Social Sentiment in Times of Crises

NYU Center for the Study of Antisemitism

FZI

Antisemitism and Social Sentiment in Times of Crises:

Exploring antisemitic attitudes in the United States and Germany since October 7, 2023

Dr. William Pimlott, Dr. Jonas Fegert, Louisa Glaum, Dr. Avinoam Patt

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Content

Summary of Findings in this Report 3

1. Introduction 4

2. Survey Questions and Explanations 5

Analysis: *Jews and Fitting in* 7

By Political Belief 8

Age 10

Conspiracy Theories and Age 11

Young People, Israel and Antisemitism 12

Regression 14

3. Discussion 19

4. Conclusion and Outlook 20

5. Information about Authors 22

6. Bibliography 25

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Summary of Findings in this Report

– Beyond campus incidents, broader longitudinal survey data suggest attitudinal shifts across society, especially among younger populations. This longitudinal attitude survey suggests that there has been a significant rise in antisemitic sentiments in both Germany and the United States since the beginning of 2024 (unfortunately this is when the data set begins).

– Age is the strongest predictor of antisemitic attitudes, with younger respondents, particularly young men, consistently more likely to endorse exclusionary views about Jews in both the U.S. and Germany.

– High social media use and conspiratorial thinking strongly correlate with antisemitic sentiment, especially in the United States, indicating digital environments as key drivers of contemporary prejudice formation.

– In the United States young people are more likely to evince antisemitic views, while in Germany older people are more likely to be islamophobic.

– The data do not support a broad resurgence of left-wing antisemitism; instead, political polarization and xenophobia, especially on the right, remain central predictors of exclusionary attitudes.



1. Introduction

The SOSEC project was launched, funded by the Alfred Landecker Foundation, in Fall 2022 in response to a period marked by overlapping crises – threats to democracy, disinformation, the war on Ukraine, and rising inflation. This report uses the primary data that SOSEC has collected. SOSEC has been conducting a large-scale longitudinal panel study in Germany and the United States. Every two weeks, 4500 participants, 1500 in Germany and 3000 in the United States, answer the same set of questions, generating a rich, representative data set on public sentiment and its shifts in relation to major events.
Following October 7th, 2023, additional survey items were introduced to capture perceptions of Jews and antisemitism. The aim was to situate changes in the levels of antisemitism and anti-muslim sentiment within broader patterns of political polarization, social media consumption, and belief in conspiracy narratives. This has given a large data set for exploring recent developments in antisemitism.

This report proposes three main interventions. The first is to consider antisemitism much more broadly in society and outside of the focus on university campuses, which concern only a small fraction of the population – and generally the campuses in question are themselves only a small portion of universities and colleges in the United States. The second is to see what can be produced by comparing Germany and the United States – two countries with distinct relationships to Jews and other minority populations – this will be elaborated further. In future reports, there will be a third intervention: to consider antisemitism in the light of other prejudices as well.

There are many limitations to this scholarship that must first be mentioned before initial hypotheses can be explored. The first is that the sample size and the nature of this survey means that antisemitism is here mainly considered by responses to questions made by non-Jews. And yet antisemitism occurs most dangerously when Jews themselves encounter expressions of hatred. As Jewish demographer Sergio Della Pergola has observed, Jewish experience should be central to definitions of antisemitism, and might also improve its measurement (Della Pergola, 2024). Likewise, because the survey data investigated here starts after October 7th, there are limits to the opportunity for intertemporal comparison. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, as with every piece of quantitative survey research, there is some residual ambivalence in the questions. Survey respondents' understanding of the questions may or may not align with our original meaning of them. Nonetheless, this report attempts to elaborate some meaningful conclusions despite the significant ambiguity in the subject.

2. Survey Questions and Explanations

Measuring antisemitism quantitatively is a methodologically demanding undertaking. Antisemitic attitudes are socially sanctioned, normatively sensitive, and often shaped by strong social desirability effects. As a result, individuals are unlikely to self-identify explicitly as antisemitic, making it neither meaningful nor methodologically sound to ask respondents directly whether they hold antisemitic views. Quantitative research on antisemitism therefore relies on indirect indicators that capture recurring patterns of interpretation, justification, and attribution through which antisemitic attitudes are articulated in socially mediated ways.

This approach follows a well-established tradition in social psychology and antisemitism research, most prominently articulated by Roland Imhoff (2010). Imhoff conceptualizes antisemitism not as a single, uniform attitude but as a set of distinct yet empirically related forms of modern antisemitism, including primary antisemitism, secondary antisemitism, and Israel-related antisemitism. In this framework, primary antisemitism refers to direct hostility and negative stereotyping of Jews, whereas secondary antisemitism denotes indirect forms such as guilt-deflection, resentment toward Holocaust remembrance, and the relativization of crimes against Jews. Central to this framework is the insight that contemporary antisemitism is often expressed indirectly through resentment, rationalization, or contextual displacement, rather than through open hostility toward Jews. Conceptually, our operationalization overlaps with established indicators used in the Group-Focused Enmity (GMF) framework (Heitmeyer, 2002 – 2011). In particular, items capturing perceptions of societal belonging (e.g., whether Jews are seen as fitting into society), power and influence attributions, and threat constructions parallel core dimensions of antisemitism measured in the GMF tradition. At the same time, the SOSEC survey departs from the GMF approach by embedding these indicators in a longitudinal (bi-weekly) panel design that allows antisemitic attitudes to be analyzed in relation to broader patterns of information environments, political orientation, psychological sentiment and belief systems over time.

Building on this theoretical foundation, the SOSEC survey operationalizes antisemitism through a set of proxy items designed to capture these different articulation strategies. In addition, the survey includes measures of susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs, which prior research has repeatedly shown to be closely associated with antisemitic worldviews. Conspiratorial thinking provides a cognitive framework in which perceptions of hidden power, manipulation, and collective blame can be articulated in ways that overlap strongly with antisemitic narratives. Including such items allows us to examine antisemitism not only as an isolated prejudice, but as part of broader interpretive patterns related to distrust, attribution of agency, and perceived threat. The following items[1] were included to measure antisemitism directly or indirectly:

- *"Jews do not fit into the American society."*
- *"Antisemitism in the United States poses a threat to Jews."*
- *"How large is the proportion of Jews in the U.S. population?"*
  (used as an indicator of perceived group size and attributed societal power)
- *"For Jews, the greatest threat comes from the following part of society:"*
  - *The Left*
  - *The Right*
  - *Muslims*
  - *Society as a whole*
  - *None of the above*
- *"When it comes to Israeli politics, I can easily understand why people dislike Jews."*
- *"The United States/Germany is dominated by a foreign power that is pulling the strings in the background."*

In line with Imhoff's framework, these items are not treated as unambiguous indicators of antisemitism in isolation. Rather, their analytical value lies in their combination and in their relationship to other political, social, and psychological variables. In particular, the item linking attitudes toward Israeli politics to hostility toward Jews captures a form of Israel-related antisemitism in which collective blame is transferred from a state to Jews as a group and individuals.

To contextualize antisemitic attitudes within broader debates surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict, the survey also includes a series of items inspired by established public opinion research, most notably the Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll. These items include[1]:

- *"Hamas is supported by the majority of Palestinians in Gaza."*
- *"Israel is a legitimate state."*
- *"There should be a Palestinian state."*
- *"The Israeli perspective dominates reporting in the American media."*
- *"Hamas is a terrorist organization."*
- *"In the current public debate on the Arab–Israeli conflict, arguments are greatly exaggerated and simplified."*
- *"In the United States, a critical attitude towards Israel is considered socially unacceptable."*

While these questions do not measure antisemitism directly, they provide essential contextual information that allows us to examine how antisemitic attitudes intersect with perceptions of the conflict, media narratives, and political discourse. Taken together, this measurement strategy reflects a deliberately cautious and theoretically informed approach. It does not claim to capture antisemitism exhaustively, but instead seeks to operationalize it in line with established research by focusing on indirect articulation patterns, justificatory narratives, and associated cognitive structures.

While our measurement strategy draws on established traditions in quantitative antisemitism research, it differs from other approaches used by organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League. Rather than relying on a fixed battery of stereotype-focused items, the SOSEC survey is embedded in a large, multi-layered longitudinal panel that captures a broad range of political attitudes, media practices, conspiracy beliefs, and perceptions of social groups. This design allows us to situate antisemitic attitudes within a wider attitudinal and informational context and to examine how they co-vary with other orientations over time. The advantage of this approach lies in its analytic flexibility: by combining antisemitism-related proxy items with a rich set of background variables, we are able to ask more differentiated questions about the social, political, and informational conditions under which antisemitic ideas emerge and gain resonance.

At the same time, this design entails important limitations. The questions in the survey cannot be unambiguously understood as antisemitic. Even a question which might at first seem clearly antisemitic, "Jews do not fit into American society", for example, can lead to a variety of interpretations. It can be read both as an antisemitic rejection of Jewish belonging to the American nation, but also as an indictment of American intolerance. Qualitative interviews and ethnographic investigation would allow more insight into how participants answer these questions and why. Nonetheless, the quantitative approach allows a much broader survey of German and American participants. Equally, the sample size, while large, does mean that Jewish experience, so crucial, as mentioned earlier, to assessing antisemitism, is not as fully explored as would be desirable.

[1] **In German:** Juden passen nicht in die deutsche Gesellschaft.
Der Antisemitismus in Deutschland stellt für Juden eine Bedrohung dar.
Wie groß ist der Anteil von Juden in der deutschen Bevölkerung?
Für Jüdinnen und Juden geht die größte Bedrohung von folgendem Teil der Gesellschaft aus: Links, Rechts, Muslime, die Gesamtgesellschaft, Keiner dieser Optionen
Bei der israelischen Politik kann ich gut verstehen, dass man etwas gegen Juden hat.
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird von einer fremden Macht beherrscht, die im Hintergrund die Fäden zieht.

Analysis: *Jews and fitting in*[2]

Recent research on the growth of antisemitism and racism has often focused on an increased radicalization of the young, and young men in particular, through extreme online and social media content. SOSEC data corroborates this hypothesis, pointing to higher antisemitic attitudes within this group in both Germany and the United States. The graphs below show the responses to the statement "Jews do not fit into German/US society."

Figure 1: *"Jews do not fit into the US/German Society"*





[2] In this section, we first show a set of graphs to give an intuitive overview of the patterns in the data, followed by a multivariate regression analysis. The graphs should be understood as exploratory, as they are not based on formal statistical testing. For this reason, these results are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. We include them nonetheless because they point in the same direction as the regression results, which offer a more rigorous way of assessing the relationships in the data.

By Political Belief

Figure 2: *"Jews do not fit into the US/German Society" Over Time by Political Party*





Figure 3: *"Jews do not fit into the US/German society" Over Time by Political Affiliation*

Political party affiliation is evaluated based on respondents' self-reported evaluation of parties (from "very good" to "very bad"). A response of 10 or 11 on a scale of 1-11 was classified as an affiliation with that party. The bipartisan American political system makes it harder to draw conclusions based on party affiliation. In Germany, supporters of the radical right-wing party AfD differ from the mainstream political landscape, showing higher support of antisemitic statements.

Regardless of party affiliation, there also appear to be significant differences in political orientation in Germany with regard to antisemitic attitudes. These show a greater difference between right-wing attitudes in Germany and other political orientations. This discrepancy appears to be smaller in the USA.

Age

Figure 4: *"Jews do not fit into the US/German Society" by Generations, Social Media Usage and Gender*





In both countries, younger people tend to display more antisemitic attitudes. In the US, this is markedly more pronounced for men compared to women. Additionally, the US graph also demonstrates that higher social media usage, as depicted along the x axis, increases the likelihood of respondents holding antisemitic views. This may hold clues towards the phenomenon as discussed in the discussion later in this report - it may be that youth antisemitism is prompted by increased social media consumption. Interestingly, the graph shows that the variance within the groups (represented by the shaded areas) is larger in Germany, whereas the variance between the groups (represented by how far apart the lines are), is larger in the US. This can be cautiously interpreted as the groups in the US being more homogenous, but more polarized.

Conspiracy Theories and Age

In the United States, those who were already prone to conspiratorial belief – i.e. those who strongly agreed with the statement that "the United States is dominated by a foreign power that is pulling the strings in the background" also showed a higher likelihood of professing antisemitic attitudes, increasing much more when they were also higher social media users (see Figure 5). In Germany, we observe the same effect in regard to respondents' foreign power beliefs. However, interestingly, that effect does not seem to be amplified by social media usage.

Figure 5: *"Jews do not fit into the US/German society" by social media usage and foreign power conspiracy belief ("The United States/Germany is dominated by a foreign power that is pulling the strings in the background")*



Young People, Israel and Antisemitism

Figure 6: *Opinions on Israel by Year of Birth*



This data set shows that as age decreases participants tend to increasingly disagree with the statement "Israel is a legitimate state" and they also begin to antisemitically link the political situation in Israel to the situation of Jews in the country they live in (as suggested by the question "When it comes to Israeli politics, I can easily understand why people dislike Jews"). Figure 6 shows some evidence suggesting that this phenomenon peaks in the participants who are born around 1990 – suggesting that it is the "millenial" generation that is most likely to make the antisemitic link, holding Jews collectively responsible for the perceived actions of the Israeli government.

This would suggest one hypothesis, which is that young people are increasingly adopting antisemitic attitudes because of their negative views of Israel. Interestingly, there is no evidence of this phenomenon in Germany, where although with younger age Israel is increasingly viewed as being a less legitimate state, there is also a decrease in the view that the actions of Israel should inflect perceptions of Jews in Germany. However, this evidence must be nuanced by considering other evidence tying growing youth antisemitism to social media consumption and conspiracism.

Figure 7: *Opinions on Israel by Year of Birth*





Regression

In order to delve deeper into the connection between age and antisemitic sentiment, we used an Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) Regression. This regression demonstrates further how age appears as an important factor in whether an individual possesses antisemitic sentiments, and permits a further exploration of which other factors age overlaps with. With this statistical technique, we are able to calculate what most strongly predicts negative or positive answers to the question “Jews do not fit into US society”. For these calculations, we use the last 10 survey waves of data only, to ensure coefficients' stability.

Many of the variables in our analysis describe types of people or responses, rather than precise numerical values. Some of these variables represent distinct categories with no natural ranking. For example, gender (male, female, other) simply identifies different groups; none of these categories is “higher” or “lower” than another. Other variables do have a natural order, but the steps between categories are not evenly spaced. Age groups (such as “18 – 29,” “30 – 44,” “45 – 60,” and “over 60”) or levels of education fall into this category. While it makes sense to say that one group comes before or after another, the difference between groups is not measured in exact units. To analyze these variables statistically, we compare groups to one another. The model does this by creating a separate indicator for each group – for example, marking whether a respondent is male or not. This allows us to examine differences between groups, such as whether men are more likely than women to agree with antisemitic statements. One group is always treated as the baseline for comparison. This baseline group is left out of the model, and all results are interpreted relative to it.
For instance, if women are used as the baseline group, a result showing that men score 0.4 points higher means that, on average, men give slightly higher responses than women on that question.
We started out with a baseline model, including just a few criteria:

Figure 8: *Regression Results, Baseline Model*



Immediately, youth sticks out as a dominating factor. All other factors staying the same, if an American respondent is young (18 – 28 or 29 – 45), they will on average give the question "Jews do not belong in US society" a 1.4 higher rating (on a 1 – 7 scale) than a person in the 60+ age range. This pattern is also present in Germany, although the estimated coefficients are smaller. Young German respondents give the question "Jews do not belong in German society" a 0.3 higher rating. While the observation that the coefficients are larger in the US is interesting, it should be interpreted with caution.

Male respondents seem to give higher responses than female respondents. Again this is slightly stronger in the US. In both countries, politically right-wing respondents and people with higher incomes tend to respond with higher agreement. In Germany, this is one of the most dominant factors, whereas in the US age and gender are significantly stronger in their effect. In both countries, income has a significant effect however these coefficients are only slightly different from 0. Additionally for the US, white (compared to non-white) and university education (compared to no university education) are non-significant in our model.

Interestingly, If we look at the coefficients over time, we see that the effect of age has been there from the beginning of our data set (11/23), but that it has gotten noticeably stronger in the subsequent months.
This suggests a growing difference in responses between younger and older respondents. In the US, the coefficient of the age group 45 – 60 moves in proportional relationship to the younger generations, with a similar development at a lower level. People in this age group answer the question "Jews do not fit into American society" significantly more positively than the reference group of 60+ year olds, if not as strongly positively as young Americans. In Germany, this effect cannot be observed. The coefficient of the age group 45 – 60 oscillates between -0.05 and +0.05 meaning there is very little difference between the 45 – 50 year olds and 60+ year olds in our data. This leads to possible further questions, for example:
Does this suggest that the generational gap in Germany is more strongly marked? And if so, why?

Figure 9: *Age Coefficients Change Over Time*





In an extension of the model, we included “conspiracy” (how much people believe their country to be controlled by a foreign entity), “Evaluation of Israel´s role in the Gaza War” (respondents’ evaluation of Israel's role in the Gaza war), “Justifying hostility towards Jews because of Israel” (how much people say they understand if someone is antisemitic given Israel's actions), and “Xenophobic attitudes” (a collection of items in our questionnaire measuring xenophobia). In both countries’ data, we find that conspiracy belief has a positive coefficient, meaning people with higher belief in a foreign power pulling the strings are more likely to agree that Jews do not fit into German/US society. This result corroborates our exploratory findings above. Our model shows a similar relationship for xenophobia. Unsurprisingly, xenophobia is associated with higher levels of antisemitism. “Justifying hostility towards Jews because of Israel” also has a positive coefficient, showing that justifying or condoning antisemitism is a predictor for actual antisemetic belief.

Interestingly, respondents’ views on Israel’s role in the conflict add almost no explanatory power once other factors are taken into account, as indicated by coefficients close to zero. One possible explanation is that responses to this question are strongly correlated with other characteristics in the model. For example, age is a powerful predictor of how individuals evaluate Israel’s role in the conflict, and once age is accounted for, the Israel-related question contributes little independent variation. Another possibility is that antisemitic attitudes emerge across different political positions, with individuals holding very different views on Israel nonetheless displaying similar levels of antisemitism. In this case, opposing responses to the Israel question may offset one another, resulting in a near-zero average association. This shows the limitations of reading youth antisemitism only through the lens of attitudes towards Israel.

Overall, this extended model shows how, even when including these various items that are nominally strongly associated with antisemitism, we find that age remains the strongest factor in the US. The coefficients for age are now slightly lower (between 1.0 and 1.2 for younger generations), which is probably due to some of the variance previously explained by age that can now be explained by other included variables. However, even the reduced values are the strongest coefficients by far. We do not find this dominance in the German data, where conspiracy belief is the second strongest factor, and all the coefficients are below 0.4 in strength.

Figure 10: *Regression Results, Extended Model*



Again, looking at the development of these coefficients, the changes in the coefficient "Justifying hostility towards Jews because of Israel" (how much people say they understand if someone is antisemitic given Israel's actions) over time are striking. In the US, we observe a definite increase between late 2023 and mid-2025 with a decrease since. Overall, the value of this coefficient has still risen. In Germany, we see smaller changes, but also with an overall increase. This means the predictive value of "When it comes to Israeli politics, I can easily understand why people dislike Jews" for the question "Jews do not fit into US/German society" has become stronger over time. This suggests that the belief that Antisemitism can be justified because of Israel's actions is increasingly correlated with actual antisemitic attitudes.

Figure 11: *Justifying hostility towards Jews because of Israel's coefficient change*





3. Discussion

How do these findings relate to the current discourse of campus antisemitism? The polemical force of writing about campus antisemitism has two separate components. The first reason that its importance is viewed to be so high is that Jewish students on campuses are perceived to be more vulnerable, having only just reached adulthood, and so potential antisemitism is thus more damaging. But a second reason, if perhaps less openly stated, is that universities represent important sites of elite formation (and of political development) – and so an allegedly rampant antisemitism would then have more serious consequences later on when those currently at university assume positions of power. The data from SOSEC presents a broader, more complex picture. Although the evidence that left-wing participants are both less antisemitic and more likely to view antisemitism as a problem would seem to contradict the narrative propagated about left-wing antisemitism on campuses – or the idea that antisemitism on campuses represents the left. There are still worrying signs of a growth of antisemitism among young Americans, particularly men who use social media regularly. Equally, there is a marked increased likelihood of slippage among those born around 1990 to confuse Israeli politics with attitudes towards Jews in other countries. This suggests, although of course more evidence is necessary, that an undue focus on campus antisemitism may be obscuring a much more generalized rise in antisemitism among young men (and to a lesser extent women), even if campuses are places where young men are very present.

These findings on higher youth antisemitism find their echo in recent journalism that has diagnosed a "youthwave" of antisemitism (Rosenberg, 2025; Mandel, 2025) and in other survey data (Yale Youth poll 2025). At this stage, we would like to advance a hypothetical polycausal explanation for this rise. The findings indicate that high social media consumption is linked to antisemitic attitudes. For this reason, it seems logical to suggest that transformations in the media landscape have partially caused this rise.
What this data set cannot give evidence of, but which seems likely, is that increased historical distance from the Holocaust has also played a role. The role of the campus and a growth in anti-Israel sentiment may also have led to this rise - but we would not give this explanation monocausal status. As other research has shown, "left" antisemitism can be overstated as a cause for antisemitism in young people (Schröder, 2020). The more significant youth antisemitism may be coming in fact from the far right (Yale Youth Poll 2025). Equally, the remarkable parallels between the German and American findings indicate that this phenomena may be, if not global, at least transatlantic. Further investigation is urgently necessary, and collaboration is keenly invited.

4. Conclusion and Outlook

This report represents the outcome of a close and, in several respects, unusual collaboration between information systems researchers employing computational social science approaches and historians of antisemitism. By combining longitudinal survey data from the SOSEC project with theoretically and historically informed perspectives from antisemitism studies, this cooperation between the NYU Center for the Study of Antisemitism and the FZI Research Center for Information Technology demonstrates how quantitative approaches can meaningfully complement qualitative and theory-driven research. Rather than replacing interpretive or historical work, the SOSEC data allow established debates to be situated within a broader societal context and empirically tested against patterns of attitudes, media use, and belief structures across large populations.

A central contribution of this approach lies in its societal scope. Much of the existing research on antisemitism understandably focuses on specific arenas, such as social media platforms, protest movements or on highly visible instances of antisemitism. While these studies provide crucial insights into discursive dynamics and mobilization processes, they often leave open the question of how far such phenomena extend into society at large, and whether they translate into broader attitudinal shifts. The SOSEC panel, by contrast, makes it possible to assess the distribution and development of antisemitic attitudes across the wider population and over time, thereby offering an empirical lens on societal impact rather than isolated instances.

Building on the findings presented in this report, we explicitly invite researchers from various fields to engage with the SOSEC data as a foundation for further research on Antisemitism. Our aim is not to close a debate, but to open one. The analyses presented here are intended as starting points that can be extended, challenged, and refined through independent research projects drawing on the same empirical basis. To this end, an interdisciplinary workshop held in October 2025 brought together scholars from different disciplines to discuss the data set, its theoretical implications, and concrete ideas for collaborative research. We consider this workshop as an initial step in educating historians and social scientists on how to work with quantitative data and to warmly encourage researchers to use the SOSEC data to pursue their own projects.

Building on the analyses presented in this report, the SOSEC data point to three particularly promising directions for further research. One key avenue concerns the longitudinal study of generational change, allowing researchers to examine how young people's attitudes toward Jews develop over time and how they respond to political, media, and societal events. A second direction lies in the comparative potential of the data set to analyze antisemitic and anti-Muslim sentiment side by side, thereby shedding light on similarities, differences, and possible entanglements between related forms of prejudice. Finally, the findings raise important questions about youth antisemitism and the role of Holocaust education.

1. Changes of young people's opinions over time: The analysis in this report suggests that one of the most consequential dividing lines in attitudes toward Jews is generational. This invites further work that traces how young people's views evolve over time within the panel and how they respond to salient political, media, and societal events. Future analyses could combine the longitudinal structure of SOSEC with event-centered approaches to better understand when, and under which conditions, attitudinal shifts occur.

2. Comparison Anti-Muslim and Antisemitic sentiment: While not the focus of this report, the breadth of the SOSEC data set creates a valuable opportunity to compare different forms of prejudice. In particular, the survey items lend themselves to examining how anti-Muslim sentiment and antisemitic attitudes co-occur, diverge, or follow distinct patterns across demographic groups and over time. Such comparative analyses could sharpen our understanding of shared drivers, unique mechanisms, and the extent to which these prejudices are entangled in contemporary political and media discourse.

3. Youth Antisemitism and Holocaust Education: In contrast to approaches closely aligned with the study of secondary antisemitism, our survey does not include a dedicated focus on memory-related dimensions such as guilt-deflection, Holocaust fatigue, or resentment toward remembrance culture. These dimensions, which are central to Imhoff's (2010) conceptualization of modern antisemitism and particularly salient in the German context, cannot be directly assessed with our current item set. As a result, our analysis is less suited to capturing antisemitic dynamics that are primarily articulated through narratives of historical burden, moral reversal, or rejection of commemorative practices. Future extensions of the SOSEC survey could productively integrate such items and explore their connection with antisemitism.

It could be productive to investigate the possible impact of Holocaust education on the young. The successes of the broad implementation of Holocaust education in the US and Germany, one that occurred within schools and across society as a whole in the form of national museums and annual commemorations, had seemed to make significant gains in fighting antisemitism, creating a social sanction against the holding of overt antisemitic stereotypes. It is possible, however, that Holocaust education is no longer sufficiently adapted to contemporary forms of antisemitism, particularly if these are spread in new forms of media and in relation to new stereotypes and prejudices. In particular, Holocaust education might be limited as a means to combatting antisemitic attitudes. When it is asked or expected to confront the correlation between perceptions of the actions of the Israeli government and holding Jews collectively responsible for these actions (which makes sense as these are historically distinct phenomena). Further research, possibly including questions that directly consider the Holocaust and antisemitism, could be very useful to explore whether new forms of education are needed to fight antisemitism. Questions in SOSEC, while they would have to be formulated with extreme caution and sensitivity, could delve deeper into whether the Holocaust is still linked in US and German's minds to prejudice against Jews and other minorities. These questions, especially if focussing on Holocaust denial as well, could also be useful in of themselves to further measure antisemitic attitudes.

Taken together, this report underscores the value of combining longitudinal quantitative analysis with theoretically informed perspectives on antisemitism. We hope that this work encourages further collaboration and comparative research that deepens our understanding of how antisemitic attitudes develop, persist, and change over time.

5. Information about Authors

Dr. William Pimlott is the inaugural Research Fellow at the New York University Center for the Study of Antisemitism. He recently completed his PhD on the Yiddish press in Britain, at UCL, and subsequently held two research fellowships at the University of London (at Birkbeck and Royal Holloway colleges respectively) before joining the CSA.

Dr. Jonas Fegert is a researcher whose work examines digital democracy, information integrity, and the societal effects of online platforms. He leads the House of Participation at the FZI Research Center for Information Technology and heads the Digital Democracy & Participation research group at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), where he completed his PhD in Information Systems, with an academic background in Political Science and Public Policy. He has led research projects funded by German federal ministries, the European Commission, and the Landecker Foundation, including SOSEC. Prior to his academic career, he worked in the German Bundestag and later at the Jewish Scholarship Fund ELES, where he also served as NYU Bronfman Global Coordinator for Europe.

Louisa Glaum has been a research assistant on the SOSEC project for over two years. She studies Economics at KIT with a focus on statistics and empirical data analysis, and her research interests center on the relationship between social media usage and social sentiment.

Dr. Avinoam Patt is the Maurice Greenberg Professor of Holocaust Studies at New York University, where he also serves as Rennert Director of the Center for the Study of Antisemitism.
He is the author of multiple books on Jewish responses to the Holocaust, including “Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish Youth and Zionism in the Aftermath of the Holocaust” (2009) and “The Jewish Heroes of Warsaw: The Afterlife of the Revolt” (2021). He is also co-editor of “Laughter After: Humor and the Holocaust” (2020) and “Understanding and Teaching the Holocaust” (2020). His newest books include “Israel and the Holocaust” (2024) and the document collection, “The Surviving Remnant: Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany” (2024).

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Notes

Notes

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