



Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report [☆]

Clemens Puppe ^{a,*}, Arkadii Slinko ^b

^a Department of Economics and Management, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany

^b Department of Mathematics, University of Auckland, New Zealand

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Condorcet domains
Social choice
Majority voting
Preference aggregation
Strategy-proofness

ABSTRACT

Condorcet domains are sets of preference orders such that the majority relation corresponding to any profile of preferences from the domain is acyclic. The best known examples in economics are the single-peaked, the single-crossing, and the group separable domains. We survey the latest developments in the area since Monjardet's magisterial overview (2009), provide some new results and offer two conjectures concerning unsolved problems. The main goal of the presentation is to illuminate the rich internal structure of the class of maximal Condorcet domains. In an appendix, we present the complete classification of all maximal Condorcet domains on four alternatives obtained by Dittrich (2018).

Contents

1.	Introduction	2
2.	Basic concepts and results	3
2.1.	Isomorphism and flip-isomorphism	3
2.2.	Arrovian aggregation and strategy-proof social choice on closed Condorcet domains	5
2.3.	Never conditions	6
2.4.	Embedding in the permutohedron	8
3.	Connected domains	8
3.1.	The single-peaked domain	8
3.2.	Locally single-peaked domains	10
3.3.	Connected domains with maximal width	10
3.3.1.	Maximal Condorcet domains that are single-crossing	10
3.3.2.	Fishburn's alternating scheme	12
3.3.3.	Condorcet domains of the tiling type	13
3.3.4.	Arrangements of pseudolines	14
3.3.5.	Separated ideals	15
3.4.	Connected domains without maximal width: a conjecture	16
4.	Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains	18
4.1.	Decomposable domains	18
4.2.	Indecomposable domains	19

[☆] We are grateful to an editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Alexander Karpov who informed us about a mistake in the first version of this survey and gave valuable hints at additional literature.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: clemens.puppe@kit.edu (C. Puppe), a.slinko@auckland.ac.nz (A. Slinko).

5. Large Condorcet domains	19
6. Conclusion	20
Declaration of competing interest	20
Data availability	20
Appendix A. All maximal Condorcet domains on four alternatives	21
A.1. Connected domains	21
A.1.1. Connected domains with maximal width	21
A.1.2. Connected domains without maximal width	21
A.2. Symmetric domains	22
A.2.1. The indecomposable Raynaud domain	22
A.2.2. Two group separable domains	22
A.3. Mixed domains	22
References	24

1. Introduction

A Condorcet domain is a set of linear orders on a given set of alternatives such that, if every voter is known to have a preference from that set, the pairwise majority relation is acyclic. Equivalently, Condorcet domains guarantee that a Condorcet winner exists on every subset of alternatives. From the perspective of collective decision making, Condorcet domains thus represent the most well-behaved restricted domains and are therefore of great importance in applications. In particular, every Condorcet domain admits rich classes of Arrovian aggregators as well as strategy-proof social choice functions, see e.g., Moulin (1980); Saporiti (2009); Puppe and Slinko (2019).

Well-known examples of Condorcet domains are the single-peaked domain, the single-crossing domain and the domain of group separable preferences. Besides continuing and growing work on these ‘classical’ domains, there has also been an unflagging interest in identifying ‘large’ Condorcet domains, see Abello and Johnson (1984); Craven (1996); Fishburn (1997, 2002) and the literature surveyed by Monjardet (2009). Among other things, this literature has demonstrated the great diversity of Condorcet domains, the scope of which is far from being understood completely. However, progress has been made on several counts since Monjardet’s magisterial survey was published, and it seems to us that the time is ripe to summarize this progress. This is the purpose of the present paper.

First, the work of Danilov et al. (2012) has led to a deeper understanding of an important subclass of Condorcet domains, the so-called ‘peak-pit’ domains (with maximal width) of which the single-peaked, the single-crossing and the ‘Fishburn alternating scheme domains’ are special cases. Moreover, the subclasses of single-peaked and locally single-peaked domains have been axiomatically characterized by Puppe (2018) and Slinko (2019), respectively, and are now well understood.

Second, an important connection with the theory of median graphs has been established in Puppe and Slinko (2019) that helps understanding the structure of Condorcet domains by visualizing them as graphs.

Third, a complete list of all maximal Condorcet domains on up to five alternatives has been obtained by Dittrich (2018) using a computational protocol: there are exactly 18 different equivalence classes in the case of four alternatives, and 688 in the case of five alternatives. We present the complete classification for the case of four alternatives in the appendix of this paper. By contrast, a detailed qualitative analysis of the class of all maximal domains on five alternatives is clearly beyond the scope and limits of the present survey; here, we only briefly review the classification of all peak-pit domains with maximal width in the case of five alternatives obtained by Li et al. (2021). Most recently, the computational analysis of Condorcet domains has been extended to the case of up to seven alternatives (Akello-Egwell et al., 2023).

Fourth, Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) discovered a series of symmetric maximal Condorcet domains, one for each number of alternatives, that all have size 4; we call them *Raynaud domains*, as Raynaud (1981) was the first who discovered such a domain in the case of four alternatives. Raynaud domains were characterized by Karpov and Slinko (2023b) by means of simple permutations, a well-known object in combinatorics. We conjecture that any symmetric maximal domain can be constructed recursively from Raynaud domains (see Section 4.2 below for the details).

Finally, recent progress has also been made in the search for large peak-pit Condorcet domains. Solving a long-standing open problem, Leedham-Green et al. (2024) have recently discovered the largest Condorcet domain on eight alternatives using computational methods; it contains 224 different orders. Interestingly, this domain does not coincide with Fishburn’s so-called ‘alternating scheme’ which represents the largest Condorcet domains on up to seven alternatives. (On eight alternatives, the domain corresponding to the Fishburn alternating scheme contains 222 orders.) In fact, the record domain discovered by Leedham-Green et al. (2024) does not even have ‘maximal width,’ i.e. it does not contain a pair of completely reversed orders. Therefore, it does not contribute to the problem of identifying the largest peak-pit domains of maximal width for all numbers of alternatives. Danilov et al. (2012) have shown that for 42 alternatives the maximal peak-pit Condorcet domain with maximal width is different from the Fishburn alternating scheme; recently, Karpov and Slinko (2023a) have shown this to hold already for 34 alternatives. At the heart of both results is a construction that produces from two given peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains another maximal peak-pit domain of a larger size.

Importantly, the present survey is limited to the case of Condorcet domains of *linear* orders, and for the most part to the analysis of *maximal* Condorcet domains. A first step in the analysis of Condorcet domains of weak orders is taken in Puppe (2018), and some remarkable facts about ‘closed’ (but not necessarily maximal) Condorcet domains have been established in Puppe and Slinko

(2019). Our analysis also assumes that every voter faces the *same* restricted domain of individual preferences, and that every profile of individually admissible preferences is admissible at the group level. Alternative surveys on restricted preference domains have recently been provided by Elkind et al. (2022) and Karpov (2022); these contributions are both complementary to ours in that they cover larger classes of domains and in that they focus on algorithmic aspects.

The remainder of this survey is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the basic concepts and results on Condorcet domains. In Subsection 2.2, we present the characterization of all monotone Arrovian aggregators on every closed Condorcet domain; it implies that every closed Condorcet domain admits a large class of strategy-proof social choice functions (Puppe and Slinko, 2019), and we provide some examples. Section 3 analyzes the class of connected domains and shows that this class is intimately related to the so-called ‘peak-pit’ domains. In Subsection 3.1, we present the characterization of the single-peaked domain as the only maximal Condorcet domain that satisfies three simple conditions: connectedness, maximal width (i.e., the existence of two completely reversed orders) and minimal richness (i.e., for each alternative the existence of an order with that alternative at the top). Subsection 3.2 contains the generalization of this result which dispenses with the maximal width condition and shows that the remaining two conditions characterize the maximal locally single-peaked (sometimes called ‘Arrow’ single-peaked) domains. Subsection 3.3 is devoted to three equivalent combinatorial characterizations of the general ‘peak-pit’ domains with maximal width: in terms of rhombus tilings (Danilov et al., 2012), in terms of arrangements of pseudolines (Galambos and Reiner, 2008), and in terms of separated ideals (Li et al., 2021). In Subsection 3.4 we present the conjecture that the class of all peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains (with or without maximal width) coincides with the class of connected maximal Condorcet domains. Section 4 is devoted to the class of symmetric Condorcet domains. A particular feature of these domains is that they are characterized by a complete set of ‘never-middle’ conditions (i.e., the conditions that require that in the restriction to every triple of alternatives there is one alternative that never occupies the middle position in the ranking). We present a construction of indecomposable symmetric Condorcet domains via ‘simple sequences’ and conjecture that this construction exhausts the class of non-trivial indecomposable symmetric Condorcet domains. Section 5 is devoted to recent advances in the construction of ‘large’ Condorcet domains, i.e., of maximal Condorcet domains with a large number of different orders.

We do not reproduce proofs that can be found in the literature, but whenever appropriate we do provide the basic intuition behind results.

2. Basic concepts and results

2.1. Isomorphism and flip-isomorphism

Let A be a finite set and $\mathcal{L}(A)$ be the set of all linear orders (transitive, complete and asymmetric binary relations) on A . Any non-empty subset $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ will be called a *domain*. If $a_1 > a_2 > \dots > a_m$ is a linear order on A , it will be denoted by a string $a_1 a_2 \dots a_m$. We will sometimes denote linear orders also with small Latin letters, and write $a >_v b$ if a is ranked higher than b in the linear order v (usually associated with a voter). Let us also introduce notation for reversing orders, i.e., if $v = a_1 a_2 \dots a_m$, then $\bar{v} = a_m a_{m-1} \dots a_1$.

Any sequence $P = (\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n) = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \mathcal{D}^n$ of linear orders from \mathcal{D} will be called a *profile* over \mathcal{D} . Unlike a domain it can contain several identical linear orders. Profiles usually represent a collection of opinions of members of a certain society so v_1, \dots, v_n are also called *voters* (voters and their linear orders are usually denoted with the same letter).

Definition 1. The *majority relation* \geq_P of a profile $P = (\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n)$ is defined as

$$a \geq_P b \iff \#\{i \mid a >_i b\} \geq \#\{i \mid b >_i a\},$$

i.e., $a \geq_P b$ means that the number of voters who prefer a to b is at least as large as the number of voters who prefer b to a . For an odd n , this relation is a *tournament*, i.e., complete and asymmetric binary relation.

The main object of our investigation are Condorcet domains, defined as follows.

Definition 2. A domain $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ over a set of alternatives A is a *Condorcet domain* if the majority relation of any profile P over \mathcal{D} with an odd number of voters is transitive. A Condorcet domain \mathcal{D} is *maximal* if for any Condorcet domain $\mathcal{D}' \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ the inclusion $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{D}'$ implies $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}'$.

An equivalent definition of a Condorcet domain requires the majority relation to be *acyclic* for all n , see Monjardet (2009); this is why Fishburn (1997, 2002) refers to Condorcet domains also as *acyclic sets of linear orders*.

As any other abstractly defined object in mathematics, a Condorcet domain can have several ‘material’ appearances. To relate them together we need a concepts of an isomorphism and flip-isomorphism. Let $\psi : A \rightarrow A'$ be a bijection between two sets of alternatives. It can be extended to a mapping $\psi : \mathcal{L}(A) \rightarrow \mathcal{L}(A')$ in two ways: by mapping the linear order $u = a_1 a_2 \dots a_m$ to $\psi(u) = \psi(a_1)\psi(a_2) \dots \psi(a_m)$ or to the reverse (‘flipped’) order $\overline{\psi(u)} = \psi(a_m)\psi(a_{m-1}) \dots \psi(a_1)$.¹

¹ We use the same symbol ψ both for the mapping on A and for the mapping on $\mathcal{L}(A)$ since no confusion can arise.




Fig. 1. Two isomorphic group separable domains. (For interpretation of the colors in the figure(s), the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)




Fig. 2. Two flip-isomorphic domains: SP_{abc} (left) and SD_{abc} (right).

Definition 3. Let A and A' be two sets of alternatives (not necessarily distinct) of equal cardinality. We say that two domains, $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ and $D' \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A')$ are *isomorphic* if there is a bijection $\psi : A \rightarrow A'$ such that $D' = \{\psi(d) \mid d \in D\}$, and *flip-isomorphic* if $D' = \{\overline{\psi(d)} \mid d \in D\}$.

We refer to the domain $\overline{D} := \{\overline{u} \mid u \in D\}$ as *flipped D*; evidently, the flipped domain \overline{D} is flip-isomorphic to D , but it is usually not isomorphic to it.

There is only one maximal Condorcet domain on a set $\{a, b\}$ of two alternatives, namely $D = \{ab, ba\}$. Up to an isomorphism, there are three maximal Condorcet domains on a set of three alternatives $\{a, b, c\}$, and up to an isomorphism or a flip-isomorphism there are only two maximal Condorcet domains on a set of three alternatives. To verify and illustrate this, consider the following two pairs of domains. The two domains shown in Fig. 1 belong to the class of so-called group separable domains introduced by Inada (1964).

Definition 4. A domain D on the set A of alternatives is called *group separable* if every subset $B \subseteq A$ with at least two elements can be partitioned into two non-empty subsets B' and B'' such that every order in D either (i) ranks all elements of B' above all elements in B'' , or (ii) ranks all elements of B'' above all elements in B' .

Inada (1964) showed that group separability is a sufficient condition for acyclicity of the majority relation. Indeed, as is easily verified the two domains $\{abc, bac, cab, cba\}$ (Fig. 1, left) and $\{abc, acb, bca, cba\}$ (Fig. 1, right) are maximal Condorcet domains on the set $\{a, b, c\}$. The group separability of the domain on the left side follows via the partition $\{\{a, b\}, \{c\}\}$ of A , and of the domain on the right side via the partition $\{\{a\}, \{b, c\}\}$ (for proper subsets of A the condition is trivial). The first domain is in fact isomorphic to the second, as can be seen by applying the bijection $\psi(a) = c, \psi(b) = b, \psi(c) = a$. Both are self flip-isomorphic relative to the identity mapping.

Fig. 2 depicts two other well-known Condorcet domains on the set $\{a, b, c\}$, the single-peaked and the single-dipped domain.

Definition 5. A domain D on the set A of alternatives is called *single-peaked* if there exists a linear order (the ‘spectrum’) $>$ on A such that, for every order $v \in D$, the upper contour set $U_v(b) := \{a \in A : a >_v b\}$ is connected in the order $>$ for all $b \in A$. The domain of all single-peaked orders with respect to a given spectrum $>$ is denoted by $SP_{>}$.

Similarly, a domain D on the set A of alternatives is called *single-dipped* if there exists a linear order (the ‘spectrum’) $>$ on A such that, for every order $v \in D$, the lower contour set $L_v(b) := \{a \in A : b >_v a\}$ is connected in the order $>$ for all $b \in A$. The domain of all single-dipped orders with respect to a given spectrum $>$ is denoted by $SD_{>}$.

The two domains shown in Fig. 2 are not isomorphic (this follows, e.g., from the fact that they have a different number of distinct top alternatives), but flip-isomorphic.

Remark. A remark on terminology is in order. The single-peaked domain as defined above has been introduced by Black (1948, 1958) and discussed in Arrow (1951, 1963). A weaker (‘local’) concept of single-peakedness only requires the restriction of a domain to any triple to be single-peaked, see Sen (1970). To distinguish the two concepts, some authors have called the above ‘global’ notion of single-peakedness ‘Black single-peakedness’ and the weaker local version ‘Arrow single-peakedness.’ In order to avoid any confusion, we use the terms ‘single-peakedness’ for the global concept, and ‘local single-peakedness’ for the weaker notion of single-peakedness on all triples. The distinction will play an important role in Section 3 below.

We will say that a Condorcet domain D is *closed* if the majority relation corresponding to any profile over D with an odd number of voters is again an element of D . The following simple observation is useful, see e.g. Puppe and Slinko (2019).

Proposition 2.1. *Let D be a Condorcet domain and $v \in \mathcal{L}(A)$ be the majority relation corresponding to a profile over D with an odd number of voters. Then $D \cup \{v\}$ is again a Condorcet domain. In particular, every Condorcet domain is contained in a closed Condorcet domain and every maximal Condorcet domain is closed.*

2.2. Arrovian aggregation and strategy-proof social choice on closed Condorcet domains

Before we move on to the detailed analysis of the rich internal structure of Condorcet domains, let us demonstrate the usefulness of Condorcet domains in economic applications. Specifically, we present a characterization of the class of all monotone Arrovian aggregators on any Condorcet domain, and show that every Condorcet domain admits a large class of strategy-proof social choice functions beyond the choice of the Condorcet winner. The following presentation is based on Puppe and Slinko (2019, Sect. 6).

Definition 6. A mapping $f : D^n \rightarrow D$ is called an *Arrovian aggregator* on D if it satisfies the following conditions.

- (i) (Unanimity) For all $\succ \in D$, $f(\succ, \dots, \succ) = \succ$, and
- (ii) (Independence) For any pair of profiles $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n), (\succ'_1, \dots, \succ'_n)$ from D and all $x, y \in A$, if $x \succ y$ and, for all $i = 1, \dots, n$, $[x \succ_i y \Leftrightarrow x \succ'_i y]$, then $x \succ' y$, where $\succ = f(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n)$ and $\succ' = f(\succ'_1, \dots, \succ'_n)$.

A mapping is called a *monotone Arrovian aggregator* if it satisfies in addition the following condition.

- (iii) (Monotonicity) For all $\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n, \succ'_i \in D$ and all $x, y \in A$, if $x \succ y$ where $\succ = f(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_i, \dots, \succ_n)$ and $x \succ'_i y$, then $x \succ' y$ where $\succ' = f(\succ_1, \dots, \succ'_i, \dots, \succ_n)$.

In the following, let $N := \{1, \dots, n\}$ denote the set of voters. For every ordered pair $(x, y) \in A \times A$ of distinct alternatives, let \mathcal{W}_{xy} be a non-empty collection of non-empty subsets $W \subseteq N$ of voters (the ‘winning coalitions for x against y ’) satisfying $[W \in \mathcal{W}_{xy} \ \& \ W' \supseteq W] \Rightarrow W' \in \mathcal{W}_{xy}$.

Definition 7. A collection $\mathcal{W} = \{\mathcal{W}_{xy} \mid (x, y) \in A \times A, x \neq y\}$ is called a *structure of winning coalitions* if, for all $x \neq y$, $W \in \mathcal{W}_{xy} \Leftrightarrow (N \setminus W) \notin \mathcal{W}_{yx}$. A structure of winning coalitions is called *order preserving* if, for all distinct pairs $x, y \in A$ and all distinct pairs $z, w \in A$,

$$\{\succ \in D \mid x \succ y\} \subseteq \{\succ \in D \mid z \succ w\} \implies \mathcal{W}_{xy} \subseteq \mathcal{W}_{zw}.$$

In other words, order preservation requires that, if every potential voter who ranks x above y also ranks z above w , then every winning coalition for x over y must also be winning for z over w .

Applying a general possibility result on aggregation on median spaces due to Nehring and Puppe (2007), we obtain the following characterization, see Puppe and Slinko (2019).

Theorem 2.1. *Let D be a closed Condorcet domain and let \mathcal{W} be any order preserving structure of winning coalitions. For all profiles $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n) \in D^n$ there exists a unique order $\succ^{\mathcal{W}} \in D$ such that, for all $x, y \in A$,*

$$x \succ^{\mathcal{W}} y \iff \{i \in N \mid x \succ_i y\} \in \mathcal{W}_{xy}. \tag{1}$$

The aggregator defined by (1) is a monotone Arrovian aggregator. Conversely, every monotone Arrovian aggregator takes the form (1) for some order preserving structure of winning coalitions \mathcal{W} .

Observe that pairwise majority voting with an odd number n of voters corresponds to the structure of winning coalitions for which all \mathcal{W}_{xy} consist of all coalitions of at least half of the voters. Since in that case $\mathcal{W}_{xy} = \mathcal{W}_{zw}$ for any two pairs (x, y) and (z, w)

of distinct alternatives, this structure of winning coalitions is clearly order preserving. But evidently, there is large class of further order preserving structures of winning coalitions different from pairwise majority voting. One class of examples are the *unanimity rules with a default*, defined as follows. Consider a closed Condorcet domain D , and fix any order $\succ_0 \in D$ (the ‘default’); define a structure of winning coalitions $\mathcal{W}(\succ_0)$ by setting, for all distinct $x, y \in A$,

$$\mathcal{W}_{xy}(\succ_0) := \begin{cases} 2^N \setminus \{\emptyset\} & \text{if } x \succ_0 y \\ \{N\} & \text{if } x \not\succ_0 y \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

Thus, for any $x, y \in A$, the corresponding social order $\succ^{\mathcal{W}(\succ_0)}$ defined by (1) agrees with \succ_0 in the pairwise comparison between x and y unless there is unanimous consent to depart from it. As is easily seen, the structure of winning coalitions $\mathcal{W}(\succ_0)$ is order preserving. The fact that the order $\succ^{\mathcal{W}(\succ_0)}$ belongs to D for all possible profiles of voters’ preferences can be shown to follow from the closedness of D , see Puppe and Slinko (2019, Prop. 6.1) for a proof of this assertion. As a simple concrete illustration, consider again the maximal group-separable Condorcet domain $D = \{abc, acb, bca, cba\}$ (cf. Fig. 1, right) and choose as default order \succ_0 the order abc . Suppose that, at a given profile, there is no agreement about the pairwise comparison of b and c , but there is unanimous consent that b should be ranked above a . By the structure of D , every voter who places b above a must also place c above a , hence the social order at such a profile is bca ; indeed, the pairwise comparison between b and c is decided by the default $b \succ_0 c$, whereas the two other pairwise comparisons are decided by unanimity.

Theorem 2.1 allows one to define a large class of strategy-proof social choice functions on every closed (hence also on every maximal) Condorcet domain in a natural way, as follows. A social choice function $F : D^n \rightarrow A$ is *strategy-proof on D* if, for all voters i , all profiles $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n) \in D^n$ and all $\succ'_i \in D$,

$$F(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_i, \dots, \succ_n) \succeq_i F(\succ_1, \dots, \succ'_i, \dots, \succ_n).$$

For each order $\succ \in \mathcal{L}(A)$ denote by $\tau(\succ) \in A$ the unique top element of \succ . The following result is due to Puppe and Slinko (2019).

Theorem 2.2. *Let D be a closed Condorcet domain. For every order preserving structure of winning coalitions \mathcal{W} , the social choice function defined by*

$$F^{\mathcal{W}}(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n) := \tau(\succ^{\mathcal{W}}) \tag{3}$$

is strategy-proof on D where $\succ^{\mathcal{W}}$ is the order given by (1).

In the case of the single-peaked domain SP_{\succ} , the anonymous social choice functions defined by (3) are exactly the generalized medians with respect to the spectrum \succ on A identified by Moulin (1980)²; and in the case of single-crossing domains (defined and further analyzed in Section 3.3.1 below) they coincide with the strategy-proof social choice functions described in Saporiti (2009). For instance, in the case of the single-peaked domain, the social choice function induced via (3) by the unanimity rule with default \succ_0 corresponds to the generalized median that puts $n - 1$ phantom voters at $\tau(\succ_0)$.

Thus, in the two well-studied cases of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, the anonymous social choice functions of the form (3) exhaust the class of all anonymous and strategy-proof social choice functions. It is an open and worthwhile problem to determine if this holds more generally, i.e., to investigate to what extent the large class of strategy-proof social choice functions defined by (3) on a closed Condorcet domain D exhausts the class of all strategy-proof social choice functions on D .

2.3. Never conditions

Let us now return to the main topic of the present paper, the analysis of the rich internal structure of the class of all Condorcet domains. The domain to the left in Fig. 1 contains all the linear orders on $\{a, b, c\}$ in which c is never ranked second, the domain to the right in Fig. 1 contains all the linear orders on $\{a, b, c\}$ in which a is never ranked second; following Monjardet (2009), we denote these conditions as $cN_{\{a,b,c\}}2$, and $aN_{\{a,b,c\}}2$, respectively. We note that these are the only conditions of type $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}i$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$ and $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ that these two domains satisfy. Similarly, the domain to the left in Fig. 2 contains all the linear orders on $\{a, b, c\}$ in which b is never ranked last—that is, it satisfies $bN_{\{a,b,c\}}3$,—and the domain to the right in Fig. 2 contains all the linear orders on $\{a, b, c\}$ in which b is never ranked first satisfying $bN_{\{a,b,c\}}1$. Again, these are the only conditions of type $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}i$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$ and $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ that these domains satisfy.

Definition 8. Any condition of type $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}i$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$ and $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ is called a *never condition* since it says that in a triple $\{a, b, c\}$ alternative x never takes i^{th} position. We say that a family

$$\mathcal{N} \subseteq \{xN_{\{a,b,c\}}i \mid \{a, b, c\} \subseteq A, x \in \{a, b, c\} \text{ and } i \in \{1, 2, 3\}\}$$

is a *complete set of never conditions* if \mathcal{N} contains at least one never condition for every triple a, b, c of elements of A .

² This can be deduced, for instance, from the analysis in (Jennings et al., 2024, Th. 11, p. 218).

Denote by $D(\mathcal{N})$ the collection of all linear orders that satisfy the set of never conditions \mathcal{N} . If $D(\mathcal{N})$ is non-empty, we call \mathcal{N} *consistent*.³ Let us also denote by $\mathcal{N}(D)$ the set of all never conditions that are satisfied by the linear orders from D .

Proposition 2.2. *A non-empty domain of linear orders $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ is a Condorcet domain if and only if it satisfies a complete set of never conditions.⁴ Moreover, for any complete and consistent set of never conditions \mathcal{N} , the domain $D(\mathcal{N})$ is a closed Condorcet domain. Conversely, every maximal Condorcet domain is of this form.⁵*

Note that (almost by definition) a domain D satisfies a complete set of never conditions if and only if every profile from D is *value-restricted* in the sense of Sen (1966).

A major difficulty in the analysis of maximal Condorcet domains stems from the fact that a maximal Condorcet $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ does in general not induce a maximal Condorcet domain on a subset $B \subseteq A$. In other words, the set D_B of all orders in D restricted to the subset B need not be maximal as a Condorcet domain. (But, of course, if D is a Condorcet domain on the set of alternatives A , then $D_B \subseteq \mathcal{L}(B)$ is a Condorcet domain on every non-empty subset $B \subseteq A$.) To illustrate this, consider the following example on five alternatives:

$$\tilde{D} := \{abcde, caebd, dbeac, edcba\}. \tag{4}$$

The domain \tilde{D} is a maximal Condorcet domain (see Section 4 below). Its restriction to the triple $\{a, b, d\}$ is given by $\tilde{D}_{\{a,b,d\}} = \{abd, dba\}$, in particular, $\tilde{D}_{\{a,b,d\}}$ is not a maximal Condorcet domain on the triple $\{a, b, d\}$ because its size is less than 4. This also implies that the domain \tilde{D} satisfies *several* never conditions on the triple $\{a, b, d\}$, namely the four never conditions $aN_{\{a,b,d\}}2$, $bN_{\{a,b,d\}}1$, $bN_{\{a,b,d\}}3$, and $dN_{\{a,b,d\}}2$.

Definition 9. A Condorcet domain $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ is called *maximal on triples*, or *copious* (Slinko, 2019), if for all triples $\{x, y, z\}$, the restricted domain $D_{\{x,y,z\}}$ is a maximal Condorcet domain on $\{x, y, z\}$. Equivalently, a Condorcet domain D is copious if and only if $|D_{\{x,y,z\}}| = 4$ for all triples $\{x, y, z\} \subseteq A$.

Below we will show that interesting subclasses of Condorcet domains are in fact copious. For those, the following simple observation is useful.

Proposition 2.3. *A maximal Condorcet domain is copious if and only if satisfies exactly one never condition on each triple.*

The fact that maximal Condorcet domains may induce non-maximal Condorcet domains on subsets applies, perhaps surprisingly, even to pairs. The following maximal Condorcet domain on five alternatives was recently discovered by Akello-Egwell et al. (2023) (orders are represented as columns):

$$\hat{D} = \begin{bmatrix} a & a & a & a & a & a & a & a & d & d & d & d \\ b & b & b & c & c & c & d & d & a & a & b & c \\ c & c & e & b & b & e & b & c & b & c & a & a \\ d & e & c & d & e & b & c & b & c & b & c & b \\ e & d & d & e & d & d & e & e & e & e & e & e \end{bmatrix}. \tag{5}$$

Note that all orders in \hat{D} place a above e , i.e. $\hat{D}_{\{a,e\}} = \{ae\}$; in other words, \hat{D} does not induce a maximal Condorcet domain on the pair $\{a, e\}$.⁶ The fact that both domains, \tilde{D} in (4) and \hat{D} in (5), are defined on five alternatives is not by chance. Indeed, for alternative sets with at most four elements, maximality of a Condorcet domain is inherited to all subsets, as asserted by the following observation.

Proposition 2.4. *Suppose that $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ is a maximal Condorcet domain and $|A| \leq 4$. Then D_B is a maximal Condorcet domain on B for all non-empty subsets $B \subseteq A$.*

This follows easily from the complete classification of all maximal Condorcet domains on up to four alternatives provided below. We close this subsection with some further terminology. A domain that, for any triple $\{a, b, c\} \subseteq A$, satisfies a condition $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}1$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$ is called *never-top* domain, a domain that for any triple $\{a, b, c\} \subseteq A$ satisfies a condition $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}2$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$

³ It is easy to construct complete sets of never conditions that are inconsistent, i.e., such that $D(\mathcal{N})$ is empty. For instance, it is not possible that *all* alternatives in A are never on top of any order.

⁴ The website <https://nevercondition.de> offers an online tool to determine, for $m = 4, 5, 6$ alternatives, if a given domain is a Condorcet domain and, if so, which never conditions it satisfies.

⁵ On the other hand, not every closed Condorcet domain must contain *all* orders compatible with a given set of complete and consistent never conditions.

⁶ Maximal Condorcet domains such that all their restrictions to pairs are maximal have been called *ample* in Karpov and Slinko (2023a).

is called *never-middle* domain,⁷ and a domain that for any triple $\{a, b, c\} \subseteq A$ satisfies a condition $xN_{\{a,b,c\}}^3$ with $x \in \{a, b, c\}$ is called *never-bottom* domain. A domain that, for any triple, satisfies either a never-top or a never-bottom condition is called a *peak-pit domain* (Danilov et al., 2012). Both the never-top and the never-bottom conditions are called *peak-pit conditions*.

2.4. Embedding in the permutohedron

In mathematics, the universal domain $\mathcal{L}(A)$ has many representations. The most useful one for us is by the *permutohedron* of order m , which is an $(m - 1)$ -dimensional polytope embedded in an m -dimensional Euclidean space. Its vertices are labeled by the permutations of $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ from the symmetric group S_m . Two permutations are connected by an edge if they differ only in two neighboring places. For our purposes geometry is not important, so for us the permutohedron is the skeleton of this polytope, that is, the graph whose vertices are the permutations from S_m with edges inherited from the edges of the aforementioned polytope. The use of permutohedron in social choice was pioneered by Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl (1963).

The permutohedron is naturally endowed with the following betweenness structure (Kemeny, 1959). An order v is *between* orders u and w if $v \supseteq u \cap w$, i.e., if v agrees with all binary comparisons in which u and w agree (see also Kemeny and Snell, 1960). The set of all orders that are between u and w is called the *interval* spanned by u and w and is denoted by $[u, w]$. With this notation, two orders u, w are connected by an edge—we call them neighbors—if and only if $[u, w] = \{u, w\}$.

Figs. 1 and 2 show the permutohedron of order three with the different subdomains shown in red (for a graphic representation of the permutohedron of order four, see below). One observes an important difference between the two group separable Condorcet domains in Fig. 1 and the single-peaked and single-dipped domains in Fig. 2: the latter are connected but the former are not. We formalize connectedness in the following definition.

Definition 10. A domain \mathcal{D} is called *connected* if any two orders $u, w \in \mathcal{D}$ are connected by a path in the permutohedron that stays within \mathcal{D} , in other words, if there exist $\{v_1, \dots, v_k\} \subseteq \mathcal{D}$ such that, for all $j = 1, \dots, k - 1$, v_j and v_{j+1} differ only in two neighboring positions, and $v_1 = u$ and $v_k = w$. A stronger notion of *direct connectedness* requires in addition that the path between u and w satisfies $\{v_h, \dots, v_l\} \subseteq [v_h, v_l]$ for all $1 \leq h < l \leq k$ (Sato, 2013; Puppe, 2016).

To illustrate the difference between connectedness and direct connectedness, consider on the set $A = \{a, b, c\}$ the domain consisting of all linear orders on $\{a, b, c\}$ except abc . This domain is connected but not directly so, because the path that connects the two neighbors bac and acb of the missing order abc in this domain is not a shortest path in the permutohedron.

3. Connected domains

3.1. The single-peaked domain

The single-peaked domain $SP_{>}$ is connected (see e.g., Elkind et al. (2014)) and possesses the following two properties.

Definition 11. A Condorcet domain \mathcal{D} is said to have *maximal width* if there is some linear order u such that $u \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\bar{u} \in \mathcal{D}$.

The property of maximal width plays an important role in the analysis of Condorcet domains as the existence of two completely reversed orders simplifies matters considerably. Mathematically, this is reflected by the fact that a maximal Condorcet domain can be naturally endowed with the structure of a distributive lattice if it has maximal width.⁸ Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) use this for a characterization of all Condorcet domains with maximal width, and they derive a lattice formula for the majority relation on such domains.⁹

Observe that a maximal *connected* Condorcet domain can contain at most one pair of completely reversed orders. Indeed, if we had two such pairs, say u, \bar{u} and v, \bar{v} , then we can find a triple $\{a, b, c\}$ on which u and v disagree. Without loss of generality we may assume that the restriction $u_{\{a,b,c\}}$ of u and the restriction $v_{\{a,b,c\}}$ of v are abc and acb , respectively. But then $\mathcal{D}_{\{a,b,c\}} \supseteq \{abc, cba, acb, bca\}$, and since \mathcal{D} is a Condorcet domain in fact $\mathcal{D}_{\{a,b,c\}} = \{abc, cba, acb, bca\}$, which is not connected. In particular, a maximal connected Condorcet domain with maximal width contains a *unique* pair of completely reversed orders.

The second property of the single-peaked domain is its ‘minimal richness,’ as follows.

Definition 12. A Condorcet domain \mathcal{D} is said to be *minimally rich* if, for all $a \in A$, there exists an order in \mathcal{D} that has alternative a on top.

From an economic point of view, minimal richness is a very natural property; it requires that every feasible alternative should be the best individual choice for at least one potential voter. This condition has been considered frequently (under that name) in the literature on domain restrictions, see, e.g., Aswal et al. (2003).

⁷ The domain $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ in (4) is a never-middle domain notwithstanding the fact that it also satisfies a never-top and a never-bottom condition on the triple $\{a, b, d\}$; indeed, for all other triples, it satisfies exactly one never-middle condition.

⁸ And in fact only then, see Puppe and Slinko (2019, Coroll. 3.2).

⁹ Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) refer to domains with maximal width as ‘normal.’




Fig. 3. The graph of the single-peaked domain SP_{abcd} .




Fig. 4. Embedding of the single-peaked domain SP_{abcd} in the 4-permutohedron.

The following result shows that the single-peaked domain is the only connected maximal Condorcet domain to have these two additional properties. The (median) graph of the single-peaked domain SP_{abcd} is depicted in Fig. 3, its embedding in the 4-permutohedron is shown in Fig. 4.

Theorem 3.1 (Puppe (2018)). *A maximal Condorcet domain D is connected, minimally rich and has maximal width if and only if there exists a linear order $>$ on A such that $D = SP_{>}$.*

The idea of the proof of Theorem 3.1 is simple. All three properties of connectedness, maximal width and minimal richness are inherited from a domain D to its restrictions on every triple. But the only domain on a triple that has these properties is the single-peaked domain (see Fig. 2, left). Hence, the restriction of D to every triple is single-peaked, i.e., satisfies a (unique) never-bottom condition; the maximal width condition guarantees that these never-bottom conditions are satisfied with respect to a common spectrum.

A similar argument implies that there is a unique maximal connected Condorcet domain D that has maximal width and has the property that every alternative occurs at least once at the bottom of the orders in D , namely the single-dipped domain (cf. Fig. 2, right).

A different description of the single-peaked domain in terms of ‘sign representations’ of single-peaked orders has been given by Zhan (2022). To describe it, consider $A = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and the class of all single-peaked orders $SP_{>}$ with respect to the natural order $>$ on $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. Let $v = a_1 \dots a_n$ be a single-peaked order with peak a_1 . If the second ranked alternative a_2 is such that $a_2 > a_1$, then the first sign in the sequence corresponding to v is a +; if $a_2 < a_1$, then it is a -. Now, suppose that we have already constructed a string of $k - 1$ signs from the set $\{+, -\}$ for the suborder $a_1 \dots a_k$. The next ranked alternative a_{k+1} either satisfies $a_{k+1} > a_j$ for all $j = 1, \dots, k$, in which case the k^{th} sign in the sequence is +, or it satisfies $a_{k+1} < a_j$ for all $j = 1, \dots, k$, in which case the k^{th} sign is -. Continuing this way we obtain a sequence of + and - of length $n - 1$ that uniquely encodes v .

On the other hand, if we have a sequence of + and -, then counting the number of + signs gives us the top alternative of the corresponding order: if there are k plusses, then the top preference is $n - k$. From the top alternative, the sequence of + and - determines then the entire order in a straightforward manner. For example, with $n = 5$, the single-peaked orders 34251 and 43251 can be encoded as +-+- and --+-, respectively. Conversely, ++-+ denotes the single-peaked preference 23415. Specifically, we have the following result.




Fig. 5. Graph of a locally single-peaked domain without maximal width.

Proposition 3.1 (Zhan (2022)). *The domain of single-peaked orders $SP_{>}$ on a set A of cardinality n is in a bijective correspondence with the set of strings of signs $+$ and $-$ of length $n - 1$. In particular, we have $|SP_{>}| = 2^{n-1}$.*

3.2. Locally single-peaked domains

While the property of minimal richness has a clear economic meaning, the maximal width condition is arguably less attractive in applications. It is thus natural to ask what happens if we drop the maximal width condition in the characterization result stated in the previous subsection.

Call a non-empty domain D *locally single-peaked* if D satisfies a complete set of never-bottom conditions; equivalently, a domain D is locally single-peaked if $D_{\{x,y,z\}}$ is single-peaked with respect to some spectrum on $\{x, y, z\}$ for all triples $x, y, z \in A$. It has long been known that the condition of single-peakedness on all triples does by itself not imply single-peakedness with respect to a common spectrum (cf. Sen, 1970).¹⁰ The following result shows that the maximal locally single-peaked domains are exactly the maximal connected Condorcet domains that are minimally rich. Fig. 5 shows the (median) graph of a maximal, locally single-peaked Condorcet domain without maximal width.

Theorem 3.2 (Slinko (2019)). *A maximal Condorcet domain is connected and minimally rich if and only if it is locally single-peaked.*

In Slinko (2019) it is also shown that all maximal locally single-peaked domain are copious (i.e. maximal on triples) and have cardinality $2^{|A|-1}$. Unlike the classical maximal (globally) single-peaked domains which are unique up to an isomorphism for each number of alternatives, the number of locally single-peaked domains grows rapidly. In an unpublished paper, Leversidge (2019) showed that the number $LSP(n)$ of locally single-peaked maximal Condorcet domains for $m \in \{3, \dots, 8\}$ is given by the following Table 1:

Table 1
The number of maximal locally single-peaked domains depending on the number of alternatives.

m	3	4	5	6	7	8
$LSP(m)$	1	2	6	40	560	17024

3.3. Connected domains with maximal width

In this subsection, we study the class of connected maximal Condorcet domains that are not necessarily minimally rich but still satisfy the maximal width condition. For this it will often be convenient to identify A with the set $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. The two most prominent examples of such domains, besides the single-peaked domain, are the single-crossing domains and the so-called Fishburn’s alternating scheme domains.

3.3.1. Maximal Condorcet domains that are single-crossing

A frequently useful sufficient condition for transitivity of the majority relation is the ‘single-crossing property;’ it requires that the orders in a domain can be put in a sequence so that along this sequence the relative positions of any pair of alternatives is reversed at most once.¹¹ Roberts (1977) and Gans and Smart (1996) provide a number of economic applications of this property. Single-crossing domains have a number of attractive characteristics. For instance, in every group with an odd number of voters with preferences from a single-crossing domain there is always a voter whose preference coincides with the majority relation — this fact is known as the ‘Representative Voter Theorem’ (Grandmont, 1978; Rothstein, 1991). Moreover, the collective choice prescribed by the majority relation can be implemented in dominant strategies through a simple mechanism (Tohmé and Saporiti, 2006), among the many social choice functions implementable in dominant strategies on single-crossing domains (Saporiti, 2009).

Recent research has revealed that understanding single-crossing domains could be crucial to understanding Condorcet domains in general. Indeed, Galambos and Reiner (2008) proved that any connected maximal Condorcet domain of maximal width is a *union*

¹⁰ The characterization given by Ballester and Haeringer (2011) identifies the additional property on quadruples needed for this implication.

¹¹ According to Monjardet (2009, p. 145), single-crossingness has been introduced in the literature by Blin (1973) under the name of multidimensional consistency. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.

of single-crossing domains. An important question then is: under which conditions is a single-crossing domain by itself already a maximal Condorcet domain? We will provide two (related) answers to this question in this subsection.

Let us start with the formal definition of single-crossingness.

Definition 13. A domain $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ is said to be a *single-crossing domain* if the orders from D can be written in a sequence $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_{|D|})$ so that $i \succ_1 j$ implies either $i \succ_s j$ for every s , or there is an integer k such that $i \succ_s j$ for every $s \leq k$ and $j \succ_s i$ for every $s > k$. Simply put, traveling along \succ_1, \succ_2, \dots the relative positions of i and j swap at most once. If D is not a proper subset of another single-crossing domain, then we say it is a *maximal single-crossing domain*.¹²

As an example, let us consider the domain D on $A = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ whose orders are represented as columns of the following matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 4 \\ 2 & 1 & 3 & 3 & 4 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 3 & 1 & 4 & 3 & 3 & 2 \\ 4 & 4 & 4 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{6}$$

Observe that each order can be obtained from its immediate predecessor by swapping exactly one pair of neighboring alternatives: the second order is obtained from the first by swapping the pair $(1, 2)$, the third from the second by swapping $(1, 3)$, the fourth from the third by swapping $(1, 4)$, the fifth from the fourth by swapping $(3, 4)$, the sixth from the fifth by swapping $(2, 4)$, and finally the seventh from the sixth by swapping $(2, 3)$. Consequently, the graph corresponding to this domain is a line graph.

The following result summarizes the basic properties of single-crossing domains. Say that a domain D has the *representative voter property* if, for all profiles $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_n)$ with odd n , there exists $k \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that the pairwise majority relation corresponding to the profile coincides with \succ_k .

Proposition 3.2.

- a) Every single-crossing domain has the representative voter property. In particular, every single-crossing domain is a Condorcet domain.
- b) Every maximal single-crossing domain is connected and has maximal width.
- c) A domain on a set of m alternatives is a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if its associated graph is a line graph of length $\frac{1}{2}m(m - 1) + 1$.
- d) Every single-crossing domain on at least four alternatives that is a maximal Condorcet domain is a ‘proper’ peak-pit domain (i.e., it is copious and satisfies some never-bottom as well as some never-top conditions but no never-middle ones).

Parts a) - c) of Proposition 3.2 follow from the analysis in Puppe and Slinko (2019).¹³ Part d) follows from two observations. First, every connected domain of maximal width is a peak-pit domain and copious. Second, if only never-top or only never-bottom conditions were satisfied, the domain would be either single-peaked or single-dipped; however, it can be neither of these (this follows at once from a comparison of their sizes). Moreover, Slinko et al. (2021) characterize exactly the set of never conditions that a single-crossing maximal Condorcet domain satisfies.

Every maximal single-crossing domain on a set of m alternatives has $k = \frac{1}{2}m(m - 1) + 1$ elements¹⁴ and is characterized by a sequence of $k - 1$ pairs of swapped alternatives

$$(i_1, j_1), (i_2, j_2), \dots, (i_{k-1}, j_{k-1}) \tag{7}$$

from the set $\{(i, j) \mid 1 \leq i < j \leq n\}$. The pair (i_s, j_s) in this sequence means that i_s and j_s are neighbors in \succ_s and \succ_{s+1} , with $i_s \succ_t j_s$ for $t = 1, \dots, s$, and $j_s \succ_t i_s$ for $t = s + 1, \dots, k$, while all other relations between alternatives in \succ_s and \succ_{s+1} are identical. Roughly speaking, the passage from \succ_s to \succ_{s+1} is a swap of neighbors i_s and j_s . For instance, as already noted above, the swapping sequence for the domain (6) is $(1, 4), (1, 3), (1, 4), (3, 4), (2, 4), (2, 3)$.

The following result can be inferred from (Galambos and Reiner, 2008, Th. 2) and is explicitly stated as Theorem 9 in Puppe and Slinko (2019).

Theorem 3.3. A maximal single-crossing domain D is a maximal Condorcet domain if and only if the swapping sequence (7) characterizing D satisfies the following ‘pairwise concatenation’ property¹⁵:

$$\{i_s, j_s\} \cap \{i_{s+1}, j_{s+1}\} \neq \emptyset \text{ for every } s \in \{1, 2, \dots, k - 1\}. \tag{8}$$

¹² Observe that a maximal single-crossing domain need not be maximal as a Condorcet domain.

¹³ Theorem 6 in Puppe and Slinko (2019) shows that a maximal Condorcet domain has the representative voter property if and only if it is either single-crossing or one of the 4-point domains discussed in Section 4 below.

¹⁴ This is the number of pairs to be switched plus one.

¹⁵ This condition appeared already in the unpublished lecture notes Monjardet (2007).




Fig. 6. Graph of Fishburn's domain F_4 on four alternatives.

Here is an embedding of \overline{F}_4 into the permutohedron (Fig. 7):




Fig. 7. Embedding of \overline{F}_4 into the permutohedron.

It is easily seen that F_m and \overline{F}_m are connected and have maximal width. Also observe that F_4 has cardinality 9 and is in fact the uniquely largest Condorcet domain on a set of four alternatives up to isomorphism or flip-isomorphism (Raynaud, 1982). Further, it is known that F_m has the uniquely largest cardinality among all maximal Condorcet domains for all $m \leq 7$ (Monjardet, 2009; Galambos and Reiner, 2008). Remarkably, despite the fact that F_m is always strictly larger than the single-peaked domain on m alternatives, the Fishburn domains are never minimally rich as some alternatives are required not to be first in some triples.

Recently, Karpov (2023) has identified a class of ‘generalized Fishburn’ domains that contains the alternating scheme, and characterized this class in a manner similar to Theorem 3.1 by weakening the minimal richness condition to the requirement that each alternative be at the top or at the bottom of some ordering in the domain.

3.3.3. Condorcet domains of the tiling type

In order to characterize the class of all connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width, Danilov et al. (2012) introduced the ‘rhombus tiling’ representation of a domain.

Definition 15 (Danilov et al. (2012)). A *rhombus tiling* (or simply a *tiling*) is a subdivision into rhombic tiles of a regular $2m$ -gon formed by the points $\sum_i a_i \psi_i$, where $0 \leq a_i \leq 1$ and ψ_1, \dots, ψ_m are unit vectors in the upper half-plane (see Fig. 8 where the unit vectors are indicated by the numbers 1, 2, 3). This center-symmetric $2m$ -gon has its bottom vertex at the origin and the top vertex at the point $\psi_1 + \dots + \psi_m$. An ij -tile is a rhombus congruent to the one formed by the points $\lambda \psi_i + \mu \psi_j$, where $0 \leq \lambda, \mu \leq 1$ (e.g., in Fig. 8 to the left, the 23-tile is the upper left rhombus, while in Fig. 8 to the right, the 23-tile is the bottom right rhombus). A *snake* is a path from the top vertex to the bottom vertex along the boundaries of the tiles which, for each $i = 1, \dots, m$, contains a unique segment parallel to ψ_i . Each snake corresponds to a linear order on $\{1, \dots, m\}$ in the following way. If a point traveling from top to bottom along a snake passes segments parallel to $\psi_{i_1}, \psi_{i_2}, \dots, \psi_{i_m}$, then the corresponding linear order will be $i_1 i_2 \dots i_m$; e.g., in Fig. 8 the snake that travels from top to bottom along the right border of either hexagon corresponds to the order 123, and the snake that travels from top to bottom along the left border corresponds to the completely reversed order 321. The set of snakes of a rhombus tiling, thus, defines a domain which is called a *tiling domain*.




Fig. 8. Two tiling domains.

For $m = 3$ we have a hexagon which can be split into rhombus tiles in two different ways as shown in Fig. 8. These lead to the domains:

$$\{123, 213, 231, 321\} \quad \text{and} \quad \{123, 132, 312, 321\},$$

which are the familiar single-peaked and single-dipped domains, respectively.

Definition 16 (Danilov et al. (2012)). A domain D containing two completely reversed orders u and \bar{u} is called *semi-connected* if it contains an entire shortest path in the permutohedron connecting u and \bar{u} .

The following result can be derived from the analysis in Danilov et al. (2012), which, in turn, is based on combinatorial results of Leclerc and Zelevinsky (1998).

Theorem 3.5 (Danilov et al. (2012)). Let D be a maximal Condorcet domain with maximal width. The following statements are equivalent.

- a) D is semi-connected.
- b) D is connected.
- c) D is a peak-pit domain.
- d) D is a tiling domain.

By Theorem 3.5, the connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width are exactly the peak-pit domains with maximal width. Observe, that these domains are all copious and thus satisfy a unique complete set of never conditions. It has been observed in Puppe (2016) that these domains are not only connected but even directly connected, i.e., any two orders of a domain are connected by a *shortest path* in the permutohedron that stays within the domain.

3.3.4. Arrangements of pseudolines

We now describe an equivalent geometric representation of connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width in terms of *pseudoline arrangements* on the plane. This combinatorial object has by now become folklore in low dimensional topology, the study of the Yang-Baxter equation and geometric combinatorics (Humphreys, 1994). Galambos and Reiner (2008) were the first to relate this concept to Condorcet domains.

The most intuitive way to think about arrangements of pseudolines is geometrically. On two vertical parallel lines L and R in \mathbb{R}^2 , we mark a set of m equidistant points. The points on the left line are labeled $1, \dots, m$ in downward order and on the right line the points are marked also $1, \dots, m$ but in upward order. The two points with the same label i — one on the left and one on the right — are joined by a continuous curve which is called *pseudoline* i so that any two pseudolines intersect exactly at one point, called a *vertex*. The arrangement is *simple* if there is no vertex where three or more pseudolines meet.

An arrangement of pseudolines consisting of piecewise linear ‘wires’ is also called a *wiring diagram*. The wires (pseudolines) are horizontal except for small neighborhoods of their crossings with other wires; see Fig. 9 for an example. There is no loss of generality in assuming that our pseudolines are wires. The arrangements we consider are all simple, and often called *simple numbered arrangements of pseudolines* (Björner et al., 1999, Sect. 6.4).

The parallel lines L and R bound an infinite LR -strip between them. The complement of the pseudolines in the LR -strip is split into *chambers* which are the connected parts of this complement (two of them the top and the bottom ones are unbounded). They are labeled as follows. For a chamber C and any pseudoline k we can say if this chamber is above or below the line k . The label of the chamber is the set of numbers of the pseudolines that go above this chamber (see Fig. 9 for an illustration). By convention, the label \emptyset is attached to the chamber that is above all pseudolines. Every path that connects the upper chamber labeled \emptyset with the bottom chamber labeled $\{1, \dots, m\}$, and consequently crosses each pseudoline exactly once, naturally defines an order on $\{1, \dots, m\}$. If it crosses the pseudolines in order i_1, i_2, \dots, i_m , then we attach the order $i_1 i_2 \dots i_m$ to it. The set of all such paths thus defines a domain corresponding to the given simple numbered arrangement of pseudolines. We say that this domain is *represented* by the just




Fig. 9. The wiring diagram corresponding to F_4 .




Fig. 10. The arrangement of pseudolines and its dual tiling for F_4 .

described arrangement of pseudolines. For instance, as is easily verified, the domain represented by the wiring diagram in Fig. 9 is Fishburn’s alternating scheme domain F_4 .

The representations of connected maximal Condorcet domains of maximal width in terms of rhombus tilings and simple numbered arrangements of pseudolines are ‘dual’ to each other. This can be inferred from the canonical bijection between the chambers of an arrangement of pseudolines and the vertices of the corresponding rhombus tiling, as indicated in Fig. 10 for the case of F_4 (see Elnitsky (1997); Felsner (2012) for more details).

Hence we obtain from Theorem 3.5 the following corollary:

Corollary 3.1. *A domain D is a semi-connected maximal Condorcet domain with maximal width if and only if it can be represented by a simple numbered arrangement of pseudolines.*

3.3.5. Separated ideals

Finally, we present yet another equivalent way to characterize the connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width. The key to this is the observation that the chambers of a simple numbered arrangement of pseudolines correspond to the *initial segments* of the orders in the represented Condorcet domain. Formally, we introduce the notion of an ideal of a domain, as follows (Danilov et al., 2012). For any order $u = a_1 a_2 \dots a_m \in \mathcal{L}(A)$, denote by $u_k = a_1 a_2 \dots a_k$ the initial segment of length $k \leq m$, and set $\text{Id}_k(u) = \{a_1, \dots, a_k\}$ with $\text{Id}_0(u) = \emptyset$ by convention.

Definition 17. The *ideal* $\text{Id}(D)$ of a domain D is defined as the collection of all subsets of A that are obtained from initial segments of the orders in D ,

$$\text{Id}(D) = \bigcup_{k=0}^n \text{Id}_k(D),$$

where $\text{Id}_k(D) = \{\text{Id}_k(u) \mid u \in D\}$.

For instance, in case of the single-peaked domain $SP_{>}$, the ideal is given by all intervals of the spectrum $>$.¹⁷

¹⁷ More generally, the ideal corresponds to the ‘spectrum’ of the tiling corresponding to the domain, see Danilov et al. (2012).

Proposition 3.3. *For any connected maximal Condorcet domain D with maximal width, the ideal $Id(D)$ is given by the family of chambers of the corresponding simple numbered arrangement of pseudolines.*

For instance, for the Fishburn alternating scheme domain F_4 we obtain the ideal

$$Id(F_4) = \{\emptyset, \{1\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{3, 4\}, \{1, 2, 3\}, \{1, 3, 4\}, \{2, 3, 4\}, \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\},$$

which consists of the labels of chambers of the arrangement of pseudolines shown in Fig. 9.

The ideals of connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width have a particular structure; indeed, they form a family of ‘separated sets’ (Leclerc and Zelevinsky, 1998). Specifically, it is said that two sets $X, Y \subseteq A = \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ are *separated* if there does not exist a triple $\{a, b, c\} \subseteq A$ such that $a < b < c$ and either

$$\begin{aligned} (X \cap \{a, b, c\} = \{b\} \quad \text{and} \quad Y \cap \{a, b, c\} = \{a, c\}), \text{ or} \\ (X \cap \{a, b, c\} = \{a, c\} \quad \text{and} \quad Y \cap \{a, b, c\} = \{b\}). \end{aligned}$$

A family of subsets is called *separated* if any two sets in the family are separated.¹⁸ For instance, the family of all intervals with respect to the natural ordering of $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, and hence the ideal corresponding to the single-peaked domain, is clearly separated. The following characterization follows from combining results of Leclerc and Zelevinsky (1998), Danilov et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2021).

Theorem 3.6. *Let D be a maximal Condorcet domain with maximal width. The following statements are equivalent:*

- a) D is connected;
- b) D is a peak-pit domain;
- c) $Id(D)$ is separated.

A remarkable corollary of Theorem 3.6 and the correspondence between the ideal of a connected maximal Condorcet domain with maximal width and the chambers of its pseudoline arrangement is the following.

Corollary 3.2 (Li et al. (2021)). *Let D be a maximal Condorcet domain with maximal width on a set of m alternatives. Then,*

$$|Id(D)| = \frac{m(m+1)}{2} + 1.$$

Thus, while the cardinalities of maximal connected Condorcet domains with maximal width on a given number of alternatives can be quite different, the cardinality of the associated ideal is constant. In Li et al. (2021) this fact is explored in order to provide a complete classification of all connected maximal Condorcet domains with maximal width on five alternatives. It turns out that, up to an isomorphism and flip-isomorphism, there are exactly 18 of them with cardinalities ranging from 11 (for the single-crossing domain) to 20 (for the Fishburn alternating scheme domain F_5); by Corollary 3.2, their ideals all have the same cardinality of $(5 \cdot 6)/2 + 1 = 16$.

3.4. Connected domains without maximal width: a conjecture

The characterization results provided in the previous subsection for the connected maximal Condorcet domains all rely crucially on the maximal width assumption. As we have shown, connectedness together with the maximal width assumption implies that the corresponding domains are copious, i.e. maximal on triples, and satisfy a unique complete set of peak-pit never conditions. Even without the maximal width condition, we still have:

Proposition 3.4. *Every connected maximal Condorcet domain satisfies a complete set of peak-pit conditions.*

Proof. As is easily verified, the restriction $D_{\{x,y,z\}}$ of a connected domain D to every triple $\{x, y, z\}$ is also connected. Moreover, since D is a Condorcet domain, this restriction can contain at most four orders. Then, one easily checks that every connected subdomain on three alternatives with no more than four elements satisfies at least one never-bottom or one never-top condition. \square

By Theorem 3.2 the converse statement holds for all maximal Condorcet domains that satisfy either a complete set of never-bottom conditions (the locally single-peaked domains) or, by symmetric arguments, a complete set of never-top conditions (the locally single-dipped domains): these domains are connected no matter if they have maximal width or not. Together with Proposition 3.4, this observation naturally leads to the following conjecture (which can indeed be verified to hold for all domains on up to 5 alternatives).

¹⁸ What we simply call ‘separated’ here, is referred to as ‘strongly separated’ in Leclerc and Zelevinsky (1998) since they also consider a weaker version of that notion.

Conjecture 1. A maximal Condorcet domain is connected if and only if it is a peak-pit domain.

For four alternatives, a classification of all peak-pit domains has been carried out in Dittrich (2018) by computerized search. There, we encounter the following two previously unseen creatures, which (in accordance with our conjecture) are connected.

1. The **ladder domain** (see Fig. 11) is defined by the following complete set of never conditions:

$$3N_{\{1,2,3\}}1, 4N_{\{1,2,4\}}1, 1N_{\{1,3,4\}}3, 2N_{\{2,3,4\}}3.$$

It is copious but does not have maximal width (cf. domain D_5 in the appendix).




Fig. 11. Graph of the 'ladder' domain.

2. The **broken ladder domain** (see Fig. 12) is defined by the following complete set of never conditions:

$$3N_{\{1,2,3\}}1, 1N_{\{1,2,4\}}3, 1N_{\{1,3,4\}}3, 2N_{\{2,3,4\}}3.$$

It is copious but does not have maximal width (cf. domain D_6 in the appendix).




Fig. 12. Graph of the 'broken ladder' domain.

Proposition 3.5 (Dittrich (2018)). If $m = 4$, then any maximal connected Condorcet domain is either isomorphic or flip-isomorphic to one of the following: the single-peaked domain; the single-crossing domain; the Fishburn’s domain; the locally single-peaked domain without maximal width; the ladder domain; the broken ladder domain. Only the first three of these have maximal width.

One difficulty in trying to prove Conjecture in general is that maximal Condorcet domains on more than four alternatives need not be copious. Indeed, the phenomenon that maximal Condorcet domains may satisfy different never conditions on the same triple of alternatives (and thus induce less than four different restricted orders on that triple) is not limited to ‘small’ domains such as the one in (4) above. Here is a non-copious maximal Condorcet domain on five alternatives with cardinality 15 (in the list of all 688 equivalence classes of non isomorphic or flip-isomorphic maximal Condorcet domains on five alternatives obtained by Dittrich (2018) it appears as no. 273).

$$D_{\#273} = \{abcde, acbde, acdbe, aebcd, aecbd, aecdb, eabcd, eacbd, eacdb, ecabd, ecadb, ecdab, ecdba, edcab, edcba\}.$$

This domain satisfies the multiple never conditions $dN_{\{c,d,e\}}1$ and $eN_{\{c,d,e\}}2$ on the triple $\{c, d, e\}$. Note that although the domain $D_{\#273}$ thus satisfies a never-top condition on the triple $\{c, d, e\}$, its restriction to this triple is not connected because it also satisfies a particular never-middle condition on that triple. In particular, the domain $D_{\#273}$ is itself not connected. But it does not represent a counterexample to the conjecture because it also satisfies the unique never-middle conditions $eN_{\{b,c,e\}}2$ and $eN_{\{b,d,e\}}2$, hence it is not a peak-pit domain.

The domain $D_{\#273}$ has maximal width; here is a non-copious maximal Condorcet domain on five alternatives without maximal width. It has cardinality 16, and it is the uniquely largest domain on five alternatives that is not copious (No. 332 in the above mentioned list).

$$D_{\#332} = \{abcde, abced, abecd, abedc, acebd, acedb, aecbd, aecdb, bacde, baced, baecd, baedc, caebd, caedb, eacbd, eacdb\}.$$

This domain satisfies multiple never conditions $aN_{\{a,b,d\}}3$ and $dN_{\{a,b,d\}}1$ on the triple $\{a, b, d\}$, multiple never conditions $aN_{\{a,c,d\}}3$ and $dN_{\{a,c,d\}}1$ on the triple $\{a, c, d\}$ and multiple never conditions $aN_{\{a,d,e\}}3$ and $dN_{\{a,d,e\}}1$ on the triple $\{a, c, d\}$; it is not connected because it satisfies a unique never middle condition $bN_{\{b,c,e\}}2$ on the triple $\{b, c, e\}$.

4. Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains

We now turn to the remaining class of ‘pure’ Condorcet domains, the maximal Condorcet domains that satisfy a complete set of never-middle conditions. These domains turn out to be intimately related to the symmetric domains systematically studied by Danilov and Koshevoy (2013).

Definition 18. A domain D is *symmetric* if $u \in D$ implies $\bar{u} \in D$.

In other words, the symmetric domains are those that are flip isomorphic to themselves. Of the maximal Condorcet domains encountered so far only the group separable domains are symmetric.

Proposition 4.1. Every symmetric Condorcet domain D satisfies a complete set of never-middle conditions. Conversely, every never-middle maximal Condorcet domain is symmetric.

Proof. Suppose that D is symmetric and satisfies $aN_{\{a,b,c\}}3$ for some triple $a, b, c \in A$. Then $D_{\{a,b,c\}} \subseteq \{abc, bac, acb, cab\}$. Since \overline{abc} and \overline{acb} are not in $D_{\{a,b,c\}}$, we must in fact have $D_{\{a,b,c\}} \subseteq \{bac, cab\}$ by symmetry. In that case, D also satisfies $bN_{\{a,b,c\}}2$. A similar argument holds if D satisfies $aN_{\{a,b,c\}}1$.

Conversely, suppose D satisfies a complete set of never-middle conditions. Since any never-middle condition is itself symmetric, if u satisfies a given never-middle condition so does \bar{u} . Due to the maximality of D , if $u \in D$ then also $\bar{u} \in D$. \square

4.1. Decomposable domains

Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains are frequently ‘decomposable’ in the following sense (Karpov and Slinko, 2023b).

Definition 19. Let \mathcal{E} be a Condorcet domain on the m -element set of alternatives $B = \{b_1, \dots, b_m\}$. Let also D_1, \dots, D_m be Condorcet domains on disjoint sets C_1, \dots, C_m of alternatives. Then we define the domain on $C_1 \cup \dots \cup C_m$ as

$$\mathcal{E}(b_1 \rightarrow D_1, \dots, b_m \rightarrow D_m) := \{u_1 \dots u_m \mid u_j \in D_j \text{ and } b_{i_1} \dots b_{i_m} \in \mathcal{E}\}.$$

When it can cause no confusion, we will denote this domain as $\mathcal{E}(D_1, \dots, D_m)$. We call \mathcal{E} the *top-level domain* and D_1, \dots, D_m *ground level domains*.

This definition is similar, in spirit, to the definition of the wreath product of permutations introduced in Atkinson and Stitt (2002).

Definition 20. A domain $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A)$ is called *decomposable* if it is isomorphic to $\mathcal{E}(D_1, \dots, D_m)$, where $|C_i| > 1$ for at least one D_i where $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$. Otherwise, if D is not decomposable, it is called *indecomposable*.

Proposition 4.2 (Karpov and Slinko (2023b)). Let $|A| = m$ and $\mathcal{E}, D_1, \dots, D_m$ be Condorcet domains on disjoint sets of alternatives A, C_1, \dots, C_m , respectively. Then $D = \mathcal{E}(D_1, \dots, D_m)$ is again a Condorcet domain with

$$|\mathcal{E}(D_1, \dots, D_m)| = |\mathcal{E}| \prod_{i=1}^m |D_i|. \tag{10}$$

Moreover, D is a symmetric domain if and only if all domains $\mathcal{E}, D_1, \dots, D_m$ are symmetric.

We want to use this construction in order to obtain an alternative description of the group separable domains as those that are ‘completely’ decomposable. First, we observe that a partial case of the above construction has already appeared in the literature (Raynaud, 1981; Fishburn, 2002; Danilov and Koshevoy, 2013). Indeed, for the case $|A| = 2$, $\mathcal{E} = \{a_1 a_2, a_2 a_1\}$ and any two Condorcet domains D_1, D_2 , the operation

$$D_1 \star D_2 := \mathcal{E}(D_1, D_2) = \{u_1 u_2 \mid u_1 \in D_1, u_2 \in D_2\} \cup \{u_2 u_1 \mid u_1 \in D_1, u_2 \in D_2\}$$

was used in Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) in order to construct a series of never-middle maximal Condorcet domains, namely,

$$a_1 \star a_2 \star a_3 \star \dots \star a_n \tag{11}$$

with some parenthesization,¹⁹ where a_i is identified with the trivial domain on a single alternative a_i . Let us call a domain *completely decomposable* if it is of the form (11) for some parenthesization. Evidently, every maximal completely decomposable domain is symmetric. For instance, we have

¹⁹ Note that the operation \star is commutative but not associative.

$$(a \star b) \star (c \star d) = \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cdab, cdba, dcab, dcba\},$$

$$a \star (b \star (c \star d)) = \{abcd, abdc, acdb, adcb, bcda, bdca, cdba, dcba\}.$$

These two domains turn out to be the two group separable maximal Condorcet domains on four alternatives (see the domains D_8 and D_9 and their embeddings in the 4-permutohedron in the appendix). In general, we have:

Theorem 4.1. *A maximal Condorcet domain is group separable if and only if it is completely decomposable.*

4.2. Indecomposable domains

Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) discovered a series of symmetric maximal Condorcet domains that, for any number of alternatives m , have cardinality of just 4. Karpov and Slinko (2023b) call them *Raynaud domains*, since Raynaud (1981) was the first to discover such a domain in the case of four alternatives, calling it ‘configuration K .’ The (unique) Raynaud domain on four alternatives is given by the symmetric domain $\{abcd, bdac, cadb, dcba\}$ (see the domain D_7 in the appendix).

Let $A = \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ and define a permutation σ_m on $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ by

$$\sigma_m := 24 \dots (2k)1(2k \pm 1) \dots 53,$$

where $2k \pm 1$ is equal to $2k + 1 = m$, if m is odd, and $2k - 1 = m - 1$ if m is even. For example, $\sigma_6 = 246153$ and $\sigma_7 = 2461753$. Denoting $e = 12 \dots m$, Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) showed that the domains

$$\{e, \bar{e}, \sigma_m, \bar{\sigma}_m\}$$

are symmetric maximal Condorcet domains on $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ for every $m \geq 4$; moreover, these domains are evidently indecomposable.

The permutation σ_m is a special case of what is known as a *simple permutation* (Albert and Atkinson, 2005):

Definition 21. Let $i_1 i_2 \dots i_m$ be a sequence of distinct elements of $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. We say that a subsequence $i_k i_{k+1} \dots i_\ell$ is an *interval* of length ℓ in the sequence $i_1 i_2 \dots i_m$ if the set $\{i_k, i_{k+1}, \dots, i_{k+\ell-1}\} = \{a, a + 1, \dots, a + \ell - 1\}$ for some $a \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. This interval is *trivial* if this subsequence has length 1 or m . A sequence without non-trivial intervals is called a *simple permutation*.

For example, 21 is the only non-trivial interval in 521463, and 52463 is the only interval in 152463; the permutations 2413, 41352, 24153, 2475316, 24683157, and all permutations of the form σ_m are simple.

Definition 22. For any permutation $u \neq e$, denote the domain $\mathcal{K}_u := \{e, u, \bar{u}, \bar{e}\}$, and say that \mathcal{K}_u is a *Raynaud domain* if it is a maximal Condorcet domain.

The following result highlights the role of simple permutations in our context.

Theorem 4.2 (Karpov and Slinko (2023b)). *A domain of the form \mathcal{K}_u is a Raynaud domain if and only if u is a simple permutation.*

All Raynaud domains are indecomposable, and the following conjecture states that these are in fact the only indecomposable symmetric maximal Condorcet domains.

Conjecture 2. *Every indecomposable symmetric maximal Condorcet domain on $m \geq 4$ alternatives is a Raynaud domain.*

5. Large Condorcet domains

As already noted, the main motivation for the work reported in Fishburn (1997, 2002) was the quest for large Condorcet domains. The title of Raynaud’s paper from 1982 describes this motivation in more detail: ‘The individual freedom allowed by the value restriction condition.’ Thus, Raynaud (1982) derives the interest in large Condorcet domains from the goal to maximize individual preference freedom under the collective rationality constraint of a transitive majority relation.

For $m \leq 6$, Fishburn himself proved that the alternating scheme F_m is indeed the Condorcet domain with maximal cardinality, and Galambos and Reiner (2008) found that this is true also for $m = 7$. But Fishburn also showed that for sufficiently large m , the alternating scheme does not deliver the largest Condorcet domain; more concretely, he showed that for all $m \geq 16$ there are Condorcet domains that have a larger cardinality than F_m (Fishburn, 1997). Denoting by $f(m)$ the largest cardinality of any maximal Condorcet domain on m alternatives, Fishburn’s result can be written as $f(m) > |F_m|$ for all $m \geq 16$. We now know from Leedham-Green et al. (2024) that in fact already $f(8) > |F_8|$.

The examples produced by Fishburn to show that $f(m) > |F_m|$ for large m used an operation on Condorcet domains similar to the one in Definition 19, in particular the examples were non-connected domains. Galambos and Reiner (2008) thus posed the following modified question:

Is the alternating scheme domain the largest in the class of connected domains with maximal width? (12)

Without the maximal width qualification the answer to this question is ‘no’ already for $m = 8$, because the uniquely largest Condorcet domain on eight alternatives discovered recently by Leedham-Green et al. (2024), while connected, does not have maximal width; it contains 224 orders, while the alternating scheme F_m has only 222 orders.

Galambos and Reiner (2008) gave an exact formula for the cardinality of Fishburn’s domains; the following Table 2 lists the first 13 values of $|F_m|$:

Table 2
Cardinalities of the Fishburn alternating scheme.

m	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
$ F_m $	1	4	9	20	45	100	222	488	1069	2324	5034	10840

Denoting by $g(m)$ the size of the largest peak-pit Condorcet domain of maximal width (following Monjardet, 2009), the question (12) can be reformulated as: Is it true that $g(m) = |F_m|$?

This question was finally answered in the negative by Danilov et al. (2012) who showed that $g(42) > |F_{42}|$. The tool for the construction of an appropriate example was an operation that given two peak-pit Condorcet domains of maximal width produces a larger peak-pit Condorcet domain with maximal width. Karpov and Slinko (2023a) improve their analysis by introducing a new construction, called ‘concatenation + shuffle scheme.’ The advantage of this composition operation is that given two maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains with maximal width it produces another peak-pit Condorcet domain with maximal width that is again a maximal Condorcet domain (in contrast to the construction used in Danilov et al. (2012)). With the help of this construction Karpov and Slinko (2023a) show that already $g(34) > |F_{34}|$.

To date, the best known lower bounds for f and g are (Karpov and Slinko, 2023a):

$$g(m) \geq 2.0767^m,$$

$$f(m) \geq 2.1890^m.$$

The issue of identifying large Condorcet domains is a particularly active research topic at the time of the writing of the present survey. Most recent contributions include Akello-Egwell et al. (2023), Karpov et al. (2023) and Zhou and Riis (2023). A systematic assessment and classification of these contributions is left to future work.

6. Conclusion

Let us conclude with some notes on what we have *not* covered here. First, in our treatment of the peak-pit domains we have left out some (non-elementary) facts and results on inversion triples, reduced decompositions and, more generally, the study of the so-called Bruhat lattice on the symmetric group of permutations; for a mathematically rigorous treatment, we refer the reader to Galambos and Reiner (2008) and Danilov et al. (2012).

Second, we have confined ourselves to maximal Condorcet domains. While this class is arguably the most relevant and interesting class of Condorcet domains, some results hold more generally for the class of closed Condorcet domains (as witnessed, e.g., by the analysis in Subsection 2.2 above). Most importantly, as shown in Puppe and Slinko (2019), every closed Condorcet domain (whether or not it is connected) naturally induces a median graph, and conversely every median graph defines (non-uniquely) a closed Condorcet domain. If a Condorcet domain is connected, the corresponding median graph is a subgraph of the permutohedron. Remarkably, some graphs induced by some closed Condorcet domains can never occur in the class of maximal Condorcet domains (for instance, trees that are not chains can be the induced median graphs of closed but not of maximal Condorcet domains, see Puppe and Slinko, 2019, Th. 7).

Third, the notion of Condorcet domain can be generalized to the case of weak orders, and even to partial orders. Indeed, a result analogous to Theorem 3.1 holds for weak orders (Puppe, 2018), and first steps towards an analysis of Condorcet domains of partial orders have been undertaken in Dittrich (2018).

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.




Fig. 13. The three connected maximal CDs with maximal width $D_1 - D_3$.

Appendix A. All maximal Condorcet domains on four alternatives

In this section, we present the complete classification of all maximal Condorcet domains (CDs) on four alternatives obtained by Dittrich (2018). Up to isomorphism or flip isomorphism there are exactly 18 different maximal CDs on the set $\{a, b, c, d\}$.²⁰

A.1. Connected domains

There are in total six connected maximal CDs on four alternatives, all of them are peak-pit domains.

A.1.1. Connected domains with maximal width

There are exactly three connected maximal CDs with maximal width:

$$D_1 = \{abcd, abdc, acbd, bacd, badc, bdac, cabd, dbac\},$$

$$D_2 = \{abcd, abdc, acbd, adbc, dabc, dbac, dbca\},$$

$$D_3 = \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, bdac, bdca, dbac, dbca, dcba\}.$$

The first of these (D_1) is the single-peaked domain with respect to the spectrum $d > b > a > c$, see Fig. 13 left; the second (D_2) is a single-crossing domain with the pair $acbd$ and $dbca$ of completely reversed orders, see Fig. 13 middle; the third (D_3) corresponds to Fishburn’s alternating scheme and is the (uniquely) largest maximal CD on four alternatives with 9 members, see Fig. 13 right.

The characterizing never conditions are,

$$\text{for } D_1 : \{aN_{abc}3, bN_{abd}3, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\},$$

$$\text{for } D_2 : \{cN_{abc}1, bN_{abd}1, cN_{acd}1, bN_{bcd}3\},$$

$$\text{for } D_3 : \{bN_{abc}3, bN_{abd}3, cN_{acd}1, cN_{bcd}1\}.$$

A.1.2. Connected domains without maximal width

There are exactly three connected maximal CDs without maximal width; they all have 8 members:

$$D_4 = \{abcd, abdc, acbd, acdb, bacd, badc, bcad, bcda\},$$

$$D_5 = \{abcd, abdc, acbd, adbc, bacd, badc, bcad, bdac\},$$

$$D_6 = \{abcd, abdc, acbd, adbc, bacd, badc, bcad, dabc\}.$$

The first of these (D_4) is flip isomorphic to a locally single-peaked domain, see Fig. 14 left; the second (‘ladder’) domain (D_5) and third (‘broken ladder’) domain (D_6) differ only by one order from each other, see Fig. 14 middle and right, respectively.

The characterizing never conditions are,

$$\text{for } D_4 : \{cN_{abc}1, dN_{abd}1, dN_{acd}1, dN_{bcd}1\},$$

$$\text{for } D_5 : \{cN_{abc}1, dN_{abd}1, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\},$$

$$\text{for } D_6 : \{cN_{abc}1, aN_{abd}3, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\}.$$

²⁰ Machine readable files with the lists of all maximal CDs on four and five alternatives, respectively, are available upon request from the authors. A list of all 688 non-isomorphic maximal CDs on five alternatives can be downloaded at <https://nevercondition.de>.




Fig. 14. The three connected maximal CDs without maximal width $D_4 - D_6$.




Fig. 15. The smallest maximal CD with four elements.

A.2. Symmetric domains

A.2.1. The indecomposable Raynaud domain

The smallest maximal CD has four elements (Fig. 15) and is given by

$$D_7 = \{abcd, bdac, cadb, dcba\}.$$

D_7 is one of the type of maximal CDs with four members identified by Danilov and Koshevoy (2013) which exist for any number of alternatives; it is characterized by the following set of never conditions:

$$\{cN_{abc}2, aN_{abd}2, dN_{acd}2, bN_{bcd}2\}.$$

A.2.2. Two group separable domains

There are two group separable maximal CDs on a set of four alternatives, see Fig. 16:

$$D_8 = \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cdab, cdba, dcab, dcba\},$$

$$D_9 = \{abcd, abdc, acdb, adcb, bcda, bdca, cdba, dcba\}.$$

The characterizing never conditions are,

$$\text{for } D_8 : \{cN_{abc}2, dN_{abd}2, aN_{acd}2, bN_{bcd}2\},$$

$$\text{for } D_9 : \{aN_{abc}2, aN_{abd}2, aN_{acd}2, bN_{bcd}2\}.$$

A.3. Mixed domains

Furthermore, there are nine ‘mixed’ domains, i.e., domains that are characterized by at least one never-middle condition and at least one never condition of another type. One of these domains (D_{10}) has only seven members; all others ($D_{11} - D_{18}$ listed here in lexicographic order) have eight members, see Fig. 17.




Fig. 16. The two group separable maximal CDs D_8 and D_9 .




Fig. 17. Mixed maximal CDs $D_{10} - D_{18}$ (top to bottom from left to right).

We have:

$$\begin{aligned} D_{10} &= \{abcd, abdc, acbd, adbc, bcad, cbad, dabc\}, \\ D_{11} &= \{abcd, abdc, adbc, adcb, bcda, bdca, dbca, dcba\}, \\ D_{12} &= \{abcd, abdc, acbd, bacd, badc, bcad, dabc, dbac\}, \\ D_{13} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, bdac, cabd, cadb, cbad\}, \\ D_{14} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, bdac, cabd, cbad, dbac\}, \\ D_{15} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cabd, cadb, cbad, cbda\}, \\ D_{16} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cabd, cadb, cbad, cdab\}, \\ D_{17} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cabd, cbad, cdab, cdba\}, \\ D_{18} &= \{abcd, abdc, bacd, badc, cabd, cbad, dabc, dbac\}. \end{aligned}$$

The characterizing never conditions are,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{for } D_{10} &: \{aN_{abc}2, aN_{abd}3, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\}, \\ \text{for } D_{11} &: \{aN_{abc}2, aN_{abd}2, aN_{acd}2, cN_{bcd}1\}, \\ \text{for } D_{12} &: \{cN_{abc}1, dN_{abd}2, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\}, \\ \text{for } D_{13} &: \{cN_{abc}2, dN_{abd}1, aN_{acd}3, dN_{bcd}1\}, \\ \text{for } D_{14} &: \{cN_{abc}2, bN_{abd}3, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\}, \\ \text{for } D_{15} &: \{cN_{abc}2, dN_{abd}1, dN_{acd}1, dN_{bcd}1\}, \\ \text{for } D_{16} &: \{cN_{abc}2, aN_{abd}3, dN_{acd}1, dN_{bcd}1\}, \\ \text{for } D_{17} &: \{cN_{abc}2, dN_{abd}2, dN_{acd}1, dN_{bcd}1\}, \\ \text{for } D_{18} &: \{cN_{abc}2, dN_{abd}2, aN_{acd}3, bN_{bcd}3\}. \end{aligned}$$

References

- Abello, J., Johnson, C., 1984. How large are transitive simple majority domains? *SIAM J. Algebraic Discrete Methods* 5, 603–618.
- Akello-Egwell, D., Leedham-Green, C., Litterick, A., Markström, K., Riis, S., 2023. Condorcet domains of degree at most seven. [arXiv:2306.15993](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.15993).
- Albert, M.H., Atkinson, M.D., 2005. Simple permutations and pattern restricted permutations. *Discrete Math.* 300, 1–15.
- Arrow, K.J., 1951. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. Wiley, New York.
- Arrow, K.J., 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd edition. Wiley, New York.
- Aswal, N., Chatterji, S., Sen, A., 2003. Dictatorial domains. *Econ. Theory* 22, 45–62.
- Atkinson, M.D., Stitt, T., 2002. Restricted permutations and the wreath product. *Discrete Math.* 259, 19–36.
- Ballester, M., Haeringer, G., 2011. A characterization of the single-peaked domain. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 36, 305–322.
- Björner, A., Vergnas, M.L., Sturmfels, B., White, N., Ziegler, G., 1999. *Oriented Matroids*. Cambridge University Press.
- Black, D., 1948. On the rationale of group decision-making. *J. Polit. Econ.* 56, 23–34.
- Black, D., 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Blin, J.-M., 1973. The general concept of multidimensional consistency: some algebraic aspects of the aggregation problem. In: *Conference Proceedings of the South Carolina Seminar on Multiple Criteria Decision Making*. University of South Carolina Press.
- Craven, J., 1996. Majority-consistent preference orderings. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 13, 259–267.
- Danilov, V., Karzanov, A., Koshevoy, G., 2012. Condorcet domains of tiling type. *Discrete Appl. Math.* 160, 933–940.
- Danilov, V., Koshevoy, G., 2013. Maximal Condorcet domains. *Order* 30, 181–194.
- Dittrich, T., 2018. Eine vollständige Klassifikation von Condorcet Domains für kleine Alternativenmengen. Ph.D. thesis. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
- Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., Skowron, P., 2014. Characterizing the single-peaked single-crossing domain. In: *Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 654–660.
- Elkind, E., Lackner, M., Peters, D., 2022. Preference restrictions in computational social choice: a survey. [arXiv:2205.09092v1](https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.09092v1).
- Elnitsky, S., 1997. Rhombic tilings of polygons and classes of reduced words in Coxeter groups. *J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A* 77, 193–221.
- Felsner, S., 2012. *Geometric Graphs and Arrangements: Some Chapters from Combinatorial Geometry*. Springer Science & Business Media.
- Fishburn, P., 1997. Acyclic sets of linear orders. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 14, 113–124.
- Fishburn, P., 2002. Acyclic sets of linear orders: a progress report. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 19, 431–447.
- Galambos, A., Reiner, V., 2008. Acyclic sets of linear orders via the Bruhat orders. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 30, 245–264.
- Gans, J., Smart, M., 1996. Majority voting with single-crossing preferences. *J. Public Econ.* 59, 219–237.
- Grandmont, J.-M., 1978. Intermediate preferences and the majority rule. *Econometrica* 46, 317–330.
- Guilbaud, G.T., Rosenstiehl, P., 1963. Analyse algébrique d'un scrutin. *Math. Sci. Hum.* 4, 9–33.
- Humphreys, J.E., 1994. *Reflection Groups and Coxeter Groups*. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
- Inada, K., 1964. A note on the simple majority decision rule. *Econometrica* 32, 525–531.
- Jennings, A., Laraki, R., Puppe, C., Varloot, E., 2024. New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness. *Math. Program.* 203, 207–238.
- Karpov, A., 2022. Structured preferences: a survey. *Autom. Remote Control* 83, 1329–1354.
- Karpov, A., 2023. Preferences over mixed manna. In: Goldengorin, B., Kuznetsov, S. (Eds.), *Data Analysis and Optimization. In Honor of Boris Mirkin's 80th Birthday*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.

- Karpov, A., Markström, K., Riis, S., Zhou, B., 2023. Set-alternating schemes: a new class of large Condorcet domains. arXiv:2308.02817.
- Karpov, A., Slinko, A., 2023a. Constructing large peak-pit Condorcet domains. *Theory Decis.* 94, 97–120.
- Karpov, A., Slinko, A., 2023b. Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains. *Order* 40, 289–309.
- Kemeny, J., 1959. Mathematics without numbers. *Daedalus* 88, 577–591.
- Kemeny, J., Snell, L., 1960. *Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences*. Ginn.
- Leclerc, B., Zelevinsky, A., 1998. Quasicommuting families of quantum Plücker coordinates. In: Kirillov's Seminar on Representation Theory, vol. 35, p. 85.
- Leedham-Green, C., Markström, K., Riis, S., 2024. The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 62, 109–116.
- Leversidge, G., 2019. On the number of Arrow single-peaked maximal Condorcet domains. Unpublished.
- Li, G., Puppe, C., Slinko, A., 2021. Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains. *Math. Soc. Sci.* 113, 191–202.
- Monjardet, B., 2007. Condorcet domains and distributive lattices. In: Lecture Notes. Ghent (personal communication).
- Monjardet, B., 2009. Acyclic domains of linear orders: a survey. In: Brams, S., Gehrlein, W., Roberts, F. (Eds.), *The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order*. In: *Studies in Choice and Welfare*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 139–160.
- Moulin, H., 1980. On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness. *Public Choice* 35, 437–455.
- Nehring, K., Puppe, C., 2007. The structure of strategy-proof social choice I: general characterization and possibility results on median spaces. *J. Econ. Theory* 135, 269–305.
- Puppe, C., 2016. The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization. *KIT Working Paper Series in Economics* 97.
- Puppe, C., 2018. The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization. *J. Econ. Theory* 176, 55–80.
- Puppe, C., Slinko, A., 2019. Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property. *Econ. Theory* 67, 285–318.
- Raynaud, H., 1981. Paradoxical results from Inada's conditions for majority rule. Tech. Rep., Stanford University Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences.
- Raynaud, H., 1982. The individual freedom allowed by the value restriction condition. Tech. Rep., Stanford University Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences.
- Roberts, K., 1977. Voting over income tax schedules. *J. Public Econ.* 8, 329–340.
- Rothstein, P., 1991. Representative voter theorems. *Public Choice* 72, 193–212.
- Saporiti, A., 2009. Strategy-proofness and single-crossing. *Theor. Econ.* 4, 127–163.
- Sato, S., 2013. A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one. *J. Econ. Theory* 148, 259–278.
- Sen, A.K., 1966. A possibility theorem on majority decisions. *Econometrica* 34, 491–499.
- Sen, A.K., 1970. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Holden-Day, San Francisco.
- Slinko, A., 2019. Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow's single-peakedness. *J. Math. Econ.* 84, 166–175.
- Slinko, A., Wu, Q., Wu, X., 2021. A characterization of preference domains that are single-crossing and maximal Condorcet. *Econ. Lett.* 204, 109918.
- Tohmé, F., Saporiti, A., 2006. Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule. *Soc. Choice Welf.* 26, 363–383.
- Zhan, P., 2022. Sign representation of single-peaked preferences and Bruhat orders. arXiv:2202.11352v1.
- Zhou, B., Riis, S., 2023. New record-breaking Condorcet domains on 10 and 11 alternatives. arXiv:2303.06524.