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The Interplay Between Explicit and Implicit Right-Wing Populism in Germany and Switzerland

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We conceptualize and measure right-wing populism (RWP) as a three-dimensional concept, explicitly and implicitly, based on online surveys and implicit association tests (IATs) in Germany and Switzerland. Confirmatory factor analyses show that explicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism establish the latent RWP-construct and that they are each related to their respective implicit counterpart. However, RWP ideology does not exist as an equally robust construct in the implicit realm as it does in the explicit realm. Resulting implicit-explicit incongruence is psychologically meaningful in that it is moderated by
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willingness to comply with perceived social norms: For participants who perceive that their own political views differ from their social environment and who conceal their diverging opinions, implicit attitudes differ more strongly from explicit attitudes. This supports our rationale that explicit expression of RWP-ideology is subject to social-compatibility concerns. Hence, corresponding implicit attitudes are useful to fully assess the RWP potential within society.

KEY WORDS: right-wing populism, explicit and implicit attitudes, survey, IAT

Right-wing populist (RWP) parties have become increasingly successful in democracies around the world (e.g., Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017). The formula for their success seems to comprise a combination of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2014; Rydgren, 2007). Initial evidence suggests that this ideological package can also be found in citizens' mind-sets (Dunn, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014; Rothmund et al., 2020). On the individual level, these attitudes are not only significant predictors for the support of RWP parties, but in some cases have been shown to be even more relevant than parties' issue positions (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018), which emphasizes the importance of additional research on RWP ideology. With this article, we aim to contribute to the current state of research in three ways: First, so far, populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes have often been analyzed separately, ignoring their potential to reflect a theoretically coherent mind-set. We operationalize the RWP construct including all three dimensions. Second, most studies have attempted to "better understand why people are willing to vote for these [RWP] politicians" (Rothmund et al., 2020, p. 479). We are also interested in the prevalence of RWP ideology in ways that might not be expressed in surveys and votes, for example, due to perceptions of social (in-)compatibility. We therefore propose to measure right-wing populism explicitly but also implicitly (e.g., Arendt et al., 2015; Bos et al., 2018), to take a closer look at implicit-explicit congruence as well as the correlates of RWP ideology. Third, current research has called for more comparative studies to explain varying levels of right-wing populism in different countries (e.g., Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). We compare implicit and explicit RWP in Switzerland, where right-wing populism is widely accepted within society, with Germany, where resentments against such ideology exist due to its Nazi past (e.g., Decker et al., 2022). Such national public opinion is reflected, for example, by party support in elections: In Switzerland, the strong RWP party, "Schweizerische Volkspartei" (SVP), has won all national elections during the past 20 years with a vote share continuously higher than 25% (BFS, 2023) and as a result has been part of the consensus government for decades. In Germany, on the contrary, "Alternative für Deutschland" (AfD) succeeded to enter the national parliament only since 2017, but with limited vote shares (e.g., 10% in 2021; see Bundeswahlleiter, 2023). In addition, AfD has been subject to extended investigation by the German Domestic Intelligence Services due to "anti-constitutional endeavours within the party" (BfV, 2022). As a result, AfD is also isolated in the national and state parliaments with all other parties consequently denying any cooperation. The political and legal situation of AfD receives plenty of media coverage in Germany, making it an interesting case for the analysis of explicit versus implicit RWP support.

A Three-Dimensional Conceptualization of RWP Ideology

At their core, populist attitudes emphasize the antagonism between the good people versus the conspiring elites (Akkerman et al., 2017; Erisen et al., 2021; Hawkins & Rovira

Kaltwasser, 2019), combining antielitism with a preference for popular sovereignty and a strong belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people (Mudde, 2007; Schulz et al., 2018). Populist attitudes thereby refer to a thin-centered ideology as they are "to some extent an empty box waiting to be filled with programmatic substance" (Hawkins et al., 2012, p. 4).

This is where right-wing attitudes come in: In wealthy democracies, populism is often attached to rightist exclusionary ideas (Hawkins et al., 2012; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Meijers & Zaslove, 2020; Rothmund et al., 2020). The key ingredients of such right-wing ideological core are *nativism* and *authoritarianism* (Mudde, 2007; for similar concepts, see Dunn, 2015; Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020; Nijs et al., 2019; Rydgren, 2007). Nativism is an illiberal form of nationalism, according to which the homogeneous nation-state is threatened by nonnative elements that can either be ideas or persons (e.g., immigrants or people of another race or religion, Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2014). From a nativist perspective, immigrants pose a multifaceted threat to the nation state as they are perceived to challenge the ethno-national identity, cause criminality and unemployment, or abuse the generosity of the welfare state (Rydgren, 2007). Authoritarianism can be defined as a preference for maintaining law and order and social conformity at the expense of individual autonomy (Feldman, 2003). Uncritical submission to formal authorities, adherence to conventional norms and traditions of the dominant social group, and aggression towards outsiders and rulebreakers are typical components of authoritarianism.

While there is evidence that populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes correlate substantially, when studying RWP ideology, researchers have often conceptualized and measured each component separately (populism, Akkerman et al., 2017; nativism, Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Some recent studies go one step further and test two or more of the three concepts simultaneously to confirm that they "complement each other's predictive validity" (Rothmund et al., 2020, p. 482; see also Pesthy et al., 2020; Rooduijn, 2014; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). In the current study, we build on the idea that these concepts reflect a coherent set in people's minds (Rooduijn, 2014; Rothmund et al., 2020) and argue that they jointly constitute the concept of *RWP ideology*. Thus, right-wing populism is regarded as a multidimensional construct, comprising populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes.[1]

Explicit Versus Implicit Right-Wing Populism

The differentiation between implicit and explicit attitudes is derived from dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology (for an overview, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000). With regard to attitude formation, dual-process models distinguish between two distinct mental processes that result in qualitatively different attitudinal responses to an object. On the one hand, the models assume propositional processes that are deliberate, reflective, and thoughtful evaluations of an object and build the basis for explicit attitudes. Hence,

[1]Some authors have even argued that constructs such as populist attitudes are "multidimensional concepts with non-interchangeable concept components" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 357). Such noncompensatory approaches imply that the singularity of the attitude lies precisely in the combination of multiple elements (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), which must all be present to a similar degree. While we agree with Wuttke et al.'s (2020) argument, our initial analyses are based on confirmatory factor analysis, and as such they deviate from noncompensatory logics. We have preferred to keep only one operationalization throughout the text for matters of consistency. We have replicated our analyses using a partially compensatory computation of RWP (i.e., geometric as opposed to arithmetic mean) to confirm the stability of our findings (see Appendix S6 in the online supporting information).

individuals are consciously aware of their judgments regarding an object and have access to such evaluations through self-reflection. On the other hand, the models propose associative processes that reflect spontaneous, impulsive, and automatic affective reactions to an object and lead to implicit attitudes. Individuals are often unaware of these automatically activated associations and therefore have only limited control over them. In consequence, explicit and implicit attitudes are regarded as distinct systems that have complementary effects on information processing, decision-making, and behavior: Whereas explicit attitudes are mainly relevant to reflective processes, controlled behavior, deliberate decisions, and implicit attitudes lead to rather immediate evaluative reactions, automatic processes, and uncontrolled behavioral reactions (for overviews, see Bablok et al., 2020; Greenwald et al., 2009; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As explicit and implicit attitudes relate to different mental processes, they are assessed with different measures. Explicit attitude measures rely on self-reported data, for example, survey measures of populist (e.g., Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Schulz et al., 2018), nativist (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2017; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017), or authoritarian attitudes (e.g., Aichholzer & Zeglovits, 2015; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). We aim to test whether the assumed structure of RWP ideology can be established in the explicit realm and thus propose that:

H1a: The three-dimensional structure of RWP ideology is reflected in corresponding explicit (direct) attitude measures.

Implicit attitudes are evaluated with indirect measures (e.g., Implicit Association Test [IAT], Greenwald et al., 1998). By employing indirect measures, researchers hope to overcome typical limitations of self-reports, especially when looking at socially sensitive domains, such as political attitudes or attitudes towards minorities or foreigners. Past studies have examined the relevance of implicit attitudes for research on right-wing populism (e.g., Arendt et al., 2015; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Pérez, 2010; Schmuck & Matthes, 2019), showing that implicit attitudes have the potential to alter explicit attitudes (Arendt & Northup, 2015), and that voting for RWP parties can be influenced at the implicit level (Bos et al., 2018).

We assume that two mechanisms justify the relevance of implicit (in addition to explicit) conceptualizations and measurements of RWP ideology: First, RWP claims often contain threats (e.g., immigration leads to an "over-foreignization" of the country; Ter Wal, 2002, p. 157) that are likely to trigger intuitive associations, which can be measured implicitly (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Second, citizens may correct their explicit attitudes according to their self-representation to avoid cognitive dissonance (i.e., self-deception) or in order to meet the expectations of others, so-called impression management (Paulhus, 1984): If people perceive the disclosure of their attitudes to not be socially acceptable, they may adjust their answers in a survey.[2] It is likely that especially nativist and authoritarian attitudes are regarded negatively in European societies, as they conflict with liberal-democratic values. Dual-process research suggests that the same adjustments do not operate on implicit attitudes (e.g., Bablok et al., 2020; Burdein et al., 2006; Ditonto et al., 2013, on implicit nativism, see Maier et al., 2015; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017). Accordingly, we suggest to complement the conceptualization and measurement of RWP ideology with an implicit component, for which we also propose a three-dimensional structure.

[2]Depending on context and individual factors such as values or beliefs, even under perceptions of undesirability, activation, mobilization, or justification are also possible (see, e.g., justification-suppression model (JSM) framework, Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).

H1b: In addition to the three direct measures, corresponding indirect measures load on the same subdimensions of the joint latent construct (RWP). The three indirect measures will each converge with their corresponding direct measure, while they will diverge from the other dimensions of the latent construct right-wing populism.

We assume that this general attitude structure will apply to the two national contexts we study:

H1c: The correlational structures predicted in Hypotheses 1a and 1b are invariant between Germany and Switzerland.

Interplay of Explicit and Implicit Right-Wing Populism

As argued above, explicit and implicit attitudes are regarded as the result of distinct but theoretically related systems; for example, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006, p. 694) conclude that individuals often use impulsive associations with an object to form a deliberate evaluative judgment regarding the object. Since the authors assume that achieving cognitive consistency is a primary concern within propositional reasoning, they also argue that affirming the validity of the spontaneous affective reactions to an object is the default mode of propositional reasoning. This process drives consistency between explicit and implicit attitudes. Yet several mechanisms might hinder (or strengthen) individuals' expression of explicit attitudes consistent with their implicit reactions in sensitive domains. Theoretically, this would signify an incongruence between implicit and explicit attitudes and, statistically, reflect moderate correlations at most. A meta-analysis based on a sample of 126 studies has confirmed such moderate but significant mean correlations of .24 between explicit self-reports and implicit attitudes in various domains (Hofmann et al., 2005; see also Deutsch & Strack, 2010; Nosek, 2005). Thus, we assume that a substantial degree of incongruence exists between explicit and implicit RWP:

H2: Implicit and explicit measures are only moderately positively related. We expect the correlation coefficient to be significantly higher than .10 and significantly lower than .50.

Explicit-implicit discrepancies seem psychologically meaningful: Various complementary mechanisms may operate that can explain different degrees of congruence between the two (for an extensive review of moderators, see Schmitt et al., 2015). One such mechanism is that explicit answers are often subject to social-compatibility concerns, that is, the concern that an attitude will not be compatible with what society generally accepts. For RWP, initial research suggests that individuals who withhold right-wing claims in the explicit realm are nevertheless affected by them on the implicit level (Arendt et al., 2015; see also Bos et al., 2018). In light of these findings, we propose that the perceived social compatibility of one's political attitudes is a meaningful moderator of RWP implicit-explicit incongruence:

H3a: The correlation between implicit and explicit RWP varies as a function of social-compatibility concerns regarding one's political attitudes. Stronger concerns are associated with decreasing implicit-explicit congruence, while weaker concerns are associated with increasing implicit-explicit congruence.

A second mechanism has to do with individuals' capabilities to adjust their attitudes. In line with this, formal education was found to strongly impact the intraindividual relation between implicit and explicit populist attitudes (Matthes & Schmuck, 2017). The authors showed that people with higher education were especially able to control and adjust their explicit attitudes to their individual values (e.g., egalitarianism) or to perceived social norms. However, they seemed "somewhat defenseless" (p. 564) against their own implicit reactions towards RWP messages. We therefore expect:

H3b: The correlation between implicit and explicit RWP varies as a function of formal education. Higher education is associated with decreasing implicit-explicit congruence, while lower education is associated with increasing implicit-explicit congruence.

Finally, the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes is also conditioned by country contexts. In countries such as Germany, where due to its Nazi past it is socially undesirable to disclose nativist or authoritarian attitudes, right-wing populism is not likely to be openly expressed. In such cases, attitudes would clearly show up in the implicit but not in the explicit realm (Maier et al., 2015). Consequently, we anticipate:

H3c: The correlation between implicit and explicit RWP varies as a function of different perceptions of the social compatibility of RWP within the respective national public opinion. Stronger perceptions of RWP as socially undesirable are associated with decreasing implicit-explicit congruence, while weaker perceptions of RWP as socially undesirable are associated with increasing implicit-explicit congruence.

H3d: Due to different public perceptions of the social compatibility of RWP in Germany and Switzerland (less desirable in Germany), the moderator effect expected in Hypothesis 3a will be more pronounced in Germany compared to Switzerland.

Right-Wing Populism and Voting Behavior

The final question is to what degree explicit and implicit right-wing populism interact when predicting political behavior, that is, radical/populist vote. In the explicit realm, the predictive power of RWP ideology for voting for a RWP party has already been demonstrated (Hawkins et al., 2012; Spruyt et al., 2016). Research on the general relevance of certain implicit attitudes for voting behavior has also been fruitful (see Galdi et al., 2008; Lundberg & Payne, 2014; Roccato & Zogmaister, 2010), but contested (e.g., Friese et al., 2016). The first attempt to explain voting for RWP parties specifically by implicit RWP found that it significantly predicted voting intentions for ideologically moderate respondents (Bos et al., 2018). The findings suggest that implicit attitudes "may be quite useful for explaining support among voters who would not normally self-report it" (p. 69).

We assume that explicit attitudes are affected by social-compatibility concerns, which is not the case for implicit attitudes (see H3a). Hence, we expect explicit right-wing populism and voting intention for a RWP party reported in a survey to be affected by social-compatibility concerns in the same manner, therefore; their correlation should be relatively strong. By contrast, because implicit RWP is not affected by social-compatibility concerns, its correlation with explicit voting intentions will be attenuated. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H4a: Participants who express higher levels of explicit RWP will also report a higher likelihood to vote for a RWP party (i.e., AfD or SVP) in the survey, while the correlation between implicit RWP and reported propensity of RWP vote will be lower.

H4b: Due to different public perceptions of the social compatibility of RWP in Germany and Switzerland (less compatible in Germany), the discrepancy between correlations of explicit and implicit RWP with RWP voting intention expected in Hypothesis 4a will be more pronounced in Germany compared to Switzerland.

Finally, if we are to expect that certain (psychologically meaningful) incongruencies exist between explicit and implicit attitudes, and that social-compatibility concerns can affect how much explicitly-stated RWP sentiments reflect people's intentions to vote for a RWP party, we must also contemplate the possibility that both explicit and implicit RWP explain those same voting intentions to different degrees depending on how consistent they are between each other. In response to that, we propose a follow-up analysis to examine whether *the relationships between implicit and explicit RWP and the reported propensity of RWP vote are contingent on the degree of implicit-explicit congruence (RQ1).*

Method

Surveys and Samples

We conducted two online surveys in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland which included three direct and indirect measures (IATs) for the three dimensions of RWP ideology: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. The surveys were conducted in early March 2020 by the market research company DemoSCOPE[3] using online access panels from Germany and Switzerland (see Appendix S1 in the online supporting information). Both samples were randomly drawn following quotas on gender, age, and education, plus region of residence (West vs. East) as additional criterion in Germany (for a comparison against population parameters, see Appendix S1). Participants completed the questionnaire on a computer. A total of 1,952 participants in Germany and 1,297 in Switzerland completed the questionnaire. Data quality was thoroughly checked using an attention check, a self-reported "use-me" question, evidence for speeding and straight lining, and error rates as well as response latencies in the IAT (see Appendix S2). Only participants who had complete data for all direct and indirect RWP measures were included in the analyses, resulting in 1,516 German and 1,051 Swiss participants (for a demographic comparison between included and excluded cases, see Appendix S3).

Measures

As the *direct measure* for explicit populist attitudes, we used a 9-item scale measuring populism on three dimensions (Schulz et al., 2018): (1) antiestablishment attitudes, (2) demand for popular sovereignty, and (3) belief in the homogeneous virtuousness of the people on a 5-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*fully agree*; for item wordings see Appendix S4 in the online supporting information).[4] We aggregated the nine items into one populism scale (GER: Cronbach's

[3]Data collection was completed on March 11, 2020, before the COVID-19 crisis struck Switzerland and Germany.

[4]The complete survey questionnaires for Germany and Switzerland including the complete instructions for the IATs are available on the project homepage under https://psy.rptu.de/aes/ikm/kommunikationspsychologie/forschung/populism.

Table 1. Items for Target and Attribute Categories in All Three IAT

Target Categories		Attribute Categories	
Populism IAT			
Politicians	Ministers	Positive	Good
	Representatives		Honest
	MBS of parliament		Hard-working
	MBS of government		Modest
Citizens	Germans/Swiss	Negative	Bad
	Taxpayers		Dishonest
	Fellow citizens		Lazy
	Voters		Arrogant
Nativism IAT			
Fellow citizens	Germans/Swiss	Positive	Generous
	Natives		Familiar
	Countrymen		Honest
	Fellow citizens		Good
Migrants	Migrants	Negative	Greedy
	Immigrants*		Strange
	Immigrants*		Criminal
	Immigrants*		Bad
Authoritarianism IAT			
Conformity values	Respect for elderly	Positive	Important
	Obedience		Right
	Good manners		Good
	Conscientiousness		Super
Autonomy values	Independence	Negative	Unimportant
	Self-reliance		Wrong
	Creativity		False
	Curiosity		Evil

*The German language knows a couple of synonyms here. We used the terms "Immigranten," "Einwanderer," and "Zuwanderer."

α = .81; CH: α = .75).[5] Explicit nativism was measured using four items of the antiimmigrant attitudes scale by Akkerman et al. (2017) (e.g., "Immigrants take jobs away from the German/Swiss"; "Immigrants are a threat to cultural life in our country"; GER: α = .90; CH: α = .88). Authoritarianism was assessed using an adapted version of the child-rearing values measure (CRV) by Feldman and Stenner (1997), including four questions about which traits would be more desirable for a child to have: respect for elders versus independence, self-reliance versus obedience, good manners versus curiosity, creativity versus sense of duty. Each value pair was rated on a 5-point semantic differential (GER: α = .68; CH: α = .57). Finally, we aggregated the 17 items of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism into one RWP scale (GER: α = .85; CH: α = .82).[6]

To assess the *implicit RWP*, we used D scores produced by three separate online versions of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003). First, the populism IAT measures the strength of implicit attitudes towards politicians versus citizens to closely mirror the items from the explicit scale. Participants had to classify words appearing in the middle of the screen into four paired categories by pressing specific computer keys. Two of these categories were the target categories *politicians* and *citizens*, and the other two were *positive* and *negative* attributes (Table 1).

[5]Variable descriptive statistics in Appendix S5 in the online supporting information.

[6]Recall that we compute the arithmetic mean as it is more consistent with the logic underlying CFA. However, a partially compensatory approach (i.e., geometric mean) for the computation of the RWP scale displayed high correspondence with the arithmetic mean (see Appendix S6 in the online supporting information).

Categorization should be faster when the pairing of a target with an attribute reflects a stronger association in memory. The nativism IAT used fellow citizens and migrants as target categories; the authoritarianism IAT referred to conformity versus autonomy values. All three IATs were built to mirror the corresponding direct measures as closely as possible while still using easy-to-grasp words. To make sure participants could complete all three IATS in the survey within a reasonable amount of time, the number of target words and attributes was limited to four positive and four negative terms for each of the three IATs.

We used the standard seven-block procedure as described by Greenwald et al. (1998; see Appendix S7 in the online supporting information). To obtain a metric measure from the IAT, we calculated the strength of the implicit association (D score) using the improved IAT-scoring algorithm by Greenwald et al. (2003). Therefore, we calculated the standard deviation for all trials in the blocks in the compatible condition, combining, for example, *ordinary people* with *positive* adjectives and *elites* with *negative* adjectives, and the blocks in the incompatible condition with the opposite combination of categories (e.g., *ordinary people* and *negative adjectives*). Then we calculated the mean latency for responses for each of the blocks (Block 3, 4 and 6, 7), which was then used to compute the two mean differences of the combinations of targets with *positive/negative* adjectives. By dividing each difference score by its associated standard deviation, we obtain the equal-weighted average of the two resulting ratios (D score).

For the populism IAT, positive values of the resulting D score indicate an automatic association of *ordinary people* with *positive* attributes, whereas negative values imply an automatic association of *elites* with *positive* attributes. For our samples, all D scores range from −2 to +2, in the case of populism showing an overall slightly stronger automatic association of *ordinary people* with *positive* attributes than of *elites* with *positive* ones (GER: $M = .44$, $\alpha = .93$; CH: $M = .34$, $\alpha = .90$).[7]

For the nativism IAT, positive values of the resulting D score indicate an automatic association of *fellow citizens* with *positive* attributes, whereas negative values imply an automatic association of *migrants* with *positive* attributes. Results show an overall stronger automatic association of *fellow citizens* with *positive* attributes than of *migrants* with *positive* ones (GER: $M = .62$, $\alpha = .96$; CH: $M = .60$, $\alpha = .96$).

For the authoritarianism IAT, positive values of the resulting D score indicate an automatic association of *conformity values* with *positive* attributes, whereas negative values imply an automatic association of *autonomy values* with *positive* attributes. We find an overall slightly stronger automatic association of *autonomy values* with *positive* attributes than of *conformity values* with *positive* ones (GER: $M = -.15$, $\alpha = .90$; CH: $M = -.11$, $\alpha = .89$).

Two moderator variables were included in the study: Social-compatibility concerns regarding one's political attitudes are measured as willingness to comply with perceived social norms in this realm and was created as a combination of two variables. First, participants' perception of whether their political attitudes were in line with or deviated from their social environment was assessed by one item which was then reverse coded for the purpose of this analysis (1 = *everybody shares my views*; 5 = *nobody has the same views as me*). This was then multiplied with the mean from a four-item scale measuring general willingness to self-censor (adapted from Hayes et al., 2005): "It's difficult for me to voice my opinion if I think

[7]To estimate the reliability of the IAT, we computed odd-even split-half groups of the trials. Subsequently, we computed the D score for both groups, followed by Cronbach's α on the two D scores (cf. Krause et al., 2011; see also Zinkernagel et al., 2011). High values of Cronbach's α of the IAT represent individual consistent reaction times regarding the preference, for example, for ordinary people with positive and negative attributes, respectively.

that others won't agree"; "If I have a different opinion than others, I rather agree with them than arguing with them"; "I tend to voice my opinion only amongst persons whom I trust"; "It's easy for me to express my opinions with people even if I know that they won't agree" (r) (1 = *does not apply at all*; 5 = *fully applies*; GER: α = .73; CH: α = .72.) The resulting willingness to comply with perceived social political norms ranges from 1 to 25 with high levels of the moderator meaning that subjects perceive their own political views as highly deviant and have a strong tendency to hide them. This variable was later transformed using its square root to prevent its skewed distribution from yielding biased estimates when testing interactions. In addition, formal education was assessed by asking participants about their highest level of education. The two countries have quite complex education systems, so to standardize education levels across them, a collapsed measure was computed containing three levels (1 = *low*; 2 = *medium*; 3 = *high education*; GER: M = 2.24, SD = .68; CH: M = 2.42, SD = .55, see Appendix S5 in the online supporting information).

Our measure for party choice is propensity to vote (PTV) for a RWP party, that is, AfD in Germany and SVP in Switzerland. We choose this variable instead of the absolute party preference to measure each participant's tendency towards RWP parties (e.g., Bos et al., 2018). The categorization of AfD and SVP as RWP parties was just recently confirmed by expert survey ratings of all existing Swiss and German political parties on the dimensions of populism, ideology, nativism, and authoritarianism (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020). PTV is measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (*It's very unlikely that I would vote for this party*) to 5 (*I would most likely vote for this party*). Descriptive analysis of the PTV for the German *AfD* showed that 11.21% of our respondents scored 4 or higher and therefore are considered supporters of the party; for the Swiss SVP, we found 26.74% supporters, whereas 80.33% of our participants in Germany and 56.33% in Switzerland stated that they would "unlikely/highly unlikely vote for this party" (score of 1 or 2).

Strategy of Analysis

Analyses were conducted in SPSS (IBM Corp, 2019) and R (R Core Team, 2019). The structure of the RWP construct was investigated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) based on maximum-likelihood estimation, using R package *lavaan* (Rosseel, 2012). Implicit-explicit incongruence was assessed by means of first-order Pearson correlations. All other tests were performed using linear-regression models.[8] In models including interaction terms, we mean-centered both, IV and moderators, to prevent multicollinearity. In models testing formal country comparisons, we used a pooled sample and included a country dummy. In all other models, we tested our hypotheses separately for each country.

Results

Structure of the Latent RWP Construct

To test the three-dimensional structure of RWP ideology in the explicit realm (H1a), we specified a CFA structure as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that we also modeled populism as three-dimensional (cf. Schulz et al., 2018). The model fitted the data well (see Model 1 in Table 2)

[8]All regression models reported in this article were also run including demographic controls. Since estimates remained stable with only minor changes in coefficients, we chose to report the more parsimonious models.



Figure 1. Latent structure of explicit RWP ideology (Model 1). Coefficients are standardized loadings. Upper values = Germany, lower values = Switzerland. Error terms omitted for parsimony. All loadings are significant ($p < .001$).

with CFI = .960 and .954, as well as SRMR = .042 and .047, for Germany and Switzerland, respectively (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1999). In addition, all factor loadings were significantly different from zero at $p < .001$. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was supported.

Table 2. Model Fit Indices for the CFA Structure of RWP Ideology

	N		CFI		RMSEA		SRMR		BIC	
Model	DE	CH	DE	CH	DE	CH	DE	CH	DE	CH
Model 1: Explicit RWP	1516	1051	.960	.954	.049	.046	.042	.047	66,307	46,849
Model 2: Explicit and implicit RWP	1516	1051	.950	.946	.047	.042	.042	.044	70,369	49,671
Model 3: Orthogonal implicit factor	1516	1051	.953	.947	.045	.042	.041	.044	70,343	49,671
Model 4: Two-factor model	1516	1051	.941	.939	.051	.045	.050	.048	70,468	49,715



Figure 2. Latent structure including IAT scores (left: Model 2: right: Model 3). Coefficients are standardized loadings. Upper values = Germany, lower values = Switzerland. Error terms omitted for parsimony. IAT, implicit association task. All loadings are significant ($p < .001$).

Hypothesis 1b predicted that the indirect measures of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism would converge with their corresponding direct measure, whereas they would diverge from the other dimensions of the joint latent RWP construct (i.e., they would follow the same three-dimensional structure as the explicit attitudes). We tested this hypothesis in three steps.

First, we specified two CFA models that are in line with the hypothesis—the original explicit RWP model from Figure 1 to which we added the populism, nativism, and authoritarianism IAT scores to each load on the respective factor (Figure 2, left side) and a second model

where we further added an orthogonal factor capturing the shared variance of the three IAT scores (Figure 2, right side). Both models fitted the data well in Germany (CFI = .950/.953; SRMR = .042/.041), as well as Switzerland (CFI = .946/.947; SRMR = .044/.044; see Table 2). While all loading coefficients were significantly greater than zero ($p < .001$), the IAT measures yielded rather low loadings (.16–.39). As we have previously argued, several mechanisms might hinder individuals' expression of explicit attitudes consistent with their implicit reactions, especially for attitudes that are perceived as socially incompatible, which implies that IAT loadings on an otherwise directly measured latent factor cannot be expected to be very high.

Model 3 fitted slightly better than Model 2. In Germany, the BIC—which includes a penalty for model complexity—was lower for Model 3 than for Model 2, suggesting that the increase in model fit justifies the increase in complexity; for Switzerland, both BIC values are identical and thus equally adequate (see Table 2). Importantly, the IAT loadings on the explicit factors did not change when adding the orthogonal implicit factor, implying that (1) each IAT score has shared variance with its corresponding explicit attitudes component, and (2) all three IAT scores share variance that is unique to the implicit realm.

Second, we estimated an alternative two-factor model (Model 4), where the IAT scores did not load on the respective explicit factors, but loaded only on an implicit factor, which was allowed to correlate with the explicit RWP factor (see Appendix S8 in the online supporting information). Such a model implies that implicit and explicit attitudes at the specific level (e.g., populism) have nothing in common above their association at the higher level (i.e., RWP). In other words, this alternative model does not assume the indirect measures to converge with the corresponding direct measure and thus contradicts Hypothesis 1b. While the absolute fit was acceptable, the model fitted relatively worse than the previous models (CFI = .941/.939 and SRMR = .050/.048, for Germany and Switzerland respectively; see also BIC values in Table 2). Thus, the model comparisons favor the assumptions of Hypothesis 1b.

Third, we examined the internal structure of the three IAT scores based in the procedure proposed by Schmukle et al. (2008): Within each RWP dimension, we sorted all opposing target stimuli into pairs (e.g., natives vs. migrants) and then calculated the logarithmized reaction time differences for each pair of IAT stimuli.[9] Following Schmukle et al. (2008), we used these item-specific scores to estimate CFA models. While a higher-order model of implicit RWP did not converge, a model with three correlated factors of implicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism yielded excellent fit and high loadings, implying internally consistent constructs of implicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (see Appendix S9 in the online supporting information). However, intercorrelations between the three factors were weak (DE: mean $r = -.05$ to .26; CH: mean $r = -.12$ to .20; also see H2 below).

Hypothesis 1c proposed that the correlational structures predicted in Hypotheses 1a and 1b would be invariant between Germany and Switzerland. We tested this hypothesis by assessing *configural invariance* between both samples, which implies the same overall pattern of factor loadings but allows for the loadings and the error variances to vary in size between the groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). As denoted by the fit indices associated with model M1 in Table 3, the loading structure is invariant across both countries supporting Hypothesis 1c. Conducting further exploratory analyses, we could also establish metric invariance (i.e., same factor loadings across countries), partial scalar invariance (i.e., same intercepts across countries for most items), and residual invariance (i.e., same residual variances across countries; cf. Table 3).

[9]Lacking a priori assumptions about which stimuli to pair within each of the three IATs, we estimated models based on all possible combinations. Differences in results were negligible.

Table 3. Testing Measurement Invariance Across Countries

							Model Comparison			
	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	χ^2	*df*	*p*	ΔCFI	ΔRMSEA	ΔSRMR	
M1: Configural Invariance	.948	.045	.041	1174.361	328	<.001	–	–	–	
M2: Metric Invariance	.944	.045	.048	1258.280	347	<.001	.004	.000	.007	from M1
M3: Scalar Invariance	.931	.050	.050	1498.626	360	<.001	.013	.005	.002	from M2
M4: Partial Scalar Invariance[a]	.940	.046	.048	1344.988	358	<.001	.004	.001	.000	from M2
M5: Residual Invariance[a]	.936	.046	.049	1421.136	378	<.001	.004	.000	.001	from M4

Note. M1 is based on Model 2 from Table 2.

[a]The intercepts of two items (Pop. 1, Nat. 1) are set free to differ across countries.

Table 4. Pearson Correlations Among Direct and Indirect Measures[a]

	Nativism explicit	Nativism implicit	Populism explicit	Populism implicit	Authoritarianism explicit	Authoritarianism implicit	RWP explicit	RWP implicit
Nativism explicit		.24 *** [.18, .29]	.40 *** [.36, .45]	.09 ** [.04, .14]	.39 *** [.32, .42]	.22 *** [.16, .27]	.86 *** [.84, .87]	.30 *** [.25, .35]
Nativism implicit	.22 *** [.17, .26]		.10 *** [.05, .15]	.16 *** [.10, .21]	.08 ** [.02, .13]	.08 ** [.01, .13]	.21 *** [.16, .26]	.63 *** [.59, .66]
Populism explicit	.45 *** [.40, .49]	.13 *** [.08, .17]		.11 *** [.05, .16]	.23 *** [.18, .28]	.09 ** [.03, .14]	.78 *** [.76, .81]	.16 *** [.11, .21]
Populism implicit	.13 ** [.08, .18]	.23 *** [.17, .28]	.16 *** [.11, .20]		.04 [-.01, .08]	-.04 [-.09, .02]	.12 *** [.06, .16]	.54 *** [.50, .58]
Authoritarianism explicit	.34 *** [.29, .38]	.12 ** [.08, .17]	.21 *** [.16, .26]	.09 *** [.04, .14]		.28 *** [.22, .33]	.50 *** [.45, .54]	.23 *** [.18, .27]
Authoritarianism implicit	.16 *** [.11, .20]	.10 ** [.05, .14]	.11 *** [.06, .16]	.01 [-.05, .06]	.33 *** [.29, .37]		.22 *** [.16, .27]	.66 *** [.62, .69]
RWP explicit	.86 *** [.85, .87]	.21 *** [.16, .25]	.81 *** [.79, .83]	.17 *** [.12, .21]	.45 *** [.41, .49]	.20 *** [.16, .24]		.30 *** [.25, .35]
RWP implicit	.26 *** [.22, .30]	.64 *** [.61, .66]	.20 *** [.16, .25]	.58 *** [.54, .61]	.31 *** [.27, .35]	.68 *** [.65, .71]	.30 *** [.26, .34]	

Notes: 1. 95% confidence intervals are reported in brackets. 2. Main implicit-explicit comparisons are highlighted in boxes.

[a]Country. Lower = Germany, Upper = Switzerland.

*$p<.05$; **$p<.01$; ***$p<.001$.

To conclude, our structural analyses revealed that (1) explicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism aggregate into a higher-order dimension of RWP ideology, (2) implicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism are internally consistent and each related to their explicit counterpart, (3) the three implicit attitudes share unique variance—if their overlap with the explicit attitudes is controlled for—which can be interpreted as a composite of implicit RWP ideology and IAT method variance, and (4) the same structural findings apply for Germany and Switzerland.

Implicit-Explicit Incongruence

Hypothesis 2 proposed that implicit and explicit measures are only moderately related (i.e., $.10<r<.50$). The first-order correlations between each of the direct measures and their corresponding indirect measure ranged from .11 to .33 (see Table 4), and most of their 95% confidence intervals excluded the limits established in the hypothesis (with the exception of populism in Switzerland, where the 95% confidence interval ranged from .05 to .16). Thus, the implicit-explicit correlations are in a similar order of magnitude as in other domains of implicit and explicit attitudes (see Hofmann et al., 2005). In addition, each component's implicit measure tended to correlate more strongly with the same component's explicit measure than with other components' explicit measures, providing further evidence for Hypothesis 1b.

Moderators of Implicit-Explicit Consistency

Hypothesis 3a proposed that increasing willingness to comply with norms regarding one's political attitudes would be associated with decreasing implicit-explicit-consistency, while decreasing compliance would be associated with increasing implicit-explicit-consistency. This

Table 5. Moderators of Implicit-Explicit Consistency

	DV: RWP Explicit											
	Model 1, DE			Model 1, CH			Model 2, DE			Model 2, CH		
	β	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE
(Intercept)	–	3.28	.02	–	3.26	.05	–	3.49	.09	–	3.59	.12
RWP implicit (A)	.29***	.75	.07	.30***	.02	.03	.16	.42	.22	.26*	.64	.32
Compliance perceived social norms (B)	.06*	.06	.03	.05	.75	−.28						
A×B	−.09***	−.38	.11	−.06*	.67	.13						
Education (C)							−.19***	−.19	.04	−.20***	−.22	.05
A×C							.12	.14	.10	.02	.02	.13
Observations	1446			1012			1516			1051		
R^2/R^2 adjusted	.097/.095			.096/.093			.110/.109			.129/.127		

	DV: RWP Explicit					
	Model 3			Model 4		
	β	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE
(Intercept)	–	3.26	.02	–	3.26	.02
RWP implicit	.29***	.75	.08	.29***	.75	.08
Compliance perceived social norms				.05	.05	.04
RWP implicit×Compliance				−.06*	−.28	.14
Country [ref: CH]	.01	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
RWP implicit×Country	.01	.02	.10	.00	.00	.10
Compliance×Country				.01	.01	.04
RWP implicit×Compliance×Country				−.02	−.1	.18
Observations	2567			2458		
R^2/R^2 adjusted	.089/.088			.098/.095		

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.



Figure 3. Interaction between implicit RWP and willingness to comply with perceived social norms.

hypothesis was tested via moderated multiple regression with explicit RWP serving as the dependent variable, implicit RWP serving as the predictor variable, and willingness to comply with perceived social norms serving as the moderator variable. An interaction term between the predictor and the moderator was significant and negative for both country samples and thus in line with the moderation hypothesis (Table 5, Model 1).[10]

Figure 3 illustrates how, for low levels of the moderator (i.e., people who do not perceive their attitudes to be different from their social contacts and who say they would not have problems voicing different views), implicit and explicit RWP ideology show higher correspondence. In contrast, for high levels of the moderator (i.e., participants who perceive that their own political views differ from the attitudes in their social environment and who have a strong tendency to suppress the expression of their deviant opinions), there is less congruence between implicit and explicit attitudes. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a was supported.[11]

Hypothesis 3b proposed that education would moderate the relationship between implicit and explicit RWP. The interaction term between education and implicit attitudes was found to be not significant, both for Germany and Switzerland (Table 5, Model 2). Thus, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.

Hypothesis 3c claimed that the correlation between implicit and explicit RWP would vary as a function of different perceptions of the social compatibility of right-wing populism within the respective national public opinion. Again, the hypothesis was tested via moderated regression analysis, this time using country as a dummy-coded moderator. The interaction effect between country and implicit RWP was not significant, contradicting H3c (Table 5, Model 3).

[10]Additional models were run where the two components of our measure of compliance with perceived social norms were included as separate variables. The analyses revealed that perceived political agreement within one's environment and not the general tendency to self-censor is what primarily drove implicit-explicit congruence—although both variables were significant in the German models. For details, see Appendix S10 in the online supporting information. However, we would still like to promote our suggested construct as it seems theoretically reasonable to us that those citizens who perceive right-wing populism to be socially incompatible, and who have a general tendency to hide deviating attitudes, should most likely show incongruent implicit versus explicit RWP.

[11]The evidence was more robust for Germany than for Switzerland. This became apparent when we explored the effect of perceived social political compatibility on implicit-explicit congruence for each of the subdimensions of RWP ideology (see Appendix S11 in the online supporting information). In Germany, the interaction was significant between compliance with perceived social political norms and implicit nativism and populism, but not with authoritarianism. In Switzerland, no interaction was significant for any of the subdimensions of RWP. Overall, this is coherent with our theoretical expectation that the perception of social (in-)compatibility of right-wing populism should play a less pronounced role in Switzerland than in Germany.

Finally, Hypothesis 3d stated that the difference in public perceptions of the social desirability of right-wing populism in Germany and Switzerland would make the moderator effect expected in Hypothesis 3a more pronounced in Germany than in Switzerland. A three-way interaction between implicit RWP, willingness to comply with perceived social norms, and the country dummy variable was not found to be significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3d was not supported (Table 5, Model 4).

RWP Ideology and Voting Intention

Turning to the prediction of voting behavior, Hypothesis 4a proposed that explicit RWP ideology would be positively associated with self-reported RWP voting intention, whereas implicit RWP ideology would be less strongly associated with self-reported voting intention due to social-compatibility concerns. Indeed, modeling the likelihood to vote for each of these parties, our results yielded significant positive coefficients for explicit RWP (β_{GER} = .47; β_{CH} = .57, $p < .001$). Implicit RWP, when considered alone without controlling for explicit RWP, was also significantly associated with RWP vote, but this relationship no longer held once explicit RWP was included in the models (Table 6). Thus, Hypothesis 4a was supported.

Next, Hypothesis 4b proposed that, due to different public perceptions associated with the social compatibility of right-wing populism in Germany and Switzerland, the discrepancy in correlations between the explicit and implicit RWP and voting intention (H4a) would be more pronounced in Germany (where the perception of the social norm should suppress explicit support for AfD) as compared to Switzerland. The null findings regarding implicit RWP and the reported likelihood to vote for a RWP party prevent us from formally rejecting Hypothesis 4b. However, a descriptive exploration of the coefficients reported in Table 6 suggests that the discrepancy in correlations between explicit and implicit attitudes and voting intention was not stronger in Germany than in Switzerland.

Finally, the interaction between implicit and explicit RWP in the models explaining RWP voting propensity was positive and significant for the German data, but not the Swiss data (RQ1). The interaction revealed that the relationship between implicit attitudes and the intentions to vote for a RWP party became stronger as explicit attitudes grew stronger. This implies that both implicit and explicit RWP ideology explain RWP voting intentions to a greater degree the more consistent they are among each other.

Summary and Conclusions

Discussion of Our Findings

The purpose of this article was to investigate the concept of right-wing populism (RWP) in the sense of a multidimensional construct consisting of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. We have argued that perceptions of social (in-)compatibility can prevent RWP ideology from becoming fully apparent in direct surveys and therefore proposed to also measure implicit RWP and to analyze its congruence with explicit RWP as well as the moderators of congruence. The cases of Germany and Switzerland were chosen, on the one hand, to provide a first test for the generalizability of the proposed attitudinal structures. On the other hand, we assumed that social (in-)compatibility perceptions regarding right-wing populism would differ significantly between Germany and Switzerland and lead to differences in implicit-explicit congruence.

Table 6. Implicit and Explicit RWP Ideology and RWP Vote Choice

	DV: Likelihood Vote AfD—DE									DV: Likelihood Vote SVP—CH								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	ß	*B*	SE	*ß*	*B*	SE	*ß*	*B*	SE	*ß*	*B*	SE	*ß*	*B*	SE	*ß*	*B*	SE
(Intercept)	–	1.39	0.05	–	−1.26	0.14	–	1.56	0.03	–	2.06	0.07	–	−2.28	0.21	–	2.44	0.04
RWP implicit	0.14***	0.68	0.12	0	0	0.12	0	−0.01	0.12	0.19***	1.22	0.19	0.02	0.14	0.17	0.02	0.15	0.17
RWP explicit				0.47***	0.87	0.04	0.47***	0.87	0.04				0.57***	1.43	0.07	0.57***	1.42	0.07
implicit×explicit							0.08***	0.57	0.17							−0.01	−0.14	0.27
N	1487			1487			1487			1008			1008			1008		
R^2/R^2 adjusted	0.019/0.019			0.223/0.222			0.229/0.227			0.038/0.037			0.331/0.330			0.331/0.330		

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Our structural analyses showed that in the explicit realm, populism, nativism, and authoritarianism indeed represented three distinct but correlated subdimensions of the latent RWP construct. *Implicit* populism, nativism, and authoritarianism on the other side, were each related to their respective explicit counterpart but were only partially related to each other. After controlling for their overlap with the explicit attitudes, the implicit attitudes loaded on a joined factor, which can be interpreted as a composite of implicit RWP ideology and IAT method variance. Implicit populism and nativism showed weak correlations, which is in line with literature showing that implicit attitudes typically do not correlate strongly. Implicit authoritarianism, however, was unrelated to populism and nativism, which shows that RWP ideology does not exist as an equally robust construct in the implicit realm as it does in the explicit realm. The attitudinal structures did not vary between Germany and Switzerland.

Second, we proposed that there would be a substantial degree of incongruence between explicit and implicit attitudes, which was supported by low to moderate correlations of implicit and explicit RWP. We had suggested that implicit-explicit incongruence of RWP ideology was psychologically meaningful in the sense that willingness to comply with perceived social political norms should moderate this relation. Our data provided partial empirical support for this reasoning. For participants with a high willingness to comply with social norms, implicit and explicit RWP were less congruent than for people with a lower willingness to comply with social norms. Granted, we cannot discard that other complementary mechanisms could simultaneously be at work here. In fact, our complementary analyses revealed that individuals' perceptions of agreement within their social circles were the primary driver of the implicit-explicit congruence, rather than the general tendency to self-censor. It is possible that when individuals perceive their own attitudes as being relatively common in society, such perceived support allows them to hold stronger attitudes, which in turn should reflect stronger implicit-explicit correspondence. Yet, such a mechanism would not necessarily inhibit perceptions and subsequent attitude adjustments related to how socially acceptable certain attitudes are. Overall, the findings related to country contexts also offer relative support for this rationale: The pattern of findings was less robust in Switzerland than in Germany, which suggests that perceptions of social incompatibility of RWP are still more relevant in Germany than in Switzerland. For this reason, implicit attitude tests seem useful to fully assess the RWP potential within a society. However, contrary to our expectations, education did not moderate the congruence between implicit and explicit RWP.

Finally, our results showed that higher levels of explicit RWP correlated with a higher probability to report a voting intention for a RWP party in the survey. Although this was originally also the case for implicit RWP, once we controlled for the effects of explicit attitudes, the former were no longer significant predictors of RWP voting intentions. We interpret this finding in line with the assumption that explicit RWP and the self-reported voting intention for a RWP party in a survey are subject to the same distortion by social-compatibility perceptions which do not affect implicit attitudes.

Limitations of Our Study and Pathways for Future Research

That higher implicit RWP did not affect voting intention in either of the two countries does not mean that implicit RWP is not relevant in explaining political behavior (e.g., Ditonto et al., 2013; for a summary see Bablok et al., 2020); they may simply do so conditionally (as suggested, for instance, by Bos et al., 2018) or depending on their degree of correspondence with an openly expressed attitude. In order to advance research on the relevance of implicit RWP ideology, it seems

promising to analyze possible effects in more "discrete" settings, which might be less sensitive to social-desirability perceptions—for example, information and communication behavior on right-leaning online platforms. In addition, research has shown that in the long term, implicit attitudes may spill over to the explicit level (Greenwald et al., 2009). It would therefore also be important to observe the intraindividual development of implicit and explicit RWP over time, especially in the context of right-wing campaigns. Ultimately however, we ought to be cautious to not overstate the predictive validity of IATs as prior work would advise (e.g., Oswald et al., 2013).

Also, several other aspects which have not been included in our study provide promising pathways for future work in this area. A first limitation of our study concerns the measurement of willingness to comply with perceived social political norms. While our theoretical account called for both components of the measure, we acknowledge that multiplying a scale by a single-item measure could have given undue weight to the latter. As the measure is not an empirically ideal solution, we provide models for both components separately (see Appendix S10 in the online supporting information) to provide transparency, and we call for future studies to improve the measurement of a complex yet, we argue, useful construct to understand the implicit-explicit interplay. Second, our structural analyses did not fully resolve to what degree the implicit attitudes constitute an RWP construct (see above). We nevertheless used a composite score of implicit RWP in our subsequent analyses, which we believe to be justified given that the best-fitting CFA model was the one that included an implicit RWP factor (Figure 2, right side), which represented shared variance between the implicit attitudes after controlling for explicit populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. Third, research has been calling for more comparative studies to explain varying levels of RWP ideology in different countries (e.g., Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). We have taken this into account by comparing RWP ideology in German-speaking Switzerland, the most right-leaning part of Switzerland, and Germany, but of course it would be enlightening to see respective results for a broader variety of countries. Finally, several studies have pointed to the different relevance of the populist, nativist, and authoritarian dimensions within RWP ideology, suggesting that nativism could be the driving force in many countries (Mudde, 2007; Rothmund et al., 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). An expansion of this line of research also to the implicit realm seems very promising.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

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