Accountable Transaction Inclusion Lists: Enhancing Ethereum's Censorship Resistance

In Ethereum, transaction inclusion is rarely in question; what matters is the delay until inclusion. Currently, block builders could exercise censorship across consecutive blocks, threatening time-critical applications, such as on-chain auctions. To mitigate this risk, existing proposals such as FOCIL, scheduled for deployment in late 2026, assign a committee to list transactions for mandatory inclusion. However, no committee member is held accountable for the actual inclusion of the transactions: an adversary can bribe the entire committee to omit any transaction for less than 2 Euro per block under current conditions. We argue that accountability, i.e., requiring all exclusion decisions to be publicly disclosed and verifiably complete, with violations attributable to a specific party, substantially raises censorship costs. To this end, we propose Fair Forward Inclusion Lists (FairFIL) as an accountable censorship resistance mechanism for Ethereum. In FairFIL, every builder must publish all transactions the builder chooses to censor, subject to a protocol-anchored policy; a committee verifies the completeness and validity of this disclosure. ... mehrThe subsequent builder must include these transactions, forfeiting the full block reward upon any omission. Therefore, under FairFIL, extending censorship beyond a single slot requires an assembler to forfeit a full block reward. We show that compliance is rational for all participants within our behavior model. Our empirical evaluation on Ethereum mainnet indicates that multi-block censorship costs one order of magnitude more than under existing proposals, while leaving the builder's MEV extraction freedom largely intact. Initial measurements further suggest that the mempool consistency FairFIL requires is met in practice.