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New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness

Jennings, Andrew B.; Laraki, Rida; Puppe, Clemens 1; Varloot, Estelle M.
1 Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)


We provide novel representations of strategy-proof voting rules applicable when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences. In particular, we introduce a ‘grading curve’ representation which is particularly useful when introducing variable electorates. Our analysis recovers, links and unifies existing results in the literature, and provides new characterizations when strategy-proofness is combined with other desirable properties such as ordinality, participation, consistency, and proportionality. Finally, the new representations are used to compute the strategy-proof methods that maximize the ex-ante social welfare for the $L_2$-norm and a uniform prior. The resulting strategy-proof welfare maximizer is the linear median (or ‘uniform median’), that we also characterize as the unique proportional strategy-proof voting rule.

Verlagsausgabe §
DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000161968
Veröffentlicht am 13.09.2023
DOI: 10.1007/s10107-023-02010-x
Zitationen: 1
Zitationen: 2
Cover der Publikation
Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Publikationstyp Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Publikationsjahr 2023
Sprache Englisch
Identifikator ISSN: 0025-5610, 1436-4646
KITopen-ID: 1000161968
Erschienen in Mathematical Programming
Verlag Springer
Vorab online veröffentlicht am 28.08.2023
Schlagwörter Strategy-proofness, Single-peaked preferences, Voting, Consistency, Participation, Proportionality, Linear/uniform median
Nachgewiesen in Dimensions
Web of Science
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