KIT | KIT-Bibliothek | Impressum | Datenschutz

Quantum Attacks on Mersenne Number Cryptosystems

Tiepelt, Kevin Marcel ORCID iD icon 1
1 Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)

Abstract (englisch):

Mersenne number based cryptography was introduced by Aggarwal et al. as a potential post-
quantum cryptosystem in 2017. Shortly after the publication Beunardeau et al. propose a lattice based attack significantly reducing the security margins. During the NIST post-quantum project Aggarwal et al. and Szepieniec introduced a new form of Mersenne number based cryptosystems which remain secure in the presence of the lattice reduction attack. The cryptoschemes make use of error correcting codes and have a low but non-zero probability of failure during the decoding phase. In the event of a decoding failure information about the secret key may be leaked and may allow for new attacks.
In the first part of this work, we analyze the Mersenne number cryptosystem and NIST submission Ramstake and identify approaches to exploit the information leaked by decoding failures. We describe different attacks on a weakened variant of Ramstake. Furthermore we pair the decoding failures with a timing attack on the code from the submission package. Both our attacks significantly reduce the security margins compared to the best known generic attack. However, our results on the weakened variant do not seem to carry over to the unweakened cryptosystem. ... mehr

Volltext §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000160171
Veröffentlicht am 05.07.2023
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Regelungs- und Steuerungssysteme (IRS)
Institut für Theoretische Informatik (ITI)
Publikationstyp Hochschulschrift
Publikationsdatum 01.11.2018
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator KITopen-ID: 1000160171
Verlag Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Umfang XII, 99 S.
Art der Arbeit Abschlussarbeit - Master
Referent/Betreuer Müller-Quade, Jorn
KIT – Die Forschungsuniversität in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft
KITopen Landing Page