Enriching the European Shared Socio-Economic Pathways with Considerations of Biodiversity and Nature Using a Nexus Approach

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Abstract

The global scientific community is taking steps toward a nexus approach to address interlinkages across biodiversity and climate systems, yet synergistic research and policymaking remains limited. This gap is manifest in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) framework, which is applied in various sectors to make sense of future complexity but excludes consideration of biodiversity and nature. As a result, the SSP narratives disregard feedbacks between socio-economic and environmental systems, potentially limiting options to address both the biodiversity and climate crises simultaneously and masking the need to build resilience to concurrent and cascading risks. In this paper, we explore this gap through a co-creation process at the European scale by enriching the original European-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach (i.e., interactions across biodiversity, energy, food, health, water, and transport). We investigate the implications through a systems analysis of the original and enriched European-SSP narratives. Our findings show that introducing consideration of biodiversity altered the system dynamics within the European-SSP narratives considerably, with outcomes for biodiversity ranging widely within and across scenarios. Further, the relative significance of indirect drivers changed across SSPs due to novel feedbacks with biodiversity and other sectors. Our findings have important implications for biodiversity governance, highlighting the need for adaptive approaches that respond to emergent socio-economic conditions and systemic policymaking that situates technical interventions within enabling governance contexts. The resulting narratives offer more 'biodiversity-centric' scenarios to the climate research community, demonstrating how scenario frameworks can be enriched to facilitate synergistic research and policymaking.

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Key Points: 20

- The Shared Socio-Economic Pathways do not include two-way interactions between 21 biodiversity and climate 22
 - Considering biodiversity enriched system interactions and altered socio-economic drivers in the European Shared Socio-Economic Pathways

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A nexus approach can enrich scenario frameworks with a systems perspective

Abstract

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The global scientific community is taking steps toward a nexus approach to address interlinkages across biodiversity and climate systems, yet synergistic research and policymaking remains limited. This gap is manifest in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) framework, which is applied in various sectors to make sense of future complexity but excludes consideration of biodiversity and nature. As a result, the SSP narratives disregard feedbacks between socio-economic and environmental systems, potentially limiting options to address both the biodiversity and climate crises simultaneously and masking the need to build resilience to concurrent and cascading risks. In this paper, we explore this gap through a co-creation process at the European scale by enriching the original European-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach (i.e., interactions across biodiversity, energy, food, health, water, and transport). We investigate the implications through a systems analysis of the original and enriched European-SSP narratives. Our findings show that introducing consideration of biodiversity altered the system dynamics within the European-SSP narratives considerably, with outcomes for biodiversity ranging widely within and across scenarios. Further, the relative significance of indirect drivers changed across SSPs due to novel feedbacks with biodiversity and other sectors. Our findings have important implications for biodiversity governance, highlighting the need for adaptive approaches that respond to emergent socio-economic conditions and systemic policymaking that situates technical interventions within enabling governance contexts. The resulting narratives offer more 'biodiversity-centric' scenarios to the climate research community, demonstrating how scenario frameworks can be enriched to facilitate synergistic research and policymaking.

Plain Language Summary

Biodiversity and climate systems are interconnected, but research and policy making that addresses these connections remains limited. This gap is manifest in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), which are used as useful narratives of the future in various sectors but exclude consideration of biodiversity and nature. This gap limits options to find solutions that address both the biodiversity and climate crises simultaneously and masks complex forms of interacting risk. In this paper, we enrich the original European-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a systems approach, considering interactions

across biodiversity, energy, food, health, water, and transport. We also investigate the implications of doing so through a systems analysis. We found that introducing biodiversity altered the system dynamics within the European-SSP narratives considerably, with widely varying outcomes for biodiversity. Further, the relative significance of indirect drivers changed across the scenarios due to novel interactions with biodiversity and other sectors.

Our findings highlight the need for adaptive biodiversity governance approaches that respond to emerging socio-economic conditions and systemic policymaking that situates

technical interventions within enabling governance contexts.

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1 Introduction

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Climate change and biodiversity loss are deeply entangled crises (Pörtner et al., 2021; IPBES, 2024). Human activities such as land use change, overexploitation of natural resources, and pollution are driving the degradation, fragmentation, and loss of habitats, which is accelerating species extinction (Jaureguiberry et al., 2023; McCallum, 2015; Turvey and Crees, 2019). Climate change is mainly caused by greenhouse gas emissions, which are driven by similar direct and indirect drivers to those driving biodiversity loss (e.g., land use and pollution, in addition to social preferences, technological change, economic growth). The impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, frequency and severity of extreme weather events, and shifts to the overall climatic regime (IPCC, 2021), further disrupt ecosystem structures and processes, thereby disrupting carbon sequestration further and perpetuating biodiversity loss (Carey, 2009; IPCC, 2022; Lawrence and Soame, 2004).

These dual crises have significant impacts on people. The loss of biodiversity and nature's contributions to people threatens many aspects of human wellbeing (Díaz et al., 2006), such as a greater risk of infectious pathogen emergence (Schmeller et al., 2020) and threats to food security and nutritional diversity (Sunderland, 2011; Wahlqvist and Specht, 1998). Climate change amplifies these impacts and introduces new threats, such as direct risks to human life and infrastructure during extreme weather events (IPCC, 2022) and forced migrations as sea level rise renders coastal areas uninhabitable (Lincke and Hinkel, 2021; Storlazzi et al., 2023). Further, the potential crossing of biodiversity and climatic tipping points increases the possibility for nonlinear impacts and cascading risks, with uncertain yet potentially severe consequences for both nature and people (Lenton et al., 2023). These impacts are not felt equally, with the most vulnerable populations most significantly affected (Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2023; IPCC, 2022). Further, solutions for halting and reversing biodiversity loss and climate change influence one another in complex ways. For example, monoculture afforestation or bioenergy supply helps mitigate climate change through carbon sequestration while potentially reducing biodiversity (Calvin et al., 2021; Stephens and Wagner, 2007), yet maintaining or improving the biodiversity of these ecosystems can improve their resilience to many disturbances including climate change (Seddon et al., 2020; Thompson, 2009).

The intertwined nature of these crises highlights the importance of a nexus approach to science and policy (IPBES, 2024). In a nexus approach, interlinkages between biodiversity and climate, in addition to a range of other sectors such as energy, food, health, water, and transport, can be addressed in a systemic and integrated way (Müller et al., 2015; Pascual et al., 2022). The aim of such approaches is to understand and mitigate trade-offs while identifying opportunities for synergistic action. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) play an important role in synthesizing evidence on their respective issues and have recently taken steps toward a nexus approach. For example, the IPBES Nexus Assessment, which went to plenary in December 2024, considers interlinkages between biodiversity and the climate system, in addition to a range of other sectors and systems (IPBES, 2024, 2019). The IPCC Working Group II (Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability) characterized the impact of climate change on ecosystems and their services in the Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2023a, 2023b). Most notably, the IPCC and IPBES hosted a joint workshop in December of 2020, which resulted in a co-sponsored workshop report on biodiversity and climate change (Pörtner et al., 2021). Yet, synergistic action remains limited, and the failure to address both climate change and biodiversity loss can be at least partially attributed to challenges dealing with the systemic nature of these crises, which requires mainstreaming solutions across socio-economic drivers and sectors that may be resistant to change (IPBES, 2018; Rounsevell et al., 2020).

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Scenarios are increasingly popular tools for exploring complex futures (Börjeson et al., 2006; Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015; Pereira et al., 2021). Both the IPCC and IPBES have adopted scenario frameworks that explore futures deemed relevant to their flagship issues. The IPCC community scenario framework includes Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that describe five possible global socio-economic trajectories, which are combined with Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) to explore complex futures under climate change and climate policy (van Vuuren et al. 2011; Kriegler et al. 2014; O'Neill et al. 2014; Riahi et al. 2017). The SSPs have been taken up as useful narratives of a global future for many different applications across sectors and scales (O'Neill et al., 2020), including to underpin recent global biodiversity projections (Pereira et al., 2024).

These existing scenario frameworks offer useful contributions to understanding the future of both climate change and biodiversity loss. However, every scenario framework can only offer a limited view of the diverse domains, scales, or perspectives implicated in the future of these challenges (Lazurko et al., 2023; Swart et al., 2004; Verburg et al., 2016). For example, Kok et al., (2019) state the need for "further extension" of the downscaled European SSPs (Eur-SSPs) to address the necessary scope of drivers, factors, sectors and actors that may be relevant for different applications of the SSPs. An important identified gap in the SSPs is the lack of explicit consideration of environmental change, including biodiversity and nature, as intertwined with socio-economic futures driving climate change (O'Neill et al., 2020; Pereira et al., 2021). Yet, a nexus approach requires efforts to consider interactions between indirect drivers underpinning these dual crises and their implications and feedbacks, including across sectors. This gap points to the potential for limits to the plausibility and comprehensiveness of the SSP narratives, particularly when applied at subglobal scales and for a wide range of topics beyond climate change (O'Neill et al., 2020). As a result, the scenarios may fail to serve their desired outcomes, such as to motivate transformative actions to reverse climate change and biodiversity loss simultaneously or to build resilience to multiple interconnected risks.

In this paper, we aim to enrich the SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach. We use the term 'biodiversity nexus' to refer to a nexus approach that considers interlinkages and feedbacks between biodiversity, energy, food, health, water, and transport. We focus on the European SSPs (Eur-SSPs) as a demonstrative case, which were downscaled and extended from the global SSPs (Kok et al. 2019). Our objectives were to 1) enrich the original Eur-SSPs narratives by detailing them with interlinkages and feedbacks between biodiversity and nature and the other elements of the biodiversity nexus using a participatory, systems approach and 2) compare the dominant interactions and biodiversity implications across the scenarios and in relation to the original Eur-SSPs through a systems analysis. These insights inform reflections on future scenario work for the IPCC and IPBES.

2 Materials and Methods

2.1 The IPCC scenario framework

The SSPs are a key part of the scenario framework used by the IPCC community. The SSPs describe five possible global socio-economic future trajectories located on two axes: socio-economic challenges for adaptation and socio-economic challenges for mitigation (O'Neill et al., 2017). The SSPs have been taken up as useful narratives of a global future for diverse applications across scales and sectors (O'Neill et al., 2020). The global SSPs have been extended to produce European SSPs (Eur-SSPs), resulting in four distinct scenarios that mirror the global SSPs, excluding SSP2 which is often considered a more business-as-usual trajectory (Kok et al., 2019). These narratives are located on two axes: inequality (low to high) and carbon intensity per GDP (low to high). The narratives include a sustainable future with global cooperation and less intensive lifestyles (We are the World; Eur-SSP1); a future in which countries struggle to maintain living standards in a high-carbon intensive Europe (Icarus; Eur-SSP3); a future in which power becomes concentrated in a small elite and Europe becomes an important player (Riders on the Storm; Eur-SSP4); and a future in which a lack of environmental concern leads to the over-exploitation of fossil fuel resources addressed by technological solutions (Fossil-fuelled Development; Eur-SSP5).






Figure 1: European SSPs for climate change research, used as a starting point for enriching with biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach (adapted from Kok et al. 2019)

2.2 Enriching the Eur-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature

The initial data for enriching the Eur-SSPs were collected during the first stakeholder co-creation workshop of the BIONEXT project (bionext-project.eu) held on 4-5 May 2023 in Santorini, Greece. The workshop was attended by 26 participants, who were selected to ensure diverse representation of regions of Europe (northern, central and eastern, western, and southern Europe), organisational types (government, business, civil society or non-

governmental organisation, and advocacy for minority groups), and expertise related to

seven nexus elements (biodiversity, water, food, health, energy, transport and climate

change). During the workshop, BIONEXT researchers served as facilitators and notetakers to

capture the data emerging from verbal discussion and visual materials (e.g., in notetaker

templates, audio recordings and photos of visual materials).

During the SSP exercise of the workshop, workshop participants were familiarized with the four Eur-SSP scenario narratives (Eur-SSPs 1, 3, 4 and 5) through a presentation. Participants were then randomly assigned into four groups where a facilitator for each Eur-SSP asked them to add additional events or impacts that may occur within the Eur-SSP narratives at different time points to the year 2100 related to the elements of the biodiversity nexus (by putting stickers on posters, e.g., Figure 2). These 'events' or 'impacts' were meant to be additional drivers or implications of existing events in the narratives to ensure they enriched the narrative yet were still coherent with the existing Eur-SSP. If not already explicit in the 'event' or 'impact', participants were then asked to indicate whether the events had positive or negative implications for biodiversity and nature. Participants repeated this exercise across the four Eur-SSPs until the posters were filled with additional events and implications for biodiversity and nature. The raw data produced during the workshop was transcribed and anonymized for further analysis (Table S2).




Figure 2: Example of poster and stickers used to enrich the original European SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature, using SSP4 as an example

The data collected during the workshop exercise were synthesised and analysed to enrich the original Eur-SSP narratives by integrating the events/impacts and implications for biodiversity at appropriate sections of the SSP narratives across different time scales. The detailed procedure for doing so, including a quality assurance procedure, can be found in Text S1.

2.3 Validating the enriched Eur-SSPs using a nexus approach

The draft enriched Eur-SSPs were then further elaborated with a subgroup of stakeholders during an online webinar on 21 November 2023, which aimed to validate the enriched Eur-SSP narratives from the workshop and to further enrich them with more explicit consideration of the elements of the biodiversity nexus (i.e., biodiversity, energy, food, health, water, and transport). Climate change was excluded as a nexus element in this exercise, since the intention was to enrich the socio-economic drivers of the SSPs, which would then be paired with RCPs to consider climate change impacts. The 26 participants from the workshop were invited and 10 attended. A detailed procedure for the webinar and how the draft enriched Eur-SSP narratives were adapted to create final enriched Eur-SSP narratives as a result can be found in Text S1.

2.4 Systems analysis of the enriched Eur-SSPs

A systems analysis was conducted to further describe and evaluate the implications of enriching the original Eur-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature. To do so, the full enriched Eur-SSP narratives were analysed to find interlinkages between a standardized set of nodes. These nodes were a) elements of the biodiversity nexus (Kim et al., 2024) and b) indirect drivers of change used to describe the original Eur-SSPs (Kok et al., 2019) as defined in Table 1. Broad definitions allowed the systems analysis to capture a comprehensive picture of the narratives.

Table 1: Scenario nodes and definitions used in the systems analysis

| Category | Nodes | Description | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Elements of | Biodiversity | Directly related to the state of terrestrial, inland water, and marine | | | | | | | | |
| the | | biodiversity and nature broadly defined, including the state of | | | | | | | | |
| biodiversity | | ecosystems, the land area of nature, outcomes for individual species, etc. | | | | | | | | |
| nexus | Water | Directly related to the state of water resources, including infrastructure | | | | | | | | |
| | | development for water supply and water/wastewater treatment, in | | | | | | | | |
| | | addition to the state of freshwater and marine resources. | | | | | | | | |
| | Food | Directly related to the state of food systems across supply chains, | | | | | | | | |
| | | including agricultural inputs and agricultural systems, fisheries, food | | | | | | | | |
| | | culture, diets, etc. | | | | | | | | |
| | Health | Directly related to the state of human health, including both the state of | | | | | | | | |
| | | the health sector and connections between human health and nature. | | | | | | | | |
| | Energy | Directly related to the state of energy systems, including energy supply | | | | | | | | |
| | | and demand, energy mixes (including renewables), and | | | | | | | | |
| | | infrastructure/technology development. | | | | | | | | |
| | Transport | Directly related to the state of transport systems, including active | | | | | | | | |
| | | transport (walking, cycling) and public and private modes. | | | | | | | | |
| Indirect | Geopolitical | Degree of geopolitical stability or lack of conflict, i.e., high/low. | | | | | | | | |
| drivers of | stability | | | | | | | | | |
| change | International | Degree of international cooperation, e.g., strong EU, weak/strong trade. | | | | | | | | |
| | cooperation | | | | | | | | | |
| | Globalisation | Pace of businesses/policies/etc gaining international influence and/or | | | | | | | | |
| | | coordination. | | | | | | | | |
| | Net migration | Balance of immigration and emigration, with a focus on demographic | | | | | | | | |
| | | change as influenced from outside of Europe. | | | | | | | | |
| | Mobility | Degree of openness for mobility across borders, with a focus on border | | | | | | | | |
| | across borders | control and economic opportunity primarily within Europe. | | | | | | | | |
| | Economic | Pace of economic growth, i.e., high/low, gradual, and/or type of | | | | | | | | |
| | development | economic development taking place. | | | | | | | | |
| | Technology | Pace, reach and nature of technology development. | | | | | | | | |
| | development | | | | | | | | | |
| | Decision- | Dominant level of decision-making, i.e., international, EU, national, local, | | | | | | | | |
| | making level | fragmented, with a focus on who has power. | | | | | | | | |
| | Quality of | Quality of structures and processes related to governance, including | | | | | | | | |
| | governance | relative priority on environment vs economy or short-term vs long-term | | | | | | | | |
| | | orientation. | | | | | | | | |
| | Choice | Degree/freedom of choice related to land and resource use, usually | | | | | | | | |
| | | related to policies. | | | | | | | | |

| So | ocial | Extent of connectedness among groups in society, with a focus on public | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| со | ohesion | attitudes, perception and culture. | | | | | | | | |
| So | ocial respect | Degree of respect between countries or between societies, with a focus | | | | | | | | |
| | | on respect and explicit participation across groups in society. | | | | | | | | |
| En | nvironmental | Degree and distribution of appreciation for the environment in the | | | | | | | | |
| res | espect | population. | | | | | | | | |
| Ed | ducation | Relative quantity and distribution of investment in education, i.e., | | | | | | | | |
| inv | vestments | high/low and equitable or elites, in addition to other aspects such as the | | | | | | | | |
| | | type or quality of education. | | | | | | | | |

Four researchers qualitatively coded the enriched Eur-SSP narratives for statements that implicitly or explicitly state a relationship or interlinkage between two nodes in Table 1. These were entered into a database, which characterised each interlinkage in a standardized format (i.e., 'from' and 'to' nodes, text summary of the nature of the interlinkage, original or enriched Eur-SSP, implicit vs explicit interlinkage, direct or indirect interlinkage, corresponding time slice, descriptive positive or negative direction, and implications for biodiversity if relevant). A detailed procedure for how the database was created including quality assurance procedures can be found in Text S1.

The first analysis of the database assessed changes to the relative importance of different nexus elements or indirect drivers in the enriched versus original Eur-SSPs. This was done by producing a summary table detailing a count of the interlinkages from and to all nexus elements and indirect drivers across the original versus enriched Eur-SSPs, in addition to two systems maps for each Eur-SSP, one representing interlinkages in the original narrative from Kok et al. (2019) and the other representing interlinkages in the enriched narratives. These system maps were produced to show the nodes (Table 1) and the edges as interlinkages between these nodes. The diagrams allow for interpretation of the relative prevalence of interlinkages in the scenario narrative, as inferred by the number of database entries for that interlinkage (i.e., thickness of the arrows), the relative importance of that node in the scenario narrative, as inferred by the number of database entries implicating that node (i.e., the size of the nodes), and the positive, negative or neutral/mixed direction of the interlinkage (i.e., the colour of the edges).

The second analysis assessed the role of biodiversity and the biodiversity nexus in each enriched Eur-SSP. A synthesized version of the database was created that summarised the multiple database entries relevant for each interlinkage. This database was used to create two sets of sub-system maps that detail 1) the impact of the biodiversity nexus on indirect drivers and 2) the impact of indirect drivers on the biodiversity nexus. An

interpretation of the relative prevalence of interlinkages in the scenario narrative, relative importance of nodes, and positive, negative or mixed directions were made possible using the same procedures as for the first analysis.

3 Results

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3.1 Description of enriched Eur-SSP narratives

This section summarises the enriched Eur-SSP narratives, focusing on the state of the biodiversity nexus as extended from the original Eur-SSPs (Kok et al., 2019). The full enriched Eur-SSP narratives are included in Text S1, which can be compared to the original narratives in the SM of Kok et al. (2019).

Enriched Eur-SSP1

The world shifts away from a market-driven economy towards moderate but steady economic growth for sustainable development. There is overall higher political stability and lower inequality with strongly regulated multi-level governance. The European Union (EU) is expanding with strong international cooperation towards renewables and green technology and reduced consumption. From the present to 2040, the governments pursue ambitious measures for the energy transition and social support with an emphasis on plural knowledge and cultural and biological diversity. There are initial trade-offs between renewable energy and pressures on land and biodiversity with public resistance to spending due to slow economic growth. Protected areas are expanded with more green space and green infrastructure. From 2040 to 2070, the European political agenda focuses on well-being over economic growth as the EU expands and participates in global governance, empowering local authorities and communities to implement solutions with cobenefits for climate, biodiversity and wellbeing. Agricultural reform leads to more positive impacts on biodiversity and Al-assisted policy planning mainstreams biodiversity policy across sectors. People lead more sustainable lives in smaller rural towns. From 2070 to 2100, Europe has a high level of sustainability-oriented awareness with continuing economic development, decreasing inequality and improving health. The state of biodiversity is among the core societal indicators.

Enriched Eur-SSP3

Economic woes in major economies and regional conflict fragments the EU, leading to high inequality within and between countries. Increasing border controls and barriers to trade result in rising energy and food prices and increasing demand for natural resources, causing severe ecosystem failures. From the present to 2040, populist movements fuel rising international tension and persistent conflicts, resulting in the reprioritization of environmental policies in favour of defence. Rising food insecurity and poorer environmental quality impact human health. Travel is reduced between countries due to border controls, reducing pressure on nature but lower environmental protection allows for continued use of pesticides, herbicides and antibiotics. The economy in Europe stagnates and the EU breaks apart. From 2040 to 2070, the gap between poorer and richer countries in the EU widens. Legislation for protected areas is abandoned and water wars arise with the collapse of some fisheries. The social fabric disintegrates and increases migration away from poor countries in Europe. From 2070 to 2100, the EU loses its leading position and deindustrialises. Criminal organizations and corruption take hold, and well-educated people migrate outside of Europe. These factors eventually reduce demand for energy and materials, alleviating environmental pressure and allowing rewilding in certain areas. Food production becomes extensive, with many people leading a subsistence lifestyle. The majority accepts political instability and social injustice and learns to live with less.

Enriched Eur-SSP4

The world shifts strongly towards innovation leading to a high-tech green Europe with strong partnerships between business and European governments. Power is concentrated in a small political and economic elite with growing inequality within and between the European countries. From the present to 2040, new innovations improve biodiversity in economically important ecosystems. Business and political elites gain control over land, which in some cases benefits ecosystems and biodiversity at the expense of a large population. As public trust grows, industrial greenwashing expands, and businesses exploit nature for profit. Tipping points are crossed affecting countries outside of Europe initially, as green innovation enables adaptation within Europe. From 2040 to 2070, technological development becomes the backbone of the economically strong EU but increases demands for resources outside of Europe, exploiting ecosystems on a global scale. Inequalities rise due to skill-based technological development, unequal education and

political power. Access to quality resources (e.g., food, healthcare, water) is unequal. Sub-cultures and counter-movements begin to move to rural areas to adopt land-based sustainable practices, while slums in cities put pressure on nature. Overseas territories begin to adopt localized policies for biodiversity protection. From 2070 to 2100, the EU has become a market leader in green technologies, but the need for strategic autonomy and international pressure leads the EU to endogenize mining and production, reducing pressure on ecosystems abroad but degrading local ecosystems. The small, connected elite benefits and becomes increasingly disconnected from other classes. Social cohesion is low and stratified, so people begin to turn back to the land to adopt sustainable lifestyles.

Enriched Eur-SSP5

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The push for economic, technological and social development is coupled with the exploitation of cheap and readily available fossil fuel resources. Significant investments are made in health, education and social support with people embracing high consumption lifestyles. From the present to 2040, market deregulation leads to a strong labour market and prosperity-driven technology development. Technological and scientific innovation enables the creation of new food systems, and higher purchasing power reduces meat consumption. However, increased imports and fossil-fuel-based transport systems impact biodiversity and deep-sea fossil fuel extraction is allowed in Marine Protected Areas. The resulting ecological degradation motivates governments to close or limit access to valuable ecosystems. From 2040 to 2070, public trust in political decision-making increases. There is a strong faith in technological solutions to environmental problems, including geoengineering, but the environment continues to degrade as people remain unaware. Despite the lower meat consumption, overconsumption and agricultural efficiency reduce dietary diversity and everyone adopts a very energy-intensive lifestyle. People in cities become used to living in an artificial and 'closed' society divorced from nature. Near 2070, biodiversity tipping points are reached, ecosystems collapse and food insecurity grows. From 2070 to 2100, the EU continues its focus on technological solutions fuelled by the exploitation of fossil fuels. New carbon markets and available investments in biodiversity protection are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. The environment degrades seriously, and human innovation cannot keep pace in masking its impact. Human health suffers with

increasing diseases and the health system breaks down. There is a slow re-emergence of renewables as fossil fuel prices rise.

3.2 State of the biodiversity nexus in enriched Eur-SSP narratives

Table 2 describes the state of biodiversity and the other elements of the biodiversity nexus in the four enriched Eur-SSPs, which are the key additions to the original Eur-SSP narratives. The findings highlight how the state of biodiversity varies across Eur-SSPs, with enriched Eur-SSP1 having the most positive and Eur-SSP5 having the most negative impacts. How these impacts change over time are included in a more comprehensive table in Table S1.

Table 2: Description of the state of the elements of the biodiversity nexus in each of four enriched Eur-SSPs

| Element | SSP1 | SSP3 | SSP4 | SSP5 |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Biodiversity | + Biodiversity improves due to | + / - Biodiversity has mixed | + / - Biodiversity has mixed | - Biodiversity declines and |
| | nature restoration, mainstreaming | impacts from geopolitical | impacts from technology | collapses due to uncontrolled |
| | into policy, and enhancing human- | fragmentation, initially increasing | development, until inequality | economic development and |
| | nature relations | natural resource use but later | worsens biodiversity and counter | resource extraction and use |
| | | reducing pressure in late century | movements return to nature | |
| | | due to governance failure | | |
| Water | Water resources in good condition | Water resources degraded and a | Water resources improve from | Water resources improve from |
| | due to more sustainable practices | source of conflict, with unequal | technology, but inequality puts | technology, but uncontrolled |
| | | access | pressure on infrastructure and | development eventually degrades |
| | | | availability of resources | water resources |
| Food | More sustainable and integrative | Food insecurity from governance | High-tech food system caters to | High-tech food system eventually |
| | food production | fragmentation, leading to | economic and political elite, | degrades the environment, |
| | | intensification and eventually | resulting in food crisis for poorer | ultimately causing Europe to rely |
| | | more extensive land use from | majority | on food imports |
| | | deindustrialisation | | |
| Health | Healthcare and wellbeing improve | Healthcare and wellbeing declining | Healthcare privatised and | Healthcare and wellbeing decline |
| | due to government investment | and unequal, with healthcare only | technology driven, with wellbeing | as focus on economic |
| | and more sustainable ways of | for richer countries and regions | declining and healthcare only for | development and treatment rather |
| | living | | societal elite | than prevention neglects other |
| | | | | aspects of wellbeing |
| Energy | Sustainable, renewable and | Governance fragmentation and | Technology innovation, renewable | Continued fossil fuel exploitation |
| 0. | cooperative energy systems across | economic development affect | transition, and elite control of | eventually resulting in peak fossil |
| | Europe | energy demand and access and | energy supply | fuel and beginnings of switch to |
| | | perpetuates reliance on fossil fuels | | renewables at the end of the |
| | | | | century |
| Transport | Transition toward sustainable | Decreased innovation and priority | High-tech clean and active | Increased demand for fossil- |
| | transport systems across Europe | in transport sector due to | transport systems implemented in | fuelled transport to enable |
| | | fragmentation and militarisation | Europe | economic growth |

3.3 Comparing the significance of indirect drivers between original and enriched Eur-SSPs

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This section compares the original and enriched Eur-SSP narratives by comparing changes to the relative significance of indirect drivers and their relationship to the elements of the biodiversity nexus. Table 3 presents a high-level summary of the relative prevalence of nexus elements and indirect drivers in the original and enriched Eur-SSP narratives. Overall, the comparison between the original and enriched Eur-SSPs reveals how consideration of implications for biodiversity and nature, and subsequently of the biodiversity nexus, enriched the complexity of interlinkages within the narratives significantly. Biodiversity changed in its prevalence in the narratives most significantly across the enriched Eur-SSPs, compared to the original narrative. SSP3 changed the least (14 new interlinkages), while all other SSPs have a similarly significant increase in count of interlinkages (24 to 27). Thus, the enriched narratives of all SSPs highlight the importance of biodiversity in underpinning other nexus elements and being affected by indirect drivers. However, the relative importance of these relationships differ across the SSPs. In Eur-SSPs 3, 4 and 5, the food nexus element was the next most significant after biodiversity, whereas in SSP1, health was the next most significant. Food is shown as particularly important in Eur-SSPs 3, 4 and 5 as concerns related to food supply and the intensive use of agricultural land is central to these scenarios. In Eur-SSP3 the population need food to survive, whereas in Eur-SSP 4 and 5 technological and economic development have strong influences on agriculture and its role in the nexus, with inequality also playing a significant role in SSP4 as the poorer masses experience food crises and return to the countryside to grow their own food. Health is shown to be particularly important in Eur-SSP1 due to the move to a wellbeing economy where quality of life and connections to nature are central.

Table 3. Summary of the count of the number of statements describing interlinkages from (Fr) or to (To) the node (nexus element or indirect driver) in each row for the original versus enriched Eur-SSPs. The sum (+) is the total count of from and to for that original or enriched Eur-SSPs. The change (Δ) is the sum (+) of the enriched minus the sum (+) of the original, to show how the relative importance of that node increased when the Eur-SSPs were enriched with considerations of the biodiversity nexus. The cell colours show a linear gradient from least significant (i.e., lowest count) in the narrative (red) to most significant (i.e., highest count) in the narrative (green).

| | | | E | ur-SSP | | | E | ur-SSI | 23 | | | | | | Eur-SS | P4 | | Eur-SSP5 | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|----|---|--------|----|----|---------|--------|----|--------|----|----|----|---------|--------|----|---------|----------|----|----|---------|----|----|--------|----|----|----|----|
| | Original En | | | nriche | | (| Origina | l | Е | nriche | d | | (| Origina | ıl | | Enriche | ed | | (| Origina | ıl | Е | nriche | d | | | |
| | Fr | То | + | Fr | То | + | Δ | Fr | То | + | Fr | То | + | Δ | Fr | То | + | Fr | То | + | Δ | Fr | То | + | Fr | То | + | Δ |
| Biodiversity | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 16 | 25 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 13 | 16 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 24 | 29 | 27 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 23 | 31 | 25 |
| Health | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 11 | 13 | 11 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
| Water | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Food | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 10 | 17 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 16 |
| Energy | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 16 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 7 |
| Transport | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 6 |
| Geopolitical stability | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| International cooperation | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Globalisation | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Net migration | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Mobility | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Economic development | 4 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 12 | 3 | 15 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 6 | 14 | 5 | 19 | 23 | 9 | 32 | 13 |
| Technology development | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 20 | 6 | 26 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 3 | 15 | 12 |
| Decision- making level | 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Quality of governance | 8 | 0 | 8 | 24 | 2 | 26 | 18 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 13 | 7 |
| Choice | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 5 |
| Social cohesion | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 15 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Social respect | 0 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 14 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 11 | 15 | 8 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 1 |

| Environmental respect | 2 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 20 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | Q. | Q | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| respect | | J | , | 0 | 12 | 20 | 13 | U | U | U | 7 | ر | / | / | U | U | U | | U | O | O | U | | | | 7 | , | |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| investments | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 |

Table 3 also highlights how including the biodiversity nexus in the narratives had indirect effects, which appear as marked increases in the significance of different indirect drivers in the original narratives. A comparison between the original and enriched Eur-SSPs details the complex interactions behind these higher-level findings, particularly focusing on interactions between indirect drivers and nexus elements. Eur-SSP1 and SSP4 are visualised in Figure 3 and Figure 4 as examples, and Eur-SSP3 and 5 can be found in Figure S1 and S2.

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
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A comparison of the size of the nodes in enriched versus original Eur-SSP1 (Figure 3) shows that environmental respect and quality of governance increased in importance significantly. This change was due to the important role of environmentally friendly lifestyles and strong governance in enabling and reinforcing positive outcomes across the biodiversity nexus, both directly and indirectly through their influence on economic development and education. In contrast, a comparison of the size of the nodes in enriched versus original Eur-SSP4 (Figure 4) shows that technological development gained influence due to mixed interactions with the biodiversity nexus, as innovation leads to intensive extraction of natural resources that have negative impacts on biodiversity, while green technological developments in food production ease some pressure on land and ecosystems. Environmental respect also gained importance in both SSPs, as improved ecosystems allow people to enjoy nature for recreation in Europe while high-tech solutions in some sectors (e.g., food) disconnect people from nature and perpetuate biodiversity loss. In the enriched Eur-SSP3 (Figure S1), economic development becomes more influential through its role in increasing demand for natural resources within the biodiversity nexus, eventually leading to economic crisis that creates stress within various aspects of the system. Geopolitical stability also gains influence as escalating regional rivalry causes wealthy countries within Europe to reduce their living standards and invest in the military, limiting Europe's overseas environmental footprint and reducing mobility between countries. In enriched Eur-SSP5 (Figure S2), economic development increases in significance, as fossil-fuelled development is enabled by technological enhancements that increase the efficiency and pace of natural resource extraction.



* 'Number of mentions' refers to the number of times the node of edge was mentioned in the scenario narrative (Text S2).

Figure 3: Original (left) versus enriched (right) system map of the narratives for Eur-SSP1. The nodes include the biodiversity nexus elements in green and indirect drivers in yellow. The size of the nodes corresponds to the number of times the element is mentioned in the interlinkages to and from that node. The thickness of the edge corresponds to the number of mentions underlying that interlinkage. The colour of the edge corresponds to the positive (blue), negative (red), or mixed/neutral (grey) direction of the node-to-node relationship.




Figure 4: Original (left) versus enriched (right) narratives for Eur-SSP4. See Figure 3 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.

3.4 Describing interlinkages between the biodiversity nexus and indirect drivers in the enriched Eur-SSPs

The process of enriching the Eur-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and the biodiversity nexus increased the relative significance of indirect drivers in the narratives (Section 3.2). These changes were explored in more detail by looking at how the interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and directly from biodiversity nexus elements to indirect drivers (i.e., positive or negative), in addition to feedbacks between the biodiversity nexus and the wider socio-economic system, manifest within the different scenarios. The analysis is visualised and discussed for enriched Eur-SSP3 and 5 as examples, which can be explored further in annotated figures for all Eur-SSPs (i.e., with labels showing a description of interlinkage) in Figures S3 to S6.

The sub-system maps for enriched Eur-SSP3 in Figure 5 Figure 5 show how nexus elements influence one another and indirect drivers directly. Regarding interlinkages between nexus elements, biodiversity, food and energy are most strongly interconnected. A decline in pollinators reduces food production while increasing energy prices affect food prices.

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
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Agricultural expansion leads to biodiversity loss and increased demand for energy leads to environmental degradation, both of which motivate a turn later in the scenario toward localized food production and in turn reduce energy demand in ways that positively impact biodiversity. Direct influences of the biodiversity nexus on indirect drivers are numerous and diverse. For example, depleted biodiversity causes societal and economic shocks while unequal distribution of energy resources motivates international cooperation to diversify energy sources across countries. Privatization of healthcare and water scarcity lead to unequal access to these services and frequent large-scale desertification drives water wars.

The feedbacks from indirect drivers back toward the biodiversity nexus (right, Figure 5Figure 5) show how quality of governance has the most negative influence on the biodiversity nexus, as the deterioration of governance systems across regions and scales gradually makes it impossible to coordinate the maintenance of transport and healthcare infrastructures and ensure food security. Importantly, the quality of governance contributes to ceasing regulations related to biodiversity and the environment. However, food security is still enabled by other drivers, such as technological development. Geopolitical instability also has detrimental impacts on multiple aspects of the biodiversity nexus. The increasing incidence of political and social conflicts requires resources to be shifted from investments in energy, transport and health to military spending. In addition, the collapse of value chains forces societies across Europe to use less clean energy and cope with worsening healthcare. At the same time, Europe's instability decreases its involvement in global value chains and thus decreases its pressure on ecosystem outside Europe. Energy is negatively influenced by multiple indirect drivers, which explains a rather surprising positive influence of international cooperation – in an attempt to mitigate the lack of energy resources, remaining governance structures try to establish alliances with other countries to help secure energy supply.



* 'Number of mentions' refers to the number of times the node of edge was mentioned in the scenario narrative (Text S2). The position of the nodes was selected for clarity and ease of comprehension.

Figure 5: Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP3 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to one another and to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). The nodes include the biodiversity nexus elements in green and indirect drivers in yellow. The size of the nodes corresponds to the number of times the element is mentioned in the interlinkages to and from that node. The thickness of the edge corresponds to the number of mentions underlying that interlinkage. The colour of the edges corresponds to the positive (blue), negative (red), or mixed/neutral (grey) direction of the interlinkage.

The sub-system maps for enriched Eur-SSP5 in Figure 6 show how biodiversity nexus elements influence one another and indirect drivers directly. As with Eur-SSP3, biodiversity is strongly connected with health, energy and food within the nexus. This is due to the role of environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, and limited access to nature negatively affecting wellbeing and public health, and the role of fossil fuel exploitation, which is exacerbated by energy policy and strategies, in damaging natural resources and marine biodiversity. Environmental degradation also has negative impacts on food production to the point of causing food insecurity. Health has a positive influence on indirect drivers, as the rebound from the economic and health crises in Europe allows long-term investments in health that lead to economic and social sustainability. Economic development is most strongly

influenced by the nexus elements. For example, increased demand for transport and investments in health boost economic development, but people relying on the fish sector transition to other livelihoods due to the negative consequences on marine biodiversity caused by fossil fuel extraction.

The indirect drivers also feedback on the biodiversity nexus (right, Figure 6Figure 6). Economic development based on fossil fuel exploitation and natural resource use negatively impacts biodiversity but has a range of mixed outcomes for other sectors. For example, near-term economic prosperity allows for increases to health investments, accompanied by a rise in transportation demand. Technological development also has a negative impact on biodiversity as technology development motivates increasing resource use. Quality of government also feeds back onto biodiversity and the nexus including energy and food, as governments limit environmental protection to prioritise economic interests, contributing to a reliance on energy and food imports.




Figure 6: Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP5 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). See Figure 5 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.

4 Discussion

These findings suggest important implications for biodiversity governance and scenario development in the IPCC and IPBES research communities.

4.1 Implications for biodiversity governance

Enriching the Eur-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature offers important insight into the underlying socio-economic dynamics that drive changes to the state of biodiversity. The analysis of the enriched Eur-SSPs shows that all indirect drivers interact with biodiversity directly or indirectly through other elements of the biodiversity nexus, with widely varying outcomes for the state of biodiversity and other nexus elements (Table 2). Which indirect drivers are most important for the overall system dynamics depends on the scenario context (Table 3). For example, quality of governance is a highly influential driver in Eur-SSP1 as society transitions toward sustainability, whereas geopolitical stability is highly influential in Eur-SSP3 which is characterised by fragmented governance and conflict. Together, these findings suggest that the state of biodiversity (i.e., positive, neutral, or negative over time) across Eur-SSPs is highly influenced by the evolution of deeply uncertain indirect drivers (Pereira et al., 2024) whose relative priority will change depending on the future trajectory in different regions across Europe (IPBES, 2024).

The findings suggest possible interactions between indirect drivers that may hold more leverage for halting and reversing biodiversity loss. For example, under multiple Eur-SSPs, interactions between economic development and technological development perpetuate unsustainable extraction or use of natural resources, even when oriented toward sustainability (e.g., green business and its externalities outside of Europe in Eur-SSP4). A similar finding occurred when downscaling the global SSPs to the United Kingdom (Harmáčková et al., 2022). This finding reinforces the importance of policy interventions that break the feedback loop between natural resource use and development: for example, by accounting for social needs and environmental limits and externalities within and beyond Europe (Chava, 2014; Raworth, 2017; Sala et al., 2020). In contrast, quality of governance and to a lesser extent environmental respect and social cohesion play a cornerstone role in the transition toward more nature-positive and sustainable futures in enriched Eur-SSP1. However, if these governance and

societal drivers orient away from biodiversity, as they do in other scenarios, these drivers also play a significant role in perpetuating biodiversity loss (e.g., fragmented governance deprioritising environmental policies in Eur-SSP3). This finding reinforces the importance of a systemic policy approach that situates interventions to support biodiversity within an enabling and even transformative governance context (Huang et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2003; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2021). Further, it aligns with recent findings in IPBES (2024), which highlights how future scenarios with positive outcomes for biodiversity and other sectors are characterized by sustainable lifestyles, more equitable distribution of benefits, and prosustainability policies and regulations, in addition to shifts to a range of indirect drivers related to governance and power relations. Importantly, our findings also highlight how each Eur-SSP is not wholly 'good' or 'bad' for biodiversity: even the scenarios that result in negative biodiversity outcomes overall include the crossing of ecological tipping points later in the century, after which society recognises and begins orienting toward sustainability (see also Harmáčková et al., 2022). Such findings reveal the importance of embedding nature-positive actions across policy portfolios in anticipation of these windows of opportunity, even amid more challenging socio-economic conditions (Bennett et al., 2016; Westley et al., 2011).

The findings also reinforce the need for a nexus approach in biodiversity governance, which embeds biodiversity objectives and goals across sectors and nexus elements (IPBES, 2024). Across the enriched Eur-SSPs, positive or negative outcomes for biodiversity are not always felt directly from indirect drivers themselves (e.g., quality of governance or economic development), but rather through their influence on other nexus elements (e.g., food, energy, health, water, transport) and their interactions with biodiversity (IPBES, 2024; Kim et al., 2024). For example, in Eur-SSP1, improved governance and environmental respect enable mainstreaming of agroecological practices that can benefit biodiversity (e.g., Chappell and LaValle, 2011). In turn, biodiversity impacts health through access to green space and indirectly through its contribution to organic and nutritious food (e.g., Crinnion, 2010). In contrast, in Eur-SSP3, a decrease in environmental respect and related increased use of pesticides in high-yield unsustainable agricultural intensification leads to biodiversity loss in land and water systems, negatively impacting human health. Similarly, in Eur-SSP5, fossil fuel-based energy and

transport sectors cause cascading effects in various sectors including health and food, which have both direct and indirect impacts on biodiversity. In such cases, biodiversity 'bites back', for example through its influence on food prices or food quality, or as ecological tipping points are crossed that affect human health directly (e.g., Hough, 2014). Perhaps most importantly, the implications of unsustainable practices and overconsumption of resources across sectors, and the resulting state of biodiversity, is intimately tied to societal outcomes, as under multiple scenarios a lack of access to resources is tied to deep and widening inequalities and conflict (Carmignani, 2013; Mildner et al., 2011). Thus, a nexus approach that considers these cross-sectoral interactions and feedbacks is needed if governance is to address the risks of social injustice accompanied by environmental collapse (IPBES, 2024), as overlooking them may underestimate the scope and scale of plausible socio-economic and environmental change.

4.2 Implications for scenario frameworks for IPBES and the IPCC

The findings have important implications for the biodiversity and climate change research communities developing and applying the scenario frameworks, including IPBES and the IPCC. The SSPs were originally developed as exploratory socio-economic scenarios for climate change research and have now been downscaled to regional and local contexts and operationalised for scenario analyses in sectors beyond climate change. These processes include quantitative, data-driven approaches drawing from databases and literature (Absar and Preston, 2015; Rohat et al., 2018) and co-creation processes drawing from stakeholder knowledge (Chen et al., 2020; Frame et al., 2018; Harmáčková et al., 2022; Zandersen et al., 2019). This uptake and extension of the SSPs is a testament to the appetite for scenario frameworks that address socio-economic uncertainty. Yet, the original SSPs were not necessarily designed with all of these applications in mind, affirming the need to be transparent about their strengths and limitations for applications in different sectors and scales (O'Neill et al., 2020).

This paper speaks directly to the discussion on gaps and future applications of the original Eur-SSPs. Kok et al., (2019) state the need for "further extension" of the enriched Eur-SSPs to address a wider set of drivers, factors, sectors and actors, highlighting that the SSPs have been developed for different purposes than they may be applied and thus may result in

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mismatching drivers, sectors, and content. We affirm that these challenges exist and offer a methodology for enriching existing narratives in ways that begin to address these gaps for applications of the Eur-SSPs in biodiversity and climate research. For example, we have shown that introducing consideration of biodiversity and nature to the original Eur-SSPs had significant implications on the overall system dynamics. This manifested differently across each of the Eur-SSPs, including by magnifying the importance of particular indirect drivers and introducing feedbacks from biodiversity back onto direct and indirect drivers of biodiversity loss. Additionally, we have shown that considering nexus interactions in scenario development (i.e., across biodiversity, food, energy, transport, water and health) reveals a much richer picture of the cause-and-effect mechanisms within the scenario and the relative importance of certain indirect drivers and nexus elements within the interactions that lead to or mitigate environmental challenges. Kok et al., (2019) also point to methodological choices that simplified the original Eur-SSP narratives (i.e., to develop 'equivalent scenarios' that directly translate outcomes from global to European scale), and thus resulted in narratives that may have excluded European-specific uncertainties. We affirmed that this challenge exists, as the incorporation of biodiversity and the biodiversity nexus introduced European-specific considerations that were masked in the original scenarios (e.g., green, technology-led development in Eur-SSP4 creating environmental externalities in other countries).

We have also gone beyond the gaps stated by Kok et al., (2019) to show that the original Eur-SSPs may underestimate the complexity and scale of change that may only be revealed when biodiversity is introduced as intertwined with socio-economic futures. For example, the crossing of biodiversity tipping points has significant socio-economic consequences in the latter part of the century in Eur-SSPs 4 and 5. Additionally, we reflect how the SSPs can help explore a wide range of outcomes for biodiversity, though few are truly nature positive, which affirms the finding of Alexander et al., (2023). More specifically, we show that the original Eur-SSPs can benefit from being enriched by details that could help mediate the relationships between climate- and biodiversity-related interventions. For example, renewable energy initiatives have mixed impacts on biodiversity in multiple Eur-SSPs, drawing attention to the need for mechanisms for decarbonisation (e.g. hydro, solar, wind powered energy, decarbonised

transportation) to be carefully weighed against broader consequences such as resource exploitation, metal waste generation and species habitat losses and collision (e.g., Gasparatos et al., 2017; Santangeli et al., 2016). A nexus perspective highlights the need for evidence on response options with multiple benefits across sectors including and beyond biodiversity and climate (IPBES, 2024).

4.3 Methodological considerations

This study offers numerous methodological reflections. We aimed to demonstrate an iterative, participatory, and complexity-oriented process for enriching the Eur-SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach. This process prioritised cocreation, wherein the researchers structured an accessible process that relied heavily on a carefully selected set of stakeholders and experts to identify key interactions and drivers that addressed the range of sectors in the biodiversity nexus. We embarked on one iteration to fill gaps (i.e., the webinar), which offered the level of detail and rigour required to meet the aims of this study. However, more iterations in the participatory process may have enabled more interactions to be identified and added, which may have allowed for bolder conclusions about exactly which indirect drivers, nexus elements and interactions are most critical for the future. Further, stakeholders' ability to enrich the Eur-SSPs depended on existing knowledge about these nexus interactions, many of which are still uncertain or under researched (Kim et al., 2024; IPBES, 2024). This gap points to open questions about our findings, such as whether the indirect drivers with few interlinkages can be assumed as less important or perhaps represent gaps in knowledge. Further, rigorous evidence is required to better quantify the impacts across interlinkages in the systems analysis.

5 Conclusion

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In this paper, we showed how considering interlinkages and feedbacks between indirect drivers and the biodiversity nexus in the Eur-SSPs enriched the complexity of narratives, highlighting the importance of biodiversity in underpinning other nexus elements and in reciprocal relationship with indirect drivers. By looking at sub-system maps of the influences from – and to – the biodiversity nexus, we were able to paint a clearer picture of the feedbacks

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between the biodiversity nexus and the wider system of indirect drivers. These findings have various implications for biodiversity governance. For example, our findings show the diverse outcomes for biodiversity across socio-economic futures, highlighting the need for an adaptive and context-relevant policy approach that can respond to emerging socio-economic trajectories of change. We also reveal interactions between indirect drivers that may hold more leverage for halting and reversing biodiversity loss amid diverse other priorities (including climate change), reinforcing the need for a systemic policy approach that situates technological interventions to support biodiversity within an enabling societal and governance context and a wider economic system.

For the scenario communities, we reinforce previous calls for extension of the Eur-SSPs to address a wider set of drivers, factors, sectors and actors. We demonstrate a methodology for doing so in ways that explore the nature of the entangled biodiversity and climate crises, thereby offering more 'biodiversity-centric' scenarios to the climate research community – and in turn, climate-relevant scenarios to the biodiversity community. However, this is only a first step. A deeper analysis of the entangled biodiversity-climate crisis may also introduce the implications of various RCPs to detail how climate change impacts on biodiversity interact with these already-complex interactions between biodiversity and socio-economic change. Further, climate projections themselves do not sufficiently account for feedbacks between climate and biodiversity nor interactions between interventions (climate mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity conservation, habitat restoration, and nature-based solutions), highlighting an opportunity for deeper integration between these two domains. Further, a nexus perspective highlights the need for further evidence regarding and implementation of policy implementation scenarios and models in understanding how multiple associated sustainability targets across temporal and spatial scales could be achieved (IPBES, 2024). Beyond these areas, interactions and feedbacks between the indirect drivers themselves and their effects on the nexus elements is reflected to some extent in the narratives, but requires further exploration. Finally, our analysis focused on the scenario narratives as a whole and further iterations would detail how the systemic interactions evolve over time. We hope this contribution demonstrates

- and inspires more intentional application of scenario frameworks that reflect the complexity of
- interacting environmental challenges.

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Open Research

- No additional data beyond the workshop data (Table S2) and final enriched European SSPs
- (Table S1) were produced during this study. All data used for this paper has been anonymized
- and published in accordance with the research ethics protocols for confidentiality and informed
- 689 participant consent.

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Supporting Information for

Enriching the European shared socio-economic pathways with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach

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Introduction

The Supplementary Information contains the following, which support the main content of the journal paper:

- Text S1 includes methodological details that clarify how the European Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs) were enriched and analysed using a nexus approach.
- Text S2 includes the full enriched European-SSP narratives produced through the study, which support the analysis in the main text.
- Figures S1 to S6 support Figure 3 to 6 in the main text as additional visualisations for the scenarios that are discussed but not fully visualized in the main text.
- Table S1 supports Table 2 in the main text by providing the temporal change of the state of each of the nexus elements in each scenario.
- Table S2 includes the anonymise data collected from the workshop, before any
 further analysis or synthesis into the narratives. Please note that some of the data
 was not included in the final enriched European SSPs in Text S2 due to
 considerations made later in the analysis, such as internal consistency and overall
 coherence of the narrative.

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Supporting Information for: Enriching the European shared socio-economic pathways with considerations of biodiversity and nature using a nexus approach.

Text S1.

Detailed methodology for enriching Eur-SSPs using workshop outputs: The stickers were clustered according to time span (i.e., present to 2040, 2040 to 2070, or 2070 to 2100) and then according to common themes. A summary statement was written to summarise common themes. These summary statements were then integrated into the original Eur-SSP narratives in ways that maintained internal consistency and plausibility within the original Eur-SSPs and maintained the narrative flow. These revisions were verified and calibrated by a quality assurance review against the raw notes from the workshop by a reviewer. During this process, internal consistency was again checked in each Eur-SSP for further adjustments, and some modifications were made to bring coherence to the events and implications across time scales. An additional quality assurance review was conducted on the draft enriched Eur-SSP narratives by a researcher independent of the original analysis.

<u>Detailed webinar methodology</u>: After a welcome and introductions, facilitators presented each of the enriched Eur-SSPs followed by an opportunity for participants to ask questions and give feedback. After this, participants were split into breakout groups, each dedicated to one of the four enriched Eur-SSPs, to draw a collaborative system diagram that allowed them to map out elements of, and interlinkages within, the biodiversity nexus in the narrative supported by an online Miro board and a facilitator. The process attempted to cover the whole Eur-SSP narrative by mapping out existing elements and interlinkages from the draft narrative on a standardized map of the nexus, and then further enriching the diagram. Groups that had extra time discussed the indirect drivers (e.g., social, technological, economic, etc.) that were driving the trade-offs and synergies within the biodiversity nexus in that Eur-SSP. The discussion was captured via the Miro board and a dedicated notetaker for each group.

Detailed methodology for adapting enriched Eur-SSPs using webinar outputs: The captured data were synthesized and incorporated into the draft enriched Eur-SSP narratives to produce a final version. To do so, the discussion points for each SSP were collated and comments were made on the draft enriched Eur-SSP narratives, highlighting potential changes to be made based on feedback after the presentation of the narratives and additions/enrichments of narratives during the collaborative systems mapping exercise. Intext edits were then made on the draft narratives with changes tracked, and notes were made regarding which webinar inputs were moved to different time periods in the narrative or rejected because of internal inconsistency. The new narratives were then subject to a second quality assurance review following the same procedure as the draft narratives after the workshop. The final narratives were then sent to stakeholders for final validation.

Detailed methodology for generate a systems analysis of enriched Eur-SSPs: Each interlinkage was labelled according to the following criteria: (i) from (originating element); (ii) to (receiving element); (iii) statement from the narrative informing the interlinkage; (iv) textual summary of the interlinkage; (v) whether the statement was from the original versus enriched narrative; (vi) whether the interlinkage was directly stated (i.e., explicit) or inferred from the narrative (i.e., implicit); (vii) whether the interlinkage implies a direct or indirect link between elements; (viii) corresponding time period in the narrative (i.e., present to 2040, 2040 to 2070, 2070 to 2100); and (ix) positive or negative interlinkage (i.e., increasing or decreasing the 'to' variable, except for biodiversity, which was positive or negative impacts on biodiversity). After initial coding of the database, each of the four coding researchers

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reviewed the database for one other Eur-SSP and commented on the comprehensiveness and consistency of the database to inform a revision. Finally, a researcher who was not involved in the original coding reviewed the whole database for comprehensiveness and consistency across all four Eur-SSPs, which informed a final revision of the database.

Text S2.

BIONEXT Enriched European SSP1 scenario

<u>From Present to 2040:</u> The interplay of financial, environmental and economic crises has strong repercussions for European citizens affecting jobs and standards of living. This fuels the feeling that societal behaviour needs to change away from an unregulated market-driven economy to a sustainable development path, and European leaders are compelled towards further integration of financial, fiscal and environmental policies. Eventually, a system of national accounts is put in place that adopts a basket of wellbeing-based performance measures instead of GDP. These are supported by scientific evidence linking human wellbeing to nature and biodiversity. Science-policy dialogues open up to plural knowledge systems and worldviews around biodiversity. Indigenous and traditional knowledge becomes embedded in curricula, laws and policies. As a result, cultural and biological diversity becomes part of everyday life.

Governments are under increasing pressure to take ambitious measures to move Europe to a more just and sustainable future. This includes tackling climate change and biodiversity loss, whilst also investing in health, education, and social support. Protected areas are expanded for nature restoration, and policy incentives are used to promote the provision of ecosystem services and sustainable practices on private agricultural and forestry land. This leads to gradual improvements in soil health and forest resilience, but it is recognised that more still needs to be done to tackle problems such as pollution and to offset indirect impacts of protected areas (e.g., displacement effects). Investments are also made to increase green space and green infrastructure in urban areas, supported by initiatives from government, communities and industry. These investments promote cycling and walking as alternative sustainable modes of transport for short distances, whilst the railway network is expanded for longer distance travel by gradually repurposing roads and integrating high-speed rail lines with nature corridors. These sustainability investments come at the expense of somewhat slower economic growth, constraining resource availability and livelihoods. As such, the green transition is initially met with some resistance. However, the resulting higher quality of life and a growing feeling of security and safety are eventually embraced. People are generally healthier, consuming more nutritious and diverse foods, and feeling more connected to their local environment.

In Europe and worldwide, trade wars and other economic crises are addressed by multi-level governance configurations with increasing effectiveness. This includes collaborative governance of marine protected areas, which are managed taking account of local context and local knowledge to improve the health of marine ecosystems, whilst supporting small-scale fisheries and fishers. The agricultural sector reforms to become more regenerative, respecting biodiversity and the ecosystem services upon which it relies (e.g. pollination). Investment in green technologies and geo-engineering increases

rapidly, facilitating an energy transition towards renewables and energy efficiency. The increased use of renewable energy, which includes bioenergy, initially increases pressure on land and results in negative impacts on biodiversity. However, over time the risks of these sustainable energy sources are addressed so they have net positive impacts on air and water quality and quantity, which improve biodiversity and human health. The social benefits of energy cooperatives are also widely recognized, and significant support is allocated to them. By 2040, efforts to transform Europe to a sustainable society are starting to pay dividends. This is reinforced by gradually changing lifestyles as humans increasingly recognize themselves as part of nature. Despite this progress, innovative solutions are still needed to address trade-offs, particularly in areas with high population density.

From 2040 to 2070: A decrease in conflicts in Europe's southern and eastern border regions leads to higher political stability and moderate but steady economic growth in an increasingly equitable Europe, which allows the middle class to grow stronger. European countries also recognise the essential role of local leaders and authorities, giving more power to local communities who design integrated solutions for lowering greenhouse gas emissions that bring co-benefits for biodiversity conservation and human wellbeing. The local communities collaborate to protect local biodiversity and put pressure on governments and the European Union to support conservation of ecosystems across regions. At the EU level new regulations are brought into law to limit thoughtless and wasteful consumption by introducing resource-caps per capita on material footprints, including water, energy and carbon. People lead more sustainable lives in compact cities or in smaller towns that are self-sufficient in the production and consumption of renewable energy and healthy food.

The European Union expands further and participates in new global governance initiatives. The larger EU takes responsibility for addressing its environmental impacts in the border regions and leads investments that help the pursuit of sustainable development goals globally. This contributes to widespread ecosystem restoration beyond Europe with the greening of arid areas, and cities joining forces to ban wildlife trade around the globe. This financing of sustainable growth outside of the EU reverses increasing trends in migration to Europe and, for the first time this century, migration towards Europe starts to decline.

There is a substantial shift in the European political agenda with a greater focus on wellbeing than economic growth, driven by human losses associated with climate change combined with positive improvements in accessible education and lifestyle. Some governments in Europe adopt a degrowth economic model. Biodiversity is consistently mainstreamed with Al-assisted policy planning and implementation that ensures policy coherence across sectors. By the 2050s, sustainability policies have matured with stricter enforcement of environmental protection. Sectors have transformed to address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss and now allocate more budget to biodiversity conservation and restoration. Advances in green technologies are

further stimulated by international competition leading to a CO_2 neutral society by 2050. The positive impact of the sustainable transition becomes increasingly visible, gaining more support from the public and the governments.

From 2070 to 2100: Worldwide, consumption is now oriented toward low material growth and low resource and energy intensity. This results from the development of new technologies that enable radically reduced resource consumption through increased resource efficiency and a strong increase in the use of renewable energy sources, facilitated by new flexible global, regional, and national institutions that enhance international cooperation. People limit air travel and spend more time in nature within their own country. Nevertheless, innovation in the aviation industry allows zero emissions travel enabling people to occasionally experience biodiversity hotspots worldwide, though in some cases this has rebound effects as some people travel more. New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge and transdisciplinary practice, with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiversity conservation. This leads to co-benefits for regulating the climate, retaining water and underpinning sustainable and diverse food production systems. This ensures that all European citizens have access to healthy and nutritious diets.

Economic development is no longer based on growth and biodiversity has become a core indicator of the health and wellbeing of society. Europe's landscape is more diverse with well-designed land use in rural areas integrating across the agricultural, forestry, water resource and energy sectors. As a result, people's mental health is enhanced through their increased connection with nature. This leads to improved physical health as individuals engage in less stressful activities, resulting in longer and healthier lives. The ageing population increasingly values biodiversity and high quality green space for recreation and relaxation but also puts pressure on social services in some cases. Technological advancements further support this positive trend. Continued steady economic development and the strong middle class enable economic and social inequality to further decrease. By 2100, Europe is characterised by a high level of sustainability oriented political and societal awareness which is reflected in the education system, focusing on renewable energy and low material growth, in a strongly regulated but effective multi-level governance structure with strong international cooperation.

BIONEXT Enriched European SSP3 scenario

<u>From Present to 2040</u>: With the economy gradually picking up, the demand for resources increases, which turns out to be a tipping point for the state of the environment. In particular, increasing resource demand contributes to worsening the biodiversity and climate change crises resulting in severe ecosystem failures which lead to cascading and compounding shocks in society and the economy. Consequently, the world economy does not perform as expected, triggering economic crises across the

European Union that stress the structural differences across and within Member States. Populist movements become increasingly mainstream and are further fuelled by increasing riots in multicultural neighbourhoods.

Actions to address the severely degraded environmental state are developed, but without any cooperation at the EU level they are not prioritised. Gradually, government and public support for environmental policies declines as policies to revive the economy are considered more important. The focus on economic development increases demand for energy, resulting in further environmental degradation, rising inflation, biodiversity loss and ecosystem damage. The rise in populism results in increasing border controls and barriers to trade, which in addition to inflation substantially increases energy prices which in turn increase food prices (e.g., due to fertiliser prices). Growing international tensions and persistent conflicts initiate a massive build-up of the defence sector, which is resource hungry but not resource efficient. Mobility between EU countries declines and innovation in the public and private transport sector diminishes due to the increased focus on the military. Escalating regional rivalry significantly reduces the overseas environmental footprint of European countries, allowing some local recovery of ecosystems outside Europe.

Extreme weather events become more frequent and further increase the costs of resources, damage control and defensive measures; this causes the economy in Europe to start to stagnate. This, in turn, increases unemployment rates and leads to the phasing out of the social security system. Agricultural areas expand and intensify as growing food becomes a key priority, yet farmers are under pressure due to rising energy costs. Less environmental protection influences food quality as the use of pesticides, herbicides and antibiotics (in livestock production) is less strictly regulated. Weakened regulations on nutrient management and water use result in significant impacts from diffuse pollution, agricultural irrigation and soil degradation. Water scarcity increases across Europe due to the impacts of climate change, but to a much greater extent in some regions, resulting in unequal access to water. Pressure on natural resources for consumer goods (e.g. wood) leads to growing competition among corporates and pushes governments to harvest unsustainably. This, together with agricultural expansion, leads to large losses in natural areas and species. Energy resources are unevenly distributed with some regions relying on existing fossil fuels, such as coal, whilst others move to local bioenergy production.

The majority of people live in large urban centres with increasing food insecurity and declining living standards, impacting health. Lack of planning regulations in cities leads to urban sprawl and significant build-up of traffic within large urban conurbations. This increases energy demand and air pollution affecting human and ecosystem health. Overall sickness increases, with the privatisation of healthcare making treatments accessible for only the richest and no public health facilities for the remaining population. In light of increasingly scarce public resources, long-term policy planning

becomes rare with hardly any money for education, research or innovation. Eventually the EU breaks down.

From 2040 to 2070: Continuing negative social, environmental and economic developments widen the gap between the poorer countries and regions particularly in the periphery of Europe and the richer, larger countries that maintain a decent level of social, economic and political stability. Policymaking is focused on immediate crisis prevention and is short sighted and egoistic. Environmental crises, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, remain a low political priority. A fragmented Europe struggles to care for its natural capital and resources as countries cannot effectively externalise the damage. Protected area legislation is abandoned to ease the ongoing conversion of natural habitat to agricultural land to help achieve food security, negatively impacting biodiversity. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing increases to cope with rising food prices, resulting in the collapse of some fisheries. Agricultural intensification decreases water quality with nutrient outflows from production impacting lakes, estuaries and oceans, and causing harmful algal blooms and dead zones. A severe decline in pollinators also negatively impacts food production. However, in some local communities, lack of access to artificial fertilizers and pesticides and a move to local food production and consumption has some positive effects on human health, biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions, with some implications on agricultural expansion that in turn negatively impacts biodiversity (e.g., deforestation).

With the disintegration of social fabric, Europeans in the poorer regions increasingly migrate in search of jobs, and are employed in countries that are somewhat better off, for relatively low wages. Most migration is within Europe. Eventually, new regional blocs are formed in the north and in the south of Europe, while new alliances with other countries are forged to ensure sufficient energy supply. By 2070, social countermovements appear with some signs of a slight economic recovery and increased social cohesion. Yet, these signs are temporary and do not take root in a fragmented and divided Europe with strong regional rivalry and conflict. Water wars become increasingly frequent in southern and eastern Europe due to large-scale desertification. Environmental flows are not maintained in rivers leading to huge losses in aquatic biodiversity in these regions. The general lack of economic resources and means to afford new technologies, coupled with weak institutions and governance structure, leads to an increasing resource intensity and fossil fuel use. Health systems fail as there is no cross-border cooperation in times of emergency, leading to increased health inequalities including limited access to facilities and availability of medication, and lower life expectancy.

<u>From 2070 to 2100:</u> In the absence of strong (inter)national institutions, criminal organizations and corruption take hold, in the aftermath of failed counter movements. Europe has lost its leading position, reinforced by difficulties to re-establish effective collaborations. Economic growth significantly reduces as the fragmented European regions deindustrialize and focus on maintaining basic human needs, such as food

security. This reduces demand for energy and materials, alleviating environmental damage and allowing incremental rewilding of certain areas. In the majority of Europe, food production becomes highly extensive as technological means of increasing yields are no longer available. Many people return to a subsistence lifestyle on the land working with nature to produce food locally.

The far-reaching fragmentation and cultural diversity have triggered a brain drain with the well-educated migrating to regions outside Europe that offer better opportunities. Eventually, Europe is not worse off than the rest of the world but struggles to avoid becoming the world's backwater as new clean technologies are increasingly developed elsewhere and affordable only for the richer European countries. Governance becomes increasingly community-based as co-ops establish and try to support each other in informal economies. However, clean water, clean energy and healthcare is only ensured for richer countries and regions, whilst the majority accept political instability and social injustice and learn to live with less.

BIONEXT Enriched European SSP4 scenario

From Present to 2040: Sparked by economic crises and extreme weather events, the EU increases commitment to find innovative solutions to the depletion of natural resources and climate change. In combination with current relatively high levels of social cohesion, energy efficiency and environmental policy-making this initiates a shift towards a hightech green Europe. This transformation is strongly supported by large businesses that successfully seek collaboration with the increasingly powerful European government. High tech green jobs are available to highly skilled young workers and there is increasing public support for environmental policies and practices. New innovations improve biodiversity in economically important ecosystems, such as through sustainable and high-tech agriculture and food production (e.g., lab-based), improved water management systems, and the mainstreaming of biodiversity within the pharmaceutical industry. Eventually, average wealth starts to increase as crises are successfully combatted and people enjoy pockets of nature for recreation. At the same time, the centralised public-private partnerships and related policies result in increased social disparities within countries. For example, a high-tech and increasingly privatised health sector leads to new treatments and cures, but little attention is given to prevention of illnesses worsened by rising inequality. Additionally, the business and political elite gains control over land and secure elite access to high-quality foods, which in some cases benefits ecosystems and biodiversity (e.g., as high-tech food production frees up land) at the expense of a large proportion of the population. Meanwhile, energy utilities engage with the energy transition through digitalisation strategies but, as public trust grows, begin to greenwash their activities and exploit nature for profit. The deep seabed is opened for mining to meet rising demand for technology, resulting in a significant loss in marine biodiversity.

Traditional knowledge related to the environment that is not directly economically valuable (e.g., for identifying new medications) is lost. Already-marginalized groups are pushed to vulnerable regions across Europe where they experience more significant impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss. Tipping points are crossed affecting countries outside of Europe initially as green innovation enables adaptation within Europe, such as technological fixes to declining bee populations. In addition, the people and ecosystems of countries outside of Europe are negatively impacted by the extractive industries that support the shift to green technology within Europe. This destabilizes already-fragile economies who move away from trade relationships with the EU.

From 2040 to 2070: Technology development is strong in the high-tech economy and sectors. Energy companies hedge against price fluctuations by diversifying their energy sources, with investments in both carbon-intensive fuels such as coal and unconventional oil, but also low-carbon energy and experimental sources such as tidal power, which have mixed impacts on biodiversity. High-tech transport systems emerge across Europe, fuelled by hydrogen and clean electricity. New high-tech sectors are growing in importance and gradually become the backbone of an economically strong Europe. However, this transition toward a high-tech green Europe continues to increase demand for resources in regions outside of Europe, exploiting ecosystems on a global scale. At the same time, inequalities are rising because of several simultaneously acting factors. These include skill-based technology development, highly unequal investments in education, and less affluent groups having increasingly weak political power and limited access to credit.

Strong technological development in food production leads to intensive production concentrating around cities, resulting in an exodus from rural areas that improves biodiversity in abandoned lands. This land abandonment is accompanied by an increased demand for land for clean energy production (e.g., solar-PV), including to fuel new high-tech transport systems which in turn reduce environmental pressures such as pollution. Techno-innovations also increase water demand, putting pressure on freshwater ecosystems, but new and improved industrial processes allow for better and more efficient water purification and recycling. However, people in cities suffer due to lack of employment, low purchasing power, poor-quality food, and inadequate access to healthcare. Together, these increasing disparities in economic opportunities and political power lead to increasing inequalities and stratification both across and within countries. The traditionally strong middle class decreases in influence but only slightly in numbers and can no longer afford to consume at high levels. Significant inequality and lack of social support provides a weak basis for preserving public goals such as nature protection, so biodiversity declines further. Elite capture of land leads to privatisation of natural resources such as water, creating bottlenecks in supply for the majority of the population. The poorest communities are driven to wildlife consumption through hunting, illegal and unreported fishing, foraging (?) and backyard animal production,

which spreads diseases and leads to biodiversity and wildlife extinction. Inadequate access to formal healthcare leads people to return to nature for natural remedies.

By 2070, there is a large and widening gap between an internationally connected society that is well educated and contributes to knowledge-intensive and capital-intensive sectors of the global economy, and a more fragmented collection of lower income societies that work in a labour intensive, low-tech economy, mostly in the service sector for the benefit of the elite. This leads to social unrest amongst the lower classes and a decline of trust in governments. Unskilled and uneducated people who are dissatisfied with the global elite form sub-cultures and counter-movements. Some of these movements move back to rural areas to adopt land-based sustainable practices on previously abandoned land. This is combined with more active modes of transport such as walking and cycling.

Despite a strong EU, power becomes increasingly concentrated in a relatively small political and business elite, while vulnerable groups have decreasing representation and influence. Among others, this results in increased conflicts in poorer regions of Europe and migration flows to safer areas, which become protected and biodiverse 'islands'. These migration flows within the EU shift the geographic distribution of natural resource use, increasing exploitation of some areas while abandoning others to rewild. Slums appear and grow across Europe in areas of high migration pressure, leading to a dramatic loss of habitat and pollution of waterways around cities, thereby reversing the impacts of technological efficiencies in the water sector. Migration flows into Europe are highly controlled by the elite, but Europe increasingly attracts illegal immigrants competing for decreasingly available low-skilled jobs. Overseas territories and former colonies continue to be disproportionately affected by natural resource extraction by European businesses, triggering a move to more localized and tailor-made policies for biodiversity protection in these regions.

From 2070 to 2100: Europe has become a market leader in (green) technologies, because of long-term under-investment in new resources in many other regions of the world related to uncertainty in fossil fuel markets. The need for strategic autonomy leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize mining and production activities where possible, reducing pressures on ecosystems outside of Europe but degrading ecosystems within Europe. Protected by a strong elite, the small "connected" upper class benefits, with high-skilled workers moving easily across countries to tap into new business opportunities. The elite becomes increasingly separated from other social classes, including the now quickly dwindling middle class, and through their exclusive access to high-tech, high-quality food and large areas of land and nature. This results in deepening inequalities within and among countries across Europe.

The majority of the population does not benefit from technological breakthroughs and does not profit from alliances between big business and the political elite. For example, agriculture focuses on high-input and GMO production in large-scale industrial farms in association with the high-tech food sector, explicitly excluding small-holder farmers.

This disconnects people from nature and perpetuates biodiversity loss. With decreasing public funding, good education is only accessible to those who can afford it. Technological development has not resulted in reduced energy prices but has instead established an oligarchy of green business developers that control energy supply and reduce resource availability for the majority. The wide gap between rich and poor leads to a worsening food crisis as poor people struggle to access healthy food. Where possible, people return to the countryside on marginal, formerly private lands that are not a priority for big business, where they grow their own food and begin to reconnect with nature. These regional communities in select rural areas continue to adopt sustainable lifestyles, locally lowering climate emissions and improving rural biodiversity, though in some cases their lack of access to technology puts pressure on ecosystems (e.g., use of biofuels). They also support each other through a focus on informal education, peer-to-peer learning and biodiversity value. As a governing body, the European Union is strong with strong ties with the lobbying industry. Social cohesion, however, is now low and stratified, while human health has decreased for most. By 2100, Europe is an important player in a world full of tensions, but with growing inequalities across and within European countries.

BIONEXT Enriched European SSP5 scenario

From Present to 2040: In the rebound from the economic and health crises in Europe, there is a shift towards market deregulation, resulting in a strong labour market and increased purchasing power. Global markets are increasingly integrated, with interventions focused on improving institutional participation of and benefits for disadvantaged population groups. There are also strong investments in health, education, and institutions to enhance human and social capital, since the economy is strong and growing rapidly. This results in a decrease in political unrest. The push for economic and social development is coupled with the exploitation of cheap and readily available fossil fuel resources. Market deregulation leads to an increase in imports and exports of commodities and food, increasing demand for transport and fossil-fuel resources. This is met through the expansion of road, air and shipping transport systems fuelled by the large-scale extraction of shale gas. This further stimulates economic growth but increases pollution, severely impacting biodiversity and human health. Environmental protection is reduced to enable increased access to natural resources. Deep sea fossil fuel extraction is allowed in Marine Protected Areas, resulting in drastic impacts on marine biodiversity and small-scale fishers. Fishers transition to other sectors, leading to a loss of cultural heritage.

Europe regains its leading position in the global economy, which further contributes towards a focus on economic growth and export markets rather than environmental policies. The increased economic wealth stimulates the development of (green) technologies. For example, technological and scientific innovation enable creation of efficient agriculture (e.g., precision farming) and new food systems (e.g., lab grown meat, GMOs, cell-based seafood, vertical farming, and hydroponics), and higher

purchasing power drives consumers toward these products. This reduces pressures on land use, particularly in terms of decreases in livestock and livestock feedstock production. Technological innovation in healthcare focuses on treatment rather than prevention or health promotion. Technology is only able to mask the negative impacts of environmental degradation on human health and wellbeing to some extent, and long-term illnesses increase as fertility rates decline. Governments only act to limit access to valuable ecosystems when their degradation threatens trade and economic growth. Nuclear energy is slowly phased out everywhere in Europe, while investments in biofuels and other renewables are relatively low, in favour of cheaper and more readily available fossil fuels.

From 2040 to 2070: Because of decreased energy price volatility and stabilising economies, public trust in political decision-making increases which facilitates strategies related to further exploitation of natural resources. Attempts to improve energy selfsufficiency within Europe intensify technological development aimed at greater extraction of fossil fuel resources, further driving climate change resulting in ecosystem collapse. Yet, faith remains strong in the ability to effectively manage social and ecological systems, including by geo-engineering and other technology fixes (e.g., carbon capture and storage). High and low skilled immigration and mobility remain high as European economies flourish. Job availability across all market sectors is high and contributes towards a reduction of inequalities and competition. Population across all societal classes, and the strengthening middle class in particular, adopts a very energy intensive lifestyle. Overconsumption and a focus on agricultural efficiency also reduces dietary diversity, leading to poorer health and a loss of cultural diversity. Education focuses on the importance of innovation in key economic sectors, such as energy, agriculture, and transport, rather than the environment and nature protection, instilling a strong trust in technology. Where environmental problems occur, these are tackled locally and reactively with technological solutions. For example, a rise in the use of desalinated water in southern and southwestern Europe enables increases in intensive food production with some negative impacts on marine biodiversity. As the environment degrades, the majority of the population is unaware because of successful technological innovation, for example in food and water production, vaccination availability, and climate adaptation, which decrease the dependency on ecosystem services. Yet, the effects of degradation are broad, such as increases in microparticle pollutants, declining water quality and poor soil quality, which collectively have a negative impact on biodiversity, food production and public health. Deep sea mining is pursued at massive scales, leading to deep sea ecosystem collapse. Carbon cycles and sequestration are severely impacted. Targets in the Paris Agreement are not met, leading to high levels of climate change and more frequent extreme climate events. Near 2070, biodiversity tipping points are reached, and ecosystems collapse as food insecurity grows. Food prices rise and unemployment worsens in rural areas. As climate impacts manifest, people move to cities and become used to living in artificial and 'closed' societies divorced from nature. The rural minority adopt self-organised, local,

and often manual means for procuring natural resources, increasing the strain on biodiversity.

From 2070 to 2100: In general, Europe continues on its path towards economic and social sustainability through competitive markets; investments in education and health; innovation and a strong focus on technological solutions fuelled by an (over)exploitation of fossil fuel resources, with an ever-stronger pressure on natural resources. Technology is used to mitigate the high levels of climate change with a strong emphasis on extracting CO₂ from the atmosphere through various carbon capture and storage technologies. The continuous high stability of the energy market and economies have changed European policymaking, now predominantly focusing on and investing in policies related to human and social capital (including financial systems and infrastructure), rather than environmental protection. However, new carbon markets begin to emerge as market-based solutions to tackling climate change are sought. Environmental conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep apace. Biodiversity loss occurs at scale. Human health suffers, with increasing non-communicable diseases straining health systems. Rapid sea-level rise forces a retreat of low-lying communities from the coastline, resulting in millions of properties being abandoned with mixed impacts on the housing markets. The population continues to grow with many non-coastal European cities having become economic hubs with efficient transportation means, increasing demand for natural resources in and around urban areas. Europe maintains an economic advantage internationally but is blamed for harmful climate and biodiversity impacts and failure to adapt to severe climate change leads to continued reliance on imports including for food and energy security. However, national governments have less political power, which enhances the free circulation of services, goods and people. Moreover, democracies are threatened as the cracks in prosperity begin to show. Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining physical and mental well-being. Towards 2100, the environment is locally seriously degraded as non-renewables are further exploited, which eventually results in a slow re-emergence of investments in renewables, deemed necessary as prices of fossil fuels rise following peak oil. Transport and energy systems begin to accelerate the move away from fossil-fuel dependency where possible. Yet, despite massive spending on technology and adaptation measures, they are still insufficient for halting and reversing the climate and ecological crises.




Figure S1. Original (left) versus enriched (right) system map of the narratives for Eur-SSP3. The nodes are scenario elements, with the biodiversity nexus elements in green and indirect drivers in yellow. The size of the nodes corresponds to the number of times the element is mentioned in the interlinkages to and from that node. The edges on the systems maps were produced so there is only one arrow for each node-to-node relationship. The thickness of the edge corresponds to the number of mentions underlying that interlinkage. The colour of the edge corresponds to the positive (blue), negative (red), or mixed/neutral (grey) direction of the node-to-node relationship.

^{* &#}x27;Number of mentions' refers to the number of times the node of edge was mentioned in the scenario narrative (Text S2).




Figure S2: Original (left) versus enriched (right) system map of the narratives for Eur-SSP5. See Figure S1 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.




Figure S3: Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP1 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). The nodes are scenario elements, with the biodiversity nexus elements in green and indirect drivers in yellow. The size of the nodes corresponds to the number of times the element is mentioned in the interlinkages to and from that node. The thickness of the edge corresponds to the number of mentions underlying that interlinkage. The colour of the edges corresponds to the positive (blue), negative (red), or mixed/neutral (grey) direction of the interlinkage. The edge labels refer to text describing the interlinkages in the table below the sub-system map.

^{* &#}x27;Number of mentions' refers to the number of times the node of edge was mentioned in the scenario narrative (Text S2).




Figure S4. Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP3 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). See Figure S3 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.




Figure S5. Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP4 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). See Figure S3 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.




Figure S6. Sub-system maps of enriched Eur-SSP5 highlighting interlinkages within the biodiversity nexus and first-degree interlinkages from the biodiversity nexus to indirect drivers (right) and the interlinkages from indirect drivers directly on the biodiversity nexus (left). See Figure S3 caption for a detailed explanation of the figure.

Table S1. Description of the state of the elements of the biodiversity nexus in each of four enriched Eur-SSPs

| Element | SSP1 | SSP3 | SSP4 | SSP5 |
|--------------|--|---|---|---|
| Biodiversity | + Biodiversity improves due to nature restoration, mainstreaming into policy, and changing human-nature relations • To 2040: biodiversity benefits from nature protection • To 2070: biodiversity benefits from mainstreaming by local communities and global goals • To 2100: biodiversity benefits from changing culture around humannature relations | + / - Biodiversity has mixed impacts from mixed response to geopolitical fragmentation and changing resource demand • To 2040: biodiversity suffers from lack of government and public support • To 2070: biodiversity declines due to reducing environmental legislation • To 2100: governance breakdown reduces demand for resources and biodiversity benefits | + / - Biodiversity has mixed impacts from technology development, until inequality worsens biodiversity and counter movements return to nature • To 2040: biodiversity has mixed impacts from shift to high-tech green Europe • To 2070: biodiversity suffers from technological fixes inside and outside of Europe • To 2100: biodiversity declines as Europe endogenizes mining impacts but begins to bounce back from counter movements | - Biodiversity declines and collapses due to uncontrolled economic development and resource extraction and use • To 2040: biodiversity declines from economic drivers • To 2070: biodiversity declines as ecosystems collapse due to uncontrolled resource extraction and use • To 2100: biodiversity loss at scale as efforts to reverse ecological crisis fail |
| Water | Water resources in good condition due to more sustainable practices To 2070: water quantity improves through more sustainable practices (e.g., energy) To 2100: water resources in good condition from more sustainable landscapes | Water resources degraded and a source of conflict, with unequal access To 2040: Water scarcity increases and unequal access begins To 2070: Water wars frequent in southern and eastern Europe To 2100: Water only available for richer countries | Water resources improve from technology, but inequality puts pressure on infrastructure and resources To 2040: water resources benefit from improved technology in water management To 2100: pressure on water resources from slums and elite privatisation | Water resources improve from technology, but uncontrolled development eventually degrades water resources To 2100: technology initially reduces reliance on water resources but over time degrades water quality |
| Food | Sustainable and integrative food production | Food insecurity from governance fragmentation, leading to intensification and eventually more | High-tech food system caters to economic and political elite, resulting in food crisis for poorer majority | High-tech food system eventually degrades the environment, |

| | To 2070: sustainable food practices adopted that are compatible with biodiversity To 2100: sustainable and integrative food production systems established across Europe | extensive land use from deindustrialisation To 2040: food prioritised but insecure due to fragmented decision-making To 2070: food exploits nature due to agricultural intensification and reduced environmental legislation To 2100: food system deindustrialises and becomes highly extensive as chemical inputs run out | To 2040: high-tech and elite-oriented agricultural and food system To 2070: intensive production around cities with poor quality food for majority To 2100: food crisis as poorest struggle for access to healthy food | eventually causing Europe to rely on food imports To 2040: new food systems from technological and scientific innovation To 2070: agricultural efficiency and intensive production begins to cause environmental degradation, and food insecurity grows To 2100: Europe depends on food imports |
|--------|---|--|---|--|
| Health | Healthcare and wellbeing improve due to government investment and more sustainable ways of living To 2040: health improves as government investments in health and sustainability To 2070: health improves as people lead more sustainable lives To 2100: health is high as a holistic health system is in place for all | Healthcare and wellbeing declining and unequal, with healthcare only for richer countries and regions To 2040: health declines as privatisation and unequal access begins To 2070: health declines further as lack of cross-border cooperation increases health inequality To 2100: health poor for most and only secured for wealthy regions | Healthcare privatised and technology driven, with wellbeing declining and healthcare only for societal elite To 2040: health shifts toward innovation and privatisation due to technology To 2070: health declines due to unequal access and lack of prevention; a return to natural remedies among poor To 2100: health poor for majority and only secured by elite | Healthcare and wellbeing decline as focus on technology and economic development neglects other aspects of wellbeing To 2040: health declines as technology innovation focuses on treatment and not prevention To 2070: health decreases due to declining state of the environment To 2100: human health poor |
| Energy | Sustainable, renewable and cooperative energy systems across Europe To 2040: transition toward renewable energy systems | Governance fragmentation and economic development affect energy demand and access and perpetuates reliance on fossil fuels To 2040: economic development boosts energy demand and energy prices rise | Technology innovation, renewable transition, and elite control of energy supply To 2040: energy utilities pursue efficiency and digitalisation To 2070: diversification of energy mix to hedge against price inflation | Continued fossil fuel exploitation eventually resulting in peak fossil fuel and beginnings of switch to renewables • To 2040: continued commitment to fossil fuel exploitation with low demand for renewables |

| | To 2070: self-sufficiency in consumption and production of renewable energy To 2100: sustainable and renewable energy systems with international cooperation | To 2070: lack of economic resources and weak governance perpetuates reliance on fossil fuels To 2100: energy access limited to richer countries; governance breakdown reduces energy demand | and increased demand for renewables To 2100: elite control of energy supply | To 2070: energy considered a key sector driving economic development To 2100: fossil fuel peak reached, resulting in re-emergence of renewables |
|-----------|--|--|---|--|
| Transport | Transition toward sustainable transport systems across Europe To 2070: switch toward shortmedium distance transport through active modes and better railway To 2100: zero emissions air travel but people still limit air travel | Decreased innovation and priority in transport sector due to fragmentation and militarisation To 2100: increased focus on military and lack of planning diminishes innovation and quality of transport planning | High-tech clean and active transport systems implemented in Europe To 2100: high-tech transport system fuelled by hydrogen and clean electricity, with more people adopting active modes | Increased demand for fossil-fuelled transport to enable economic growth To 2070: economic development increases demand for fossil-fuelled transport To 2100: European cities become economic hubs with efficient transport, eventually moving away from fossil fuels |

Table S2. Full dataset from stakeholder workshop used to enrich the European SSPs with considerations of biodiversity and nature

| Event | SSP1 | Possible summers for SSR- 11-15 | Motor | Fuest | | SSP3 Contribution summary | Notes | Front | SSP4 | Contribution | Notes | Impact on Diadinary 1 | SSP5 Contribution summary Notes |
|---|---|--|---------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|---|
| Event | Impact on Biodiversity | Possible summary for SSPs (before checks for internal consistency) | Notes | Event | Impact on Biodiversity | Contribution summary | Notes | Event | Impact on Biodiversity | Contribution summary | Notes Event | Impact on Biodiversity | Contribution summary Notes |
| U rules about finance are | | EU rules about finance are re-set and | | EU values such as solidarity | | EU policy design will no longer exist. | | | Reduction of intensive food | | | | Due to the severe negative impact |
| reset | | system of national account is established to measure natural | | will disappear. EU policy design will no longer exist. | | EU values such as solidarity will disappear with growing | | economic commitment to force innovation allow for a | • | | impact on natural environment trough | | of mass tourism, governments begins to close or limit access to the |
| | | capita and well-being. | | Individualisim will grow No | | Individualisim and no consensus to | | transfer to sustainable food | • | Food products are strongly regulated | massive extensive tourism, | | most valuable ecosystems. |
| | | capita and wen being. | | consensus to collaborate. | | collaborate. National policies | | systems. Food products get | , , | to protect biodiversity. | government starts to | | iniost valuable ecosystems. |
| | | | | No decision at global level | | support only solutions at country | | strongly regulated in terms | | | close/limit access to most | | |
| | | | | at benefit of all | | level and lack further coordination, | | of impact on biodiversity, | | | valuable ecosystems. | | |
| | | | | | | resulting in Inefficient public policies. | | climate, diseases, etc. | | | | | |
| Contain of maticinal | This published if we can | | a combined with an ambauc | Nightianal maliaina ayyanant | | | a probing of with one and | | lasa bambisidas and | | | Delitical transactively binder | Delitical toward il bindows the |
| System of national counts is established to | This only works if we can establish an enormous shift | | combinea with one above | National policies support only solutions at country | | | combined with above | | less herbicides and pesticides | | The pollution will bring forward the overshoot day | | Political turmoil hinders the exploitation of abundant fossil fuel |
| measure well-being | in human behaviour | | | level, lack of further | | | | | pesticides | | to an unrealistic early date | | · |
| | | | | coordination, Inefficient | | | | | | | in the year | | |
| | | | | public and policies | | | | | | | | | |
| aced with the need for | | Faced with the need for an enhanced | seems to contradict | Lack of strong EU means | | Lack of strong EU leads to | | | | Public awareness of environmental | | | Fossil fuel extraction is allowed in |
| coordination action of | | status the European federation in | positive impact of EU | their global impact is | | decreased global impact with less | | on improving the state of | • | issues stimulates new technologies | | • • | Marine Protected Areas, severely |
| hanced global status, EU | | the world, EU member states agree | green deal | decreased, less money in EU is less inversment in | | inversment in mining, food trade, | | the environment and tools available. Improvement. | and biodiversity | that protect ecosystems and improve biodiversity. | fossil fuel extractionin MPAs, thus increases? | | impacting marine biodiversity and small-scale fishers. Fishers transition |
| ember states agree on a eaty change, giving EU | | on a treaty change, giving EU competencies In tax, foreign policy, | | mining, food trade etc., | | etc., allowing local recovery. Smaller scale and regional | | available. Improvement. | | bloulversity. | European seas | | to other sectors, resulting in a loss |
| competencies? In tax, | | etc. EU imports resources from | | Less money, less | | community governance increases | | | | | European seus | · | of cultural heritage. |
| oreign policy, etc. (and | | elsewhere in the world, contributing | | consumption allows a | | with Individualistic behaviour. | | | | | | (later), this is easily | or carter arrival reger |
| perhaps losing some | | to global degradation of nature. | | decreace in Europes global | | | | | | | | possible, but LOSS OF | |
| embers a long the way).; | | | | impact and allows local | | | | | | | | CULTURAL HERITAGE | |
| nis paves the way to an | | | | recovery | | | | | | | | | |
| European federation, | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| presuming a shared | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| entity among citizens is enhnaced | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EU exports all of its | Global nature degraded by | | combined with one above | Increase of smaller scale | | | combined with above | Power and control increase | Nature [?] benefits from | The political and business elite gains | Despite tech-innovation | | Despite technological innovation, |
| esource consumption | EU consumption | | | and regional community | | | | over policy and land. | elites but collapses later | significant control over land, which | due economic growth; the | | the impacts of environmental |
| sewhere to the rest of | | | | governance, Individualistic | | | | Initially biodiversity | - | benefits ecosystems and biodiversity | health adverse impacts of a | | degradation and unbridled |
| e world, contributing to | | | | behaviour (for the | | | | benefits as social exclusion | | at the expense of large proportion of | failing environment and the | | economic growth lead to adverse |
| legradation elsewhere | | | | individual or small group | | | | increases and natural | | the population. | dominant lifestyle, leads to | | health impacts, including higher |
| | | | | that has formed) | | | | resources protected. | | | impact in: | | rates of cancer and lung diseas and |
| | | | | | | | | Health of wealthy improves and of poor declines. | | | eg. health: cancer, low fertility rates, lung diseases. | | lower fertility rates. Reproductive rites decline as governments |
| | | | | | | | | Wildlife health where | | | e.g. rights: rights around | | attempt to reverse population |
| | | | | | | | | protected improves. | | | reproduction are declining | | decline and stimulate the labour |
| | | | | | | | | p. 636668 p. 63668 | | | in due attemept to reverse | | market. Further, many people |
| | | | | | | | | | | | the population decline due | | experience poor mental health, |
| | | | | | | | | | | | to womens's bodies who | | increasing costs of social and |
| | | | | | | | | | | | must return into | | physical health care. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | supporting a labour market | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | with | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | reproductive care. Food: | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | failing crops due to tipping | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | points worlaide being flipped. | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | IIIppeu. | | |
| st results and impact of | | First results of plans and agreements | | Regionalisation cultural | | Regionalisation of smaller economic | | the focus on tech-solutions | Biodiversity and climate- | The focus on technological solutions | Consumption driven living | | Added above |
| ans and agreements like | | like EU green deal are surfacing. This | | smaller economic entities | | entities with specialisaiton | | fails to address the drivers | related tipping points | ultimately fails to address the drivers | standards that are | lack of understanding or | |
| EU green deal are | | motivates more ambitious plans, | | with specialisaiton, | | strengthens cultural identification | | of the biodiversity and | reached | of the global biodiversity and climate | disconnected from the | need for connection to | |
| urfacing. This motivates | | positively impacting the climate and | | regionalisation will increase | | and solidarity. | | climate crisis with | | crises. Tipping points are crossed | nature have a negative | nature. | |
| urther more ambitious ans, positively impacting | | biodiversity crisis. People are eating more diverse and yet are more | | cultural identification and solidarity. This might play | | | | catastrophic consequences on tipping points and life | | affecting countries outside of Europe initially as green technological | impact on health index and giving level of depression | | |
| he climate crisis and its | | connected to local ecosystems. EU | | out well if regions can level | | | | on Earth 12 these are mostly | | innovation enables adaptation within | in the society (mental | | |
| mpact on biodiversity. | | policy (environmental and | | out on regional solidariity | | | | affecting landscapes | | Europe. | health) Increases costs of | | |
| eople are eating more | | agricultural) primarily incentivises | | | | | | outside of Europe for a | | · · | social/physical health care. | | |
| verse and yet are more | | the provision of ecosystem services | | | | | | couple of years as the | | | | | |
| connected to local | | and sustainable practices in private | | | | | | green tech extends the | | | | | |
| ecosystems | | agricultural and forestry sectors. This | | | | | | adaptation capacity of EU | | | | | |
| | | improves soil health and forests to be | | | | | | countries | | | | | |
| | | more resilient but there is still more to be done at the policy level. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | to be done at the policy level. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ' ' ' | improvement of soil health, | | combined with one above | China will be in control of | | | Unclear whether this | Marginalised/most | Technological | Already-marginalized groups are | | | Public spending on health care is |
| d agricultural) primarily | more resilient forests | | | most of the harbours in | | | level of specificity is | vulnerable groups, are | advancement will help but | pushed into the most vulnerable | | between mand and nature | high with benefits shared across the |
| centivises via financial | | | | Europe | | | relevant | pushed into most | not remove risks | regions of Europe, where they | shared> high value | | population. High value treatments |
| chanisms the provision ecosystem services and | | | | | | | | vulnerable regions of Europe I flood risk, heat, | | experience more significant impacts of biodiversity and climate crises. | treatments to all. But prevention and health | | are available with little prevention and health promotion, so people |
| ustainable practices in | | | | | | | | wildfires, SLR. | | or biodiversity and climate crises. | prevention and health promotion are reduced> | | experience more long-term illnesses. |
| rivate agricultural and | | | | | | | | a.ii co, otiv. | | | more illness. | | Superior of the sound continuing sound |
| forestry sectors | | | | <u> </u> | | | | | | | | | |
| | strong legal actions are | | | As EU breaks down | Wildlife disapears from | - | | Health concerns will | | Public health concerns stimulate | Ecological risk on large scale | Increasing awareness | Ecological risk is experienced on a |
| | urgently required but they | | | countries go individually to | most EU due to food | individually to secure food, resulting | | stimulate different | | innovation to generate new | | | large scale. |
| | must include livelihood | | | secure food. Huge increas | intensive systems. Huge | in increased yield-intensive food | | approaches to generate | | medication strategies and better | | | |
| | security and justice | | | of food intensive production at national | biodiversity loss. | production with transformations of landscape leading to loss of wildlife | | new medication strategies, | | water systems. | | | |
| | | | | levels with transformations | | and biodiversity across countries. | | cleaning water systems | | | | | |
| | | | | of landscape. Wrong diets | | and broarver sity deross coullilies. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | increase, health decreases | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Governments pursue | Biodiversity is both shared | | | Shift in agricultural | Soil degradation from | There is a shift in agricultural | | energy utilities start getting | | | Science and innovation | less intensive livestock - | Technological and scientific |
| mbitious measures to | and spared | | | structure, national | intensive farming | structure, national subsidies, and | | | for profit. Green washing | | | | innovation enable creation of new |
| | | | | subsidies, market | | market protections for food safety | | energy transition based on | 'peaks' | primarily on digitilisation solutions. | | | food systems (e.g., lab meat, GMO |
| transition | | | | protections for food safety. | | with significant water problems for | | higher digitalisation | | Public trust in EU utilities grows, | products, Ocean food. High | | products, ocean food). High |
| transition | 1 | | | Significant water problems in some countries for | | agricultural irrigation and soil | | solutions. | | allowing them to 'use' nature for | purchasing power drives | | purchasing power drives consumers |
| transition | | | | agricultural irrigation. | | degradation from intensive farming. | | People (consumers) get happier (at start) and more | | profit and resulting in increasing greenwashing. | consumers towards these foods. This lead to | | toward these products, leading to a reduction on consumption of |
| transition | | | | | i | Ī | 1 | | | greenwasiling. | | | I I |
| transition | | | | agricultural irrigation. | | | | passive as trust to FII | | | reduction on consumption | | livestock. This shift leads to |
| transition | | | | agriculturur irrigution. | | | | passive as trust to EU utilities grows. | | | reduction on consumption of livestock and | | livestock. This shift leads to healthier diets and healthier |
| transition | | | | agriculturur irrigation. | | | | passive as trust to EU utilities grows. | | | • | | |
| transition | | | | agriculturur irrigation. | | | | · · | | | of livestock and | | healthier diets and healthier |

| sustainable development consider of characteristics | Strong action on lering the human side nge is utmost needed to skip failure | | | of people are concentrated | ecosystems in the EU are transformed into monocultures to meet the | Land is largely managed by a small elite who controls the food system. Last remaining healthy ecosystems in the EU are transformed into monocultures to meet the demands of the urban poluation. The majority of people live in big urban centers with increasing food insecurity and declining living standards, impacting health. | | Deep sea opened up for mining in order to meet rising demand for green technology, especially renewable energy for energy transition. | ecosystems fundamentally | The deep sea bed is opened up for mining to meet the rising demand for green technology, resulting in a significant loss of marine biodiversity. | be high Ind | | nto realising the trap they fall into | Fossil fuels and resources consumed at a higher rate than can be replenished, so economic growth is limited. People turn back to nature and biodiversity to find solutions for long-term sustainability. | |
|--|--|--|-------------------------|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|--------------|
| autho demod | of requiring more oritarian rather than cratic actions early in the transition | | | Populism results in closed borders and highly localized food systems based on the highly intensified status quo. Bioderversity further declines climate resilience as well. We're depending on local corporate knowledge, mainly resulting into production of unhealthy (for planet&human) commodities with higly inaccessible food | Land for food production being used for monoculture and biofules | Populism results in closed borders and highly localized food systems based on the highly intensified status quo. Bioderversity and climate resilience declines with production of unhealthy commodities from monoculture and biofuel driven land use. | | Strong collaboration between industry and government focuses on protecting nature where it provides ecosystem services that are economically relevant. | ecosystems that are not directly economically valuable are losing protection | Strong collaboration between industry and government focuses on protecting economically-relevant ecosystems, while those that are not directly economically valuable are lost. | and rat prod tech Foss | e than the planet can duce> economic and nnological growth find end | · · | | Added above. |
| inves citiz | Big government estments push away izens (negative for natural world) | | | biodiversity Water scarcity is increasing in Europe but its impact is unequal regionally so it does not gain common attention and solution needed to be implemented. It impacts growing inequality in acces of food. | Water scarcity with biodiversity loss | Water scarcity is increasing in Europe but its impact is unequal across the region, not gaining sufficient attention to find common solutions to improve it, resulting in inequality in access of water. | | | Economically relevant ecosystem services protected | | tech gr wir proj str ha er | The costs of RES nology drops, enabling reat development of ad, solar, storage, etc. ject. Energy coops are ongly challenged and rdly compete against nergy utilities. Bigger ojects large-scale are mostly developed. | consideration about nature and biodiversity marjor lossess | The costs of renewable energy systems including wind, solar, and storage. Exploiting this opportunity leads to rapid development without consideratino of nature, leading to major biodiversity losses. | |
| Other bio-oriented cycles are not considered yet at a policy level. E.g. phosphate cycle | | | | Pressure on resources for consumer goods (like wood) lead to growing competition among corporates and pushes governments to harvest more with no sustainablity criteria | to more plantations, loss of | Pressure on resources for consumer goods (like wood) leads to growing competition among corporates and pushes governments to harvest unsustainably, leading to loss of natural forest and species. | | | biodiversitysomething through traditional knowledge | High-tech green solutions mask the risks asociated with loss of biodiversity, generating a false sense of security that allows for further ecosystem degradation and a complete loss of traditional knowledge and culture related to the environment. | | | | | |
| | ace for biodiversity red with production lands | Protected areas are established as land for restoration, space for biodiversity shared with production lands. Incentives for farmers are recognizing actions for securing livelihoods and diets shift to healthy and culturally relevant for local production. | | People get more and more organized in energy co-ops but acces to high tech solutions is limited. Low tech diy pvs/wind systems energy but tensions start to As prodcution is not enough to cover energy needs | | People get more organized in energy co-ops but with a limited access to high tech solutions, leading to insufficient production to meet the demand. Energy resources will be unevenly divided with some regions still prospering with well organised energy production. | | Decline of democracy | [] | | | | | | |
| Complacency over current ecological state of Europe and political [?] to 'sustainable development' without any proof that any level of development can be sustainable. Unless consumption and human copulation decline nothing is sutainable. This is ??? | gain in population of some ? | Complacency over current ecologica state of Europe and political [?] to "sustainable development" without any proof that any level of development can be sustainable. Unless consumption and human population decline nothing is sutainable. | | Energy resources will be unevenly divided. But some regions will still prosper with well organised energy resources | | | combined with above | People get stewardship at local level and become protectors of nature | The visibility is promoting this approach in many regions | People at local levels understand the importance of biodiversity and become stewards of nature. | | | | | |
| of MPAs with SSF suports ecosys | mproves marine stems health in MPAs d fisheries spillover | Collaborative governance of MPAs with SSF suports both marine biodiversity and fisheries (and fishers). MPA management is adapted to local context based on local knowledge and improves marine ecosystems health in MPAs and prevents spillover in fisheries. | | Redcution of health, overall sicknesses increase, treatment is acessible for the richest, healthcare is more privatized, no publich health | | Overall sicknesses increase with privatization of healthcare making treatments acessible for only the richest and no publich health facilities for the remaining population. | | Informal urbanisation - slums appear and grow across Europe, impacting natural areas, sewage into waterways | Dramatic loss of natural habitat and pollution of waterways | Slums appear and grow across Europe, leading to a dramatic loss of habitat and pollution of waterways. | | | | | |
| connections, buildings als n urban areas (EU ensures green spaces etc) in cities biodiv | Increases urban versity, both through down government nitiaties but also nunity initiatives and industry | Green space and infrastructure in urban areas increase biodiversity supported by initiaties from government, community and industry. | | Biodiversity crisis causes shock to society and economy which eventually leads to new actions at all levels to improve its state, but no cooperation at European level | | Biodiversity crisis causes shock in society and economy which eventually leads to new actions at all levels to improve its state, but without any cooperation at the EU level. | | Social enterprises voice risk to disappear [?] inequalities | | | | | | | |
| ncreased use of renewable energy including bioenergy, initially increase pressure on land and biodiversity | · | Increased use of renewable energy including bioenergy, initially increase pressure on land and biodiversity and have negative impact on nature. The social impact of energy coops is acknowledge and a lot of support is provided. | e d e | Environment is not a priority therefore public awarenees and government support decreases | Increased biodiversity loss - drivers causing even more damage | Environment is not a priority therefore public awarenees and government support decreases with increased biodiversity loss and various drivers causing even more damage on nature. | | green job opportunities available to youth/skilled workers/ highly educated workers leading to happy public and support to the policies/practices around this scenario | | High tech green jobs are available to highly skilled young workers, increasing public support for environmental policies and practices. | | | | | |
| The social impact of energy oops is acknowledge and a lot of support is provided | | | combined with one above | The social and gender gap widens and female head households in poverty as more men are mobilized in the army, gender + social equity gap widens leading to massive poverty | | The social and gender gap widens with more female head households in poverty as more men are mobilized in the army. | Might be too extreme to be consistent with underlying SSP3 narrative | Mining and other extractive activities to support green tech, harm people, societies and ecosystems outside of Europe, destabilising already fragile economies and societies. Probably some of the regions will move away from relationships trade with EU. | | Mining and extractive industries support the shift to green technology, but in the process harm people and ecosystems outside of Europe. This destabilizes alreadyfragile economies who move away from trade relationships with the EU. | | | | | |

| | cultural and biological diversity become parts of everyday life | Science-policy opens up to the plural knwoledge systems and worldviews around biodiversity. Indigenous and traditional knowledge is considered in curriculum, laws and policy. As a result, cultural and biological diversity becomes part of everyday life. | Huge risk of gender gap and more participation of women to innovation and technologies. Increase of profit driven enterprises | | More participation of women in innovation and technologies increases profit driven enterprises. | in citie shift to | ies but there is also a | alternative/independent/bi odiverse food cooperations are raising as 'counterhubs' with labour as a value | Inequality increases in cities, contributing to a rise in rural independent communities who focus on alternative means for living sustainably. | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|--|---|--|---|--------------|
| Solar technology depending on China technology and resources and [?] increasing human rights violation in the supply chain | human rights in the supply chain | Solar technology depending on China and there is an increasing human rights violation in the supply chain. Overregulations leads to social resistance and distrust towards EU. As a result, populists rise to the | | | | | | this will make a shift in younger generations (back to the hippy) communes | | | | | |
| overregulation leads to inefficiency, lots of bad decisions. Overregulations = technocracy divorced from reality, leads to social resistance and distrust towards EU and technocrats and social revolves. Populists rise to | | center of EU regulations. | combined with one above | | | treat BUT ineq health | n-tech health I new atments, new cures. I I no public health, quality in access to th, no prevention for sks of illness are only limited. | no public health, no reduction of illness. Better preventions worths more than better treatment. | A high-tech health sector leads to new treatments and cures, but little attention is given to prevention of illnesses that are worsened by rising inequality. | | | | |
| in touch with the natural health and being more focused on wellbeing opposed to economic growth. Then a strong increase in physical health due to less pollutive activities | (societal and individual) | nature. As a result people's mental health is improved by being more connected to nature and focused on wellbeing opposed to economic growth. This leads to improved physical health due to less stressful activities and people live longer healthier with technological development. The life quality improves for the society with reduced cost in health investment. | | | | unrest for I pro declin | quality leads to social set with increasing calls health wellbeing a otests, civil unrest, line in voting/ trust in institutions, strikes | | Rising inequality leads to social unrest and a decline of trust in governments, with increasing calls for health and wellbeing. | | | | |
| people get older due to increased health and wellbeing and technological development. Negative impact on aging population | as it reduces pressure on | | combined with one above | | | | | | | | | | |
| investment and reduction of growth could reduce end of life expenses Higher quality of life and | | Higher quality of life and sense of security generate public support. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| public support | the population density in different areas. Quota for amount of inhabitants Requires quality of life defined as [wellbeing?] | Innovation in biodiversity solutions need to address the population density in different areas. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| cultural part of sustainable | more central theme as gender equity in decision making supports transformative change | Gender equity becomes an integral part of sustainable development and transformative change. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Governments don't experiment with de-growth models in certain regions but we need degrowth because economic growth with population growth will post challenges. | Potential to reinforce current trade etc to maintain EU consumption at the expense of natural resources elsewhere | Some governments in Europe adopt degrowth economic model. The rest of Europe maintains consumption of natural resources elsewhere and reinforces existing trade relations. | This is the emblematic pathway to worse scenario that would lead to missing the objectives of sustainability, resilience and security, more innovation for small scale solutons | | | | nology development is ong (original event) | | Technological development is strong, but food systems begin to collapse. | agreement targets resulting | drags diverse healthy food systemsinteresting biodiver with it | Targets in the Paris Agreement are not met, leading to an over 2 degree Celsius rise in temperatures. Biodiversity tipping points are reached and ecosystems collapse as food insecurity grows. Public awareness increases abou the risks of over-exploitation. | |
| | Considerable land is freed for restoring second-hand nature | The EU regulates the lifestyle and harmful sectoral use of natural resources and land use, resulting in considerable land freed for restoring nature. | | o massive climate change | | | mocratic processes Interact inequalities | | Democratic processes counteract the rising inequalities. | | Awareness will hopefully prevent the push towards over-exploiting of the earth | | Added above. |
| Shift from monetary economy to bio-economy (resource-based economy): *primary production; * carbon storage; | Biodiversity protection takes precedence over economic development in political agenda, Risk for onesided focus on CO2 to negatively impact other issues and the biodiversity nexus | There is a shift in the economic model to bioeconomy and biodiversity protection takes precedence over economic development. The challenges remain with focus on carbon storage with primary production, posing some risks on biodiversity nexus issues. | more budget to term environmental concerns. The fragmented | natural resources in and organically disorganized way, creating substantial strain on biodiversity | Immediate socio economic needs clash with longer term environmental concerns. The fragmented EU struggles to care for its natural capital and resrources as they cannot effectively externalize the damage. People exploit natural resources in a disorganized way, resulting in substantial strain on biodiversity. | intercond cities are restora Scenar is hig powe poor huge | cus on tech leads to tensive production incentration around is. Exodus from rural reas spurs natural ration (Spured Nature ario). Unemployment igh, low purchasing er drives cheep food in dietary health and its social costs. Spured ture insufficient to | biodiversity (intact nature) increases in spare lands. Low around cities. | Technological development leads to intensive production concentrated around cities. The exodus from rural areas improves biodiversity in abandoned land, but people in cities suffer due to lack of employment, low purchasing power, and poor quality food. | biodiversity is maintained for primary for entertainment and educational purposes. | | Biodiversity in the wild is neglected, but a few havens relevant for entertainment and educational purposes are protected. | |
| Reallocation of income / wealth from 1% allocated to social security + reparations to the south for adoption. Increase tax = money for the poor | | | Doesn't seem relevant tp enrichment. Protectionism and trade friction drive conversion of natural habitat to agricultural land to help achieve food security. | rotected areas contract to make way for farmland expansion | The conversion of natural habitat to agricultural land to help achieve food security but at the cost of farmland expansion in protected areas, negatively impacting biodiversity. | | mitigate climate. | low diversity and potentially negative impact on health | | | a few havens for adorable or interesting biodiversity is protected | | Added above. |

| preceived by citizens (and used by the populists) as an ideology and creates tensions in society that lead | the population into xploiting their natural roundings, should they | With economic crisis constraining resource availability and livelihood, sustainability is perceived as an ideology and creates tension and division in some parts of the society. | Doesn't seem to align with underlying SSP1 narrative produced/consumed. Positive for health/biodiversity | Locally produced food reduces use of pesticides/emissions/etc. | Emphasise on self provision of food, local production and consumption leads positive impact on human health and biodiversity with reduced use of pesticides and emission. | lt de la constant de | | biodiversity not a priority | Inequality and lack of social support provides a weak basis for preserving public goals like nature protection, so biodiversity declines further. | Gender inequalities among as they are domininated among? by fear on domestic inacome from professional work, acces to? conflicts from fossil fuel? (cannot really read what is written in the sticker) | | Contribution was difficult to read (on sticky note) and might not make sense |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| role of local leaders and local authorities, giving more power in decisions to people who lead the way to | reality from the ground and will preserve and tect biodiversity as the | EU recognises the essential role of local leaders and authorities, giving more power to people who can lead the way to low emissions in local communities, which also contributes to preserving and protecting biodiversity and improving human wellbeing. | Overfishing also in EEZ of other countries on the rise, also IUU, as a way to deal with food prices. Completely unregulated and not monitored | Fisheries collapse | Overfishing in EEZ and IUU of other countries are on the rise as a way to cope with rising food prices, resulting in the collaps of fisheries completely unregulated and unmonitored. | pi pi | ow social cohesion rovides weak basis for reserving public goals, uch as nature/biodiversity. | Biodiversity declines further | | Increase e.g. microparticle plluters and? / soil decline leads to negative health impact to all? | | An increase in microparticle pollutants, decline in the quality of soil, and other impacts of overexploitation have a negative impact on public health. |
| Strong governance systems lead by EU lead to binding agreement to enforce green transition across the world. Steady economic development leads most countries long term, New food trade agreements; new international health regulation, [EU] Leading other regions by positive example | toration and greening the planet | Strong governance systems lead by EU results in binding agreement to enforce green transition across the world. Steady economic development leads most countries to new food trade agreements and new international health regulation long term. EU leads other regions by positive example as a chamption to ecological restoration and greening the planet. | Plant health rapidly declines | Forest biodiversity decline | | om rest of narrative tl | hey form movements and sub-cultures to counter | pseudo solutions having negative environmental impacts and new anthropogenic problems. | Unskilled and uneducated people become dissatisfied with the global elite and form sub-cultures and countermovements. Some of these movements adopt sustainable practices (e.g., food production) but others believe fake news and adopt pseudo solutions that create new environmental issues. | Biodiversity declines rapidly due to climate change and lack of protection. Nobody seem to notice bacause human life happes mostly in atficial space | | Biodiversity declines rapidly due to climate change and a lack of protection, but few people notice because their effects are masked by rapid economic and technological development. |
| | | Biodiveristy is consistently mainstreamed with AI assisted policy planning and implementation that ensures policy coherence for in policy ensures coherence sustainability across sectors. | Water wars in souther/eastern Europe due to desertification (e.g. Spain, Greece) | Loss of biodiversity, canalization and retention areas. Water as asset/valuable commodity | There are water wars in southern and eastern Europe due to desertification (e.g. Spain, Greece), impacting biodiversity. | | of Europe increase migration to safer areas | hubs create a bigger gap | High tech hubs emerge that create a bigger gap between commodity producing areas and high tech hubs for food production. | on increased efficiency) reduces dietary diversity and increases? health loss of cultural diversity and homogenitatioin of experiences fules depression increased consumption demand, despite improve efficiency drve futher conversion of intact land. Biodiversity is need? not | out is neither shared nor spared. | Overconsumption and a focus on agricultural efficiency reduces dietary diversity, leading to poorer health and a loss of cultural diversity. Biodiversity in Europe and outside is neither shared nor spared. |
| sustainable policies which have matured now & d stricter environmental protection as part of their accession process leading (rest | - | New sustainability policies have matured now with stricter environmental protection reinforcement, which leads to transformation across sectors with more access to biodiveristy finance and also addresses the drivers leading to 'simpler' restoration oriented mitigation and conservation | What is MS? Health systems fail as there is no cross border cooperation in case of emergency, helath inequalities increase: access to helath services, availabilty of medication, lower life age | | Health systems fail as there is no cross border cooperation in times of emergency, resulting in increased health inequalities with access to facilties, availabilty of medication, and lower life expenctancy. | n | | wealth worldwide (not just concentrated in specific | Transition toward high tech green Europe increases demands for resources in regions outside of Europe, exploiting ecosystems on a global scale. | saved? Potential use of desalination for water resources increase for food production S&SW Europe. Intensive agriculture mixed with nature prodection areas. | | Rise in the use of desalinated water in southern and southwestern Europe increases food production. Intensive agriculture is mixed in with natural protected areas. |
| Europe focuses on exanding solar energy development, but Asia possesses access to all materials & technology that creates confusion & loss of trust to governments in EU among citizens, Too much pressure & attention to one technology | | policies and practices. | seems to contradict original SSP1 narrative | | | | | can result in exploitation on a global scale | | | who do not have the means leads to increased strain on tarual resources – logging etc. | As climate impacts increase, people become used to living an artificial and 'closed' society divorced from nature. Only the elite can afford access to nature. The rest adopt informal means for accessing natural resources, increasing the strain on biodiversity. |
| beyond the EU borders, focussing on collaborative relationships with other bi | ned - biodiveristy wins! | EU addresses its impact on landscapes and seascapes beyond the EU borders, focussing on collaborative relationships with other regions, establishing relevant policies for trade, international business practices etc. and addressing (neo)colonial practices. This contributes to ecosystems being restored; arid areas greened; oceans covered with floating farms, and cities binding to banning the wildlife trade around the globe. | | | | t | | depopulation may incrementally lead to 'rewilding' of certain areas (but also increased strain on others) | Migration within the EU shifts the geographic distribution of natural resource use, rewilding some areas while increasing exploitation of others. | Due to lack of attention to climate change adaption European agricultural and forestry sectors are no longer competitive. Food prices are on the rise, unemployment in rural areas increases. | food systems in our diet -soil degradation -ecosystem degradation -loss of species | The agricultural and forestry sectors of Europe are no longer competitive due to a lack of climate adaptation. Food prices rise and unemployment worsens in rural areas. The lack of social and regional food systems impacts diets. |
| The positive impact of measures taken on biodiversity and therefore in general well-being becomes largely visible, thus gaining more support from the general public/governments | | The positive impact measures on biodiversity and general well-being becomes largely visible, gaining more support from the general public and the governments. | | | | (l) Se | ncreasing demand for land — other than agri-use biofuel, etc.) + ecosystem ervice use. Change of land wnership (associated with diversifying energy) | | Increasing demand for land and changing land ownership leaves some areas open for ecosystem services and biodiversity. | Societies are unaware of the risks of biodiversity loss until the moment it collopses A biodiversity- related event takes place that the current syste is not able to deal with e.g. resources are depleted. | | Same as above. |
| creates assymetries between north-south; EU joint green transition dreams starts to break down So retur pr ecc | up in global south as livelihoods impacts | Exessive focus on wellbeing over economic growth creates assymetries between North and South. Southern EU countries return to overconsumption that degrades ecosystems and increases biodiversity loss. | Doesn't seem to align with underlying SSP1 narrative | | | n r | (pointing to energy ompanies hedging against price inflation)) driven by market-based demand but also European policy and adequate incentives. | Biodiversity is spared | Contribution is uncle | · | Decrease in food, wood, etc. production Economic collapse. | Rising temperatures generate extreme climatic events and ecosystem collapses. There is a decrease in the production of economically valuable goods, resulting in a collapse of the economy. The result is a dramatic increase in poverty. |

| | | | | | | CSA's will be [???] to maintain food sovereignty | _ | The middle class can no longer afford | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|---|---|-------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| | | | | | | maintain 1000 sovereignty | levels – equivalent of | to consume at high levels, but Community Supported Agricultural | | | | |
| | | | | | | | today's global south. | systems maintain food sovereignty. | | | | |
| | | | | | | gender inequity broadens | Gender inequity | Broad inequality and focus on | Logic linking gender to | | | |
| | | | | | | behind' we leave women + | accelerates blodiversity los | technological solutions perpetuates gender inequality and results in a | biodiversity is missing | | | |
| | | | | | | the youth behind | | biased world, which accelerates biodiversity loss | | | | |
| | | | | | | inequality drives social | | Inequality drives social collapse, with | | | | |
| | | | | | | collapse with those unable to participate in the tech | | those who are unable to participate | | | | |
| | | | | | | economy going back to | | in the tech economy moving back to the land in search of self-sufficiency | | | | |
| | | | | | | land in search of self- sufficiency and greater | | and to find greater meaning in their lives. | | | | |
| | | | | | | meaning in lives. Rejection | | lives. | | | | |
| | | | | | | of meaningless high-tech world. More shared lands | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | in marginal areas not | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | occupied by as tech | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | a tech intensive future | | | Added to above | | | |
| | | | | | | might be designed mainly by men. Now we now that | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | women in tech are less | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | than ¼ of experts. Big risk of a biased world. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | overseas territories/ former colonies are | localised policy on biodiversity, more tailor | Overseas territories and former colonies are disproportionately | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | disproportionally affected, | made | affected by technological | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | deciding to be independent ② further fragmentation | | development, leading to further fragmentation. As a result, these | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | | | regions adopt more localized and | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | tailor-made policies for biodiversity protection. | | | | |
| | | | | | | widening gaps lead to a | hunger driven poor | Widening gaps between rich and | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | healthy food crisis to poor people 2 major | communities to wildlife consumption and backyard | poor lead to food crisis, so poor people cannot access healthy food. | | | | |
| | | | | | | economic/health crisis unfolds | animal production. Diseases spread. | Poorer communities are driven to wildlife consumption and backyard | | | | |
| | | | | | | uniolus | Biodiversity + wildlife | animal prodctuion, which spreads | | | | |
| | | | | | | | extinction | diseases and leads to biodiversity and wildlife extinction. | | | | |
| Phased introduction of | Reduced economic activity | Phased introduction of resource-caps | World security is at risk as a | biodiversity hotspots | World security is at risk as a failing | Europe has become a | : It would work if Europe | As market leader in green | | Exports environmental | Biodiversity decline, loss of | Europe runs out of natural I'm not sure I understand where |
| resource-caps per capita (material foodprint; water; | relieves pressure on environment | per capita on material foodprint including water, energy and carbon | failing EU insists on harmful and violent foreign | around the world are failing, triggering tipping | EU insists on harmful and violent foreign diplomacy with other | market leader in green technologies | would be also the leader of circular economy | technologies, Europe prepetuates neo-colonial practices of knowledge | | degradation elsewhere in | - | resources and exports its population decline comes from h environmental degradation |
| energy; carbon). Limiting | CHVIIOIIIICH | limits thoughtless and wasteful | solutions with other | points | regions trying to imrprove trade | teemologies | circular economy | and technology sharing. | | food production, etc. | fuel. | elsewhere. |
| thoughtless and wasteful consumption + reducing | | consumption, leading to reduced economic activity and reducing | regions from trying to imrprove trade policies, | | policies, initiating wars and coups and reducing finance into | | | | | ("bosreally" reinforces current situation) | Human population decline. | |
| desire to work and save. | | pressure on environment. | initiating wars/coups, | | development, biodiversity and | | | | | current situation) | | |
| Leading to socially acceptable | | | halting development/biodiversity/o | | climates, eventually triggering tipping points in biodiversity | | | | | | | |
| acceptable | | | limate finance flows to | | hotspots. | | | | | | | |
| Economic development no | No more growth: no more | Economic development no longer | biodiversity hotspots Faced with global | Deindustrialization helps | The EU is faced with global | | selling to who? (this | | | - | Sharp drop in consumption | |
| longer based on growth: | consumption. Decrease | based on growth with dcrease | competition and its | alleviate the damage from | competition and its inherent | | perpetuates neo-colonial | | | | due to population decrese. | |
| decoupled from resource consumption > otherwise | The state of the s | resource consumption globally. Biodiversity is the core indicators of | inherent disadvantages (energy prices, co2 pricing, | manufacturing plants and allows for planned or | disadvantages (rise in energy prices, carbon pricing, lack of natural | | practices of knowledge/tech sharing) | | | | Drop in emissions | |
| the maths doesn't work. No | | | lack of natural resources, | incremental rewilding of | | | | | | | | |
| more GDP! | of the health of our society | | deindustrializes losing millions of jobs in the | certain areas | leading to loss of millions of jobs). This reduces the economic growth | | | | | | | |
| | | | process). This reduces the economic output but also | | and also demand for energy and materials. Deindustrialization helps | | | | | | | |
| | | | energy & material demand. | | alleviate damage from | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | manufacturing plants and allows for planned or incremental rewilding of | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | certain areas. | | | | | | | |
| Democracy in Europe | | Democracy in Europe doesn't only not sure if I understo | od There is a lot of need for | | There is a lot of need for | decrease of agriculture | | | Contribution is unclear | Peak oil | degraded all fossil fuel | Peak oil is reached as all fossil fuels |
| doesn't only shift in green | | shift the system towards green policy correctly | collaboration. CO-ops try to | | collaboration. CO-ops try to support | intensity (lack of water) in | | | contribution is unclear | r cur on | sources (Antartica, ocean | |
| policy (makers), but also in adaptiveness from EU | | but also climate adaptation for the | support each other from the rich to the poor | | each other from the rich to the poor countries. EU co-ops start to | S/S-W Europe (increase of RCP 8) | | | | | gas, etc.) | |
| citizens | | citizens. | · | | produce their own technologies. | 1.01 0) | | | | | | |
| · | | citizens. | countries. EU co-ops start | | Prioritising energy saving and | | | | | | | |
| 1 | | citizens. | to produce their own | | efficiency (vs generation). | | | | | | | |
| | | citizens. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and | | efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect | | | | | | | |
| | | citizens. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Citizens. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | | | | | | | |
| New technologies are | | New technologies are inspired by | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more | | awareness increases, more respect | the imperative of EU | effectively this leads to | The need for strategic autonomy | | Political systems are | More resources to invest. | Political systems are influenced by |
| inspired by nature and | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a | further biodiversity loss | leads the EU to shorten value chains | | increasing by tech focussed | | technology, leading to a stronger |
| • | | New technologies are inspired by | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | • | further biodiversity loss | - | | • | | |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more | In principle that leads to | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"- | | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic | consider a multidiscipline, | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. focus on GMO agriculture and application of | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on highinput and GMO agriculture, which | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"-resources Ecosystem collapse. "Marine", human and | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality of diets reduces. Biodiversity |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic approaches. Balanced | | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. | further biodiversity loss and strain on natural resources within the EU. decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on high- | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"-resources Ecosystem collapse. | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic approaches. Balanced participation to women. More women in developing | consider a multidiscipline, inter and transdisciplinary approach to technology in finding solutions should | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. focus on GMO agriculture and application of chemicals leads to exclusion of traditional and natural agriculture 2 | decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. Disconnection between | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on high-input and GMO agriculture, which excludes small-holder and sustainable production and promotes large-scale industrial farms. This resuls in a | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"-resources Ecosystem collapse. "Marine", human and animal "plant" "diet" decline. Growth a microbial especially decompenses | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality of diets reduces. Biodiversity |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic approaches. Balanced participation to women. | consider a multidiscipline, inter and transdisciplinary approach to technology in finding solutions should | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. focus on GMO agriculture and application of chemicals leads to exclusion of traditional and | decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. Disconnection between | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on high-input and GMO agriculture, which excludes small-holder and sustainable production and promotes large-scale | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"- resources Ecosystem collapse. "Marine", human and animal "plant" "diet" decline. Growth a microbial | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality of diets reduces. Biodiversity |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic approaches. Balanced participation to women. More women in developing technology and using it and design it. >> solutions coming from integration of | consider a multidiscipline, inter and transdisciplinary approach to technology in finding solutions should consider biodiversity in mainstream ways and a positive approach. | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. combined with one all | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. focus on GMO agriculture and application of chemicals leads to exclusion of traditional and natural agriculture promotion of large scale or | decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. Disconnection between | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on high-input and GMO agriculture, which excludes small-holder and sustainable production and promotes large-scale industrial farms. This resuls in a decrease in biodiversity, rise in | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"-resources Ecosystem collapse. "Marine", human and animal "plant" "diet" decline. Growth a microbial especially decompenses communities, ecological reduce biodiversity, high vertebrate mostly "bird" () | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality of diets reduces. Biodiversity |
| inspired by nature and traditional knowledge which stimulate even more biodiveristy conservation New technology: hard and soft included in systemic approaches. Balanced participation to women. More women in developing technology and using it and design it. >> solutions coming from integration of | consider a multidiscipline, inter and transdisciplinary approach to technology in finding solutions should consider biodiversity in mainstream ways and a | New technologies are inspired by nature, traditional knowledge, transdisciplinary practice with balanced participation of women, which stimulates more integrative biodiveristy conservation. combined with one all | to produce their own technologies. Prioritising energy saving and efficiency (vs generation), awareness increases, more respect and consideration future. | | awareness increases, more respect | strategic autonomy a shortening of value chains and an end to externalisation of mining and production. We end up with a heavy industrialised economic model with all the consequences. focus on GMO agriculture and application of chemicals leads to exclusion of traditional and natural agriculture promotion of large scale or artificial food production. | decrease in biodiversity. Unhealthy food. Disconnection between | leads the EU to shorten value chains and endogenize all mining and production activities, leading to biodiversity loss and further increasing strain on natural resources. High-tech solutions focus on high-input and GMO agriculture, which excludes small-holder and sustainable production and promotes large-scale industrial farms. This resuls in a decrease in biodiversity, rise in unhealthy food, and disconnection | | increasing by tech focussed leading to stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from atmosphere. Create new carbon markets/new resources available. Growing risk of corruption. Dependency on "funded"-resources Ecosystem collapse. "Marine", human and animal "plant" "diet" decline. Growth a microbial especially decompenses communities, ecological reduce biodiversity, high | marine biodiversity | technology, leading to a stronger emphasis on extracting CO2 from the atmosphere. New carbon markets and resources are available to invest in biodiversity protection, but they are accompanied by a growing risk of corruption. Ecosystems collapse, and the quality of diets reduces. Biodiversity |

| · · | More diverse landscapes, With a major shift in the agriculture, | <u> </u> | coops intensify their effort | focus is also put on | CSAs increase their efforts to support | T | Social. The benefits of | Coops can focus on | More support for energy | |
|---|--|----------------------------|--|--|---|-------------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| • | healthy & diverse diets are more reservoirs and wetland and | | to support their | biodiversity value (during | vulnerable communities, with a focus | | energy coops are | biodiversity protection and | cooperatives accelerates just energy | |
| export). More [of ao?] CO2, water) * biodiversity; | accesible to everyone, well-designed energy plantations in wetlands increase rural areas, Europe's landscape has | | communities especially focusing on the most | training) and events | on education, peer-to-peer learning, and biodiversity value. | | acknowledged, and a lot of support is provided. | reduction of "en" use. | transition and in turn builds support for biodiversity protection and | |
| nore water in landschape | become more diverse with healthy | | vulnerable - but it's hard! | | and bloutversity value. | | Coops can really work | | reduction of energy use. | |
| (depending op crop) | diets accesible to all. | | A lot of focus is put on education and peer to peer | | | | across all relevant topics for a just energy transition | | | |
| | | | learning (to address the | | | | Tor a just energy transition. | | | |
| | | | gap of public funding to education) | | | | | | | |
| Rural areas being clusteres | | comebined with one above | stronger centralised | green space nature | A stronger centralized government | | Lifeless world, fossil fuel | humanity extinct or | A total economic breakdown due to | |
| of energy. supply = use on | | | government ensures | • | ensures environmental protection. | | powered low global | | low resource availability and | |
| account of food production | | | due to majority not getting | | The elites maintain access to green spaces but the majority are excluded. | | population extreme inequality and poverty. | society. | ecosystem collapse leads to reduction of human population. A | |
| | | | needs met, elites keep | | | | Total economic break | | lower human population allows | |
| Extreme growth in | | Is this relevant for SSP1? | access to greening spaces – reminiscent of wild land, | global implication as elite | | | down (low capacity to produce food, wood, etc). | nature restores as people | nature to recover. | |
| bureaucracy lead to | | | ownership in [middle ages?] | capture nature + land | | | Ecosystems collapsed. | go extinct. | | |
| ineffiency what works on paper does not work in | | | | around the world + exclude people | | | Biodiversity "gone" every "device depecede" on | | | |
| reality. Breakdown of the | | | | | | | fossil fuels. | | | |
| whole 'regulation' idea. People feel their freedom is | | | | | | | Gradual extinction of humanity | | | |
| reduced. Technocrats rise to power and SSP1 shifts | | | | | | | | | | |
| to power and 33P1 shirts towards SSPS4 | | | | | | | | | | |
| All seems to be functioning | | Is this relevant for SSP1? | social revolution, conflicts, | initial decline, but as human influence | Social revolution and conflicts | Not clear why biodiversity | [original event] Population grows with many European | | The growth of urban population, | |
| so well that people might lose interest in | | | war – technologically advanced. Destruction of | | perpetuate destruction of the environment, which later recovers as | recovers from conflict | cities having become | | and in particular the urban social class, increases demand on natural | |
| sustainability/stop seeing | | | environment. Initial decline | of biodiversity | human influene decreases. | | | factor. But the increase of | resources. | |
| its importance | | | in biodiversity and exhaustion of natural | | | | efficient transportation | resources demanding urban social classe will lead | | |
| | | | resources. Later some | | | | | to a non-sustainable | | |
| Collapse of ecosystem and | Failed to understand | Is this relevant for SSP1? | biodiversity recovery. solar and hydro dominate | money on the market to | Renewables like solar and | | Rapid sea-level rise forces | pressure on resources urban pollutants released | Rapid sea-level rise forces a retreat | |
| population. Massive | nature - focus on few | | the market. No more | restore exterminated | hydroelectric energy dominant the | | chaotic retreat of low-lying | • | of low-lying communities from the | |
| extraction technologies make not better. Scenario | species - collapse and extinction | | climate emissions. | species | market, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. More money on the | | communities "coming" from the coastline. | | coastline. The housing market collapses and millions of properties | |
| no better than business as | | | | | market is available to restore | | Housing market collapses. | | are abandoned. Urban pollutants | |
| usual. Managed decline in economy to level where | | | | | exterminated species. | | Millions of properties abandoned to the sea. Sea- | | are released into the sea. | |
| [] only road to sustainability | | | | | | | level rise. | | | |
| SUSTAILIADIIITA | | | | Europe cannot be an | | Unclear logic for this impact | We have found a viable | Bigger gap between rich | | Doesn't really fit within this original |
| | | | | effective and influencing negotiator with little | | | way to live on Mars and start a colony there for the | and poor | | narrative (moreso SSP4) |
| | | | | control on global resources. | | | () in the first instance and | | | |
| | | | increasing social conflicts | | | Added above. | them for the rich as a | Increase in innovation, a | | |
| | | | eventually disrupt the | | | Added above. | Solution for depleted Lanti | change to the used lessons | | |
| | | | system | | | | | learned | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | inequality means that | Negative impact on | Poorer coastal areas see an increase | | Clean water due to severe | some efforts towards NBS | | Not clear how this is a positive impo |
| | | | poorer groups must resort | fisheries and marine | in illegal and unreported fishing and | | treatment, and | | | |
| | | | to other means for meeting their needs. Poorer coastal | biodiversity in general. | people struggle to meet their needs, degrading marine biodiversity. | | Eutrofication problems in lakes and seas due to | | | |
| | | | areas see and increase of | | | | agriculture. | | | |
| | | | illegal and unreported fishing. | | | | | | | |
| | | | some societies / groups / | | Regional development in rural areas | | Leads to deep sea mining (if | | Deep sea mining pursued at massive | |
| | | | countries come back to less-consumption | rural areas acknowledges biodiversity | increasingly adopt lower- consumption lifestyles, lowering | | not happened yet) at massive scales for RE | | scales, leading to deep sea ecosystem collapse. Carbon cycles | |
| | | | (agriculture driven) living | | climate emissions and improving rural | | | | and sequestration are severely | |
| | | | standards and focus on rural areas development | | biodiversity. | | | dead 😟. | impacted. | |
| | | | that leads to lowering some | | | | | | | |
| | | | sectors of climate emissions. | | | | | | | |
| | | | lack of trust between | | The EU has lost its main connecting | | | | Economic collapse outside of | |
| | | | people and communities 2 lack of connectivity and | | power due to lack of social cohesion. People turn back to the reconnecting | | shortages in Europe. Collapse happens (though | decrease consumption, | Europe leads to food and other resource shortages in Europe. | |
| | | | interaction between individual 🏿 Europe loses its | connecting, re-uniting. | and uniting power of nature. | | "diztandaled") to end of "centres". | increase nature 😂 | Scarcity leads to social stratification | |
| | | I I | mouvioual is curope loses its | | | | "centres". No more food supply or | | as rich get access to resources. | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | No more rood supply of | | | |
| | | | | | | | water as ecosystem | () tinning point > called | | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | '''' | () tipping point -> collapse in food, water systems | | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem "sences". Collapse + leads to social stratification as rich get | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech | | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining | |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. | Difficult to read |
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| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? g Environmental degradation | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? g Environmental degradation and human health problem | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? g Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep pace. Human health suffers, | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? g Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental degradation of ecosystems | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental degradation of ecosystems > biodiversity loss | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep pace. Human health suffers, increasing non-communicable diseases and the breakdown of health systems, and biodiversity loss | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental degradation of ecosystems > biodiversity loss | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep pace. Human health suffers, increasing non-communicable diseases and the breakdown of | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental degradation of ecosystems > biodiversity loss Nature and tech not able to mitigate impacts of climate | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep pace. Human health suffers, increasing non-communicable diseases and the breakdown of health systems, and biodiversity loss occurs at scale. Massive spending on technology and adaptation measures, but they | Difficult to read |
| | | | main fuel: 'people power | | | | water as ecosystem | in food, water systems leads to Europe tech dependence collapse We're too late? Environmental degradation and human health problem are happening in () with strong environmental degradation of ecosystems > biodiversity loss Nature and tech not able to mitigate impacts of climate change. Adaptation ability | Youth no longer have access to nature, contributing to declining mental and physical wellbeing. Environment conditions degrade so severely that human innovation for masking the effects cannot keep pace. Human health suffers, increasing non-communicable diseases and the breakdown of health systems, and biodiversity loss occurs at scale. Massive spending on technology | Difficult to read |

| | | No r | more Netherlands due | |
|--|--|------|-----------------------|--|
| | | | to sea-level rise. | |
| | | Re | Restoration of marine | |
| | | | ecosystem? | |