Single-Peaked Preferences - Extensions, Empirics and Experimental Results
Abstract:
A novel possibility result for strategy-proof aggregation of generalized single-peaked preferences is proven on a space of connected coalitions. In the second part, such preferences are elicited empirically by an online survey and the data are validated in the context of German political coalitions. Finally, a laboratory experiment is conducted to investigate for manipulation and the frequency of Nash play under the mean and under the median rule.
| Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |
| Publikationstyp | Hochschulschrift |
| Publikationsjahr | 2014 |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Identifikator | urn:nbn:de:swb:90-412089 KITopen-ID: 1000041208 |
| Verlag | Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) |
| Art der Arbeit | Dissertation |
| Fakultät | Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften (WIWI) |
| Institut | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |
| Prüfungsdaten | 06.02.2014 |
| Schlagwörter | Social Choice Theory, Generalized Single-Peaked Preferences, Voting Experiments, German Parliament, Manipulation |
| Nachgewiesen in | OpenAlex |
| Globale Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung | |
| Referent/Betreuer | Puppe, C. |