informatik (FZI)
2 Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
3 Institut für Informationssicherheit und Verlässlichkeit (KASTEL), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)

Abstract:

Encryption satisfying CCA2 security is commonly known to be unnecessarily strong for realizing secure channels. Moreover, CCA2 constructions in the standard model are far from being competitive practical alternatives to constructions via random oracle. A promising research area to alleviate this problem are weaker security notions—like IND-RCCA secure encryption or IND-atag-wCCA secure tag-based encryption—which are still able to facilitate secure message transfer (SMT) via authenticated channels.
In this paper we introduce the concept of sender-binding encryption (SBE), unifying prior approaches of SMT construction in the universal composability (UC) model. We furthermore develop the corresponding non-trivial security notion of IND-SB-CPA and formally prove that it suffices for realizing SMT in conjunction with authenticated channels. Our notion is the weakest so far in the sense that it generically implies the weakest prior notions—RCCA and atag-wCCA—without additional assumptions, while the reverse is not true. A direct consequence is that IND-stag-wCCA, which is strictly weaker than IND-atag-wCCA but stronger than our IND-SB-CPA, can be used to construct a secure channel.
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Postprint §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000143858
Veröffentlicht am 28.02.2023
Originalveröffentlichung
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-97131-1_11
Scopus
Zitationen: 1
Dimensions
Zitationen: 1
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Informationssicherheit und Verlässlichkeit (KASTEL)
Publikationstyp Proceedingsbeitrag
Publikationsjahr 2022
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISBN: 978-3-030-97130-4
ISSN: 0302-9743
KITopen-ID: 1000143858
HGF-Programm 46.23.01 (POF IV, LK 01) Methods for Engineering Secure Systems
Erschienen in Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2022. Ed.: G. Hanaoka. Vol. 2
Veranstaltung 25th International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC 2022), Online, 08.03.2022 – 11.03.2022
Verlag Springer International Publishing
Seiten 316–344
Serie Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 13178
Vorab online veröffentlicht am 27.02.2022
Schlagwörter Secure message transfer, Authenticated channel, Tag-based encryption, IND-CPA, IND-CCA2, CCA2, Relaxations, Universal composability, McEliece
Nachgewiesen in Dimensions
Scopus
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