On the explanatory power of atomistic simulations

Given that explanation is at the heart of science and considering that computer simulations have become ubiquitous in a multitude of scientific fields, it is important to examine their role in the acquisition of scientific explanations. Even though philosophers of science are increasingly paying attention to the use of computer simulations in explanatory contexts, the concrete contributions that simulations can make to explanations deserve closer philosophical scrutiny. Zooming in on the case of atomistic simulations and starting from a counterfactual account of explanation, we here explore how such simulations can help scientists tackle three relevant challenges in the search for explanations. We argue that atomistic simulations can help access variables at explanatorily relevant levels of description, that they can help track the effects of changes in variables in a highly controlled and fine-tuned way, and that they can allow for a fine-grained account of the relative importance of various difference-makers. Considering a concrete example and illustrating how atomistic simulations are actually used in scientific practice to support explanations, our examination aims to contribute to a more comprehensive and nuanced view of their explanatory power.