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GOOSEIDRS: Intrusion Detection and Automated Response for IEC61850 GOOSE Masquerade Attacks

Conceição Alberto, Hermenegildo da ORCID iD icon 1; Sánchez, Gustavo ORCID iD icon 1; Dembel, Jean Marie; Diop, Idy; Elbez, Ghada ORCID iD icon 1; Hagenmeyer, Veit ORCID iD icon 1
1 Institut für Automation und angewandte Informatik (IAI), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)

Abstract:

Advanced cyber-attacks on smart grids expose limitations of conventional defenses, particularly for detecting protocol-compliant masquerading and supporting timely response. This paper presents GOOSEIDRS, a reproducible intrusion detection and response framework for the IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol. To support reproducible training and evaluation, we use a protocol-aware augmentation pipeline that extends limited Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) captures into long-duration masquerading traces, while Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) supports decision auditing. We engineer a compact feature set centered on State Number (stNum)/Sequence Number (sqNum) semantics with timing context (inter-arrival time, rolling statistics, and violation indicators). Our LightGBM-based IDS operates online with a two-threshold warning/attack logic, achieves over 99% on accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score, and triggers protocol-compliant corrective GOOSE responses in live HIL experiments. We evaluate the framework against state-dominant masquerading attacks and release the dataset and artifacts for reproducibility1.


Verlagsausgabe §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000195394
Veröffentlicht am 17.07.2026
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Automation und angewandte Informatik (IAI)
Publikationstyp Proceedingsbeitrag
Publikationsdatum 22.06.2026
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISBN: 979-8-4007-2199-1
KITopen-ID: 1000195394
Erschienen in Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Sustainability Week
Veranstaltung ACM Sustainability Week (2026), Banff, Kanada, 22.06.2026 – 25.06.2026
Verlag Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Seiten 36–46
Schlagwörter Machine learning, masquerade attack, smart grid, testbed, IEC61850, digital substation
Nachgewiesen in Scopus
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