Revisiting the Causal-Constitutive Divide in Mechanistic Explanations

Since Wesley Salmon’s (2005) proposal distinguishing causal from constitutive explanations, the incompatibility between causal and constitutive relationships has been a focus of debate for decades. This boundary is traditionally delineated based on features such as independence between entities, distinctions between events, synchrony of changes, and presence of causal interactions (Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Craver et al., 2021; Gillett, 2020). In this study, I scrutinize these criteria, arguing that applying them effectively requires precise identification of events and their interrelations, both horizontally across events and vertically across levels. I propose an account for identifying and structuring events that challenges the presumed clarity of the causal-constitutive boundary in life science explanatory frameworks. My analysis suggests that the boundary between causal and constitutive relationships is less distinct than commonly proposed, especially when co nsidering self-organized living systems. I argue that with invoking the temporal factor, a relation can be both constitutive and causal. This reconceptualization will broaden our understanding of causal and constitutive relationships, allowing deeper inquiry into interlevel causation and causation within complex systems.