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5GDescrambler: Locating, Descrambling, and Decoding 5G Scheduling Information (long version)

Windisch, Fritz ORCID iD icon 1; Strufe, Thorsten ORCID iD icon 1
1 Kompetenzzentrum für angewandte Sicherheitstechnologie (KASTEL), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)

Abstract:

Tracking users in 5G NR has recently been successfully demonstrated by exploiting various side-channels. This allows for identification of individuals, classification of user activity in real time as well as tracking by fingerprinting, affecting billions of users with a 5G subscription and companies with private 5G deployments. However, previous work relies on weak operator configurations that leak networking parameters--either the radio network temporary identifier (RNTI) or scrambling factor ($N_{ID}$) during handshake--or to inefficiently brute-force Downlink Control Information (DCI).
In this paper we present a novel technique exploiting algebraic structure to reverse DCI scrambling, fully integrated into an open-source end-to-end binary DCI sniffing pipeline. It provides enabling input for subsequent attacks like live tracking of users and supports automatic detection of control channel configurations used. We demonstrate the robustness and performance of our approach with measurement campaigns against deployments of srsRAN, OpenAirInterface5G, and two commercial vendors. It reaches block error rates of less than $1\%$ at SNRs below expected values for efficient communication, while performing significantly faster on a reference sample than a previously suggested passive technique brute-forcing the required parameters. ... mehr


Volltext §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000198140
Veröffentlicht am 20.10.2026
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Kompetenzzentrum für angewandte Sicherheitstechnologie (KASTEL)
Publikationstyp Forschungsbericht/Preprint
Publikationsdatum 15.11.2026
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator KITopen-ID: 1000198140
Verlag Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Umfang 19 S.
Bemerkung zur Veröffentlichung To be published in the Proceedings of the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, preprint open access on arXiv. Vendors names under test are redacted.

DOI: 10.1145/3830454.3846809
Vorab online veröffentlicht am 07.09.2026
Schlagwörter 5G, Sniffing, Scrambling, Physical Downlink Control Channel
Nachgewiesen in arXiv
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