How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts

Governments and multilateral organisations often attempt to influence multi-sided
violent conflicts by supporting or undermining one of the conflicting parties. We
investigate the (intended and unintended) consequences of strengthening or weaken-
ing an agent in a multi-sided conflict. Using a conflict network based on Franke and
Öztürk (J Public Econ 126:104–113, 2015), we study how changing the strength of
otherwise symmetric agents creates knock-on effects throughout the network. Increas-
ing or decreasing an agent’s strength has the same unintended consequences. Changes
in the strength of an agent induce a relocation of conflict investments: Distant con-
flicts are carried out more fiercely. In line with previous results, asymmetry reduces
aggregate conflict investments. In the case of bipartite networks, with two conflicting
tacit groups with aligned interests, agents in the group of the (now) strong or weak
agent face more intense conflicts. Furthermore, in conflicts where the (now strong or
weak) agent is not involved, the probabilities of winning remain unchanged compared
to the symmetric case.