Masquerading IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol: Cyber-Physical Experiments and Detection
Alberto, Hermenegildo da Conceicao
1; Sánchez Collado, Gustavo
1; DEMBELE, Jean Marie; DIOP, Idy; Elbez, Ghada
1; Hagenmeyer, V.
1
1 Institut für Automation und angewandte Informatik (IAI), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
1; Sánchez Collado, Gustavo
1; DEMBELE, Jean Marie; DIOP, Idy; Elbez, Ghada
1; Hagenmeyer, V.
11 Institut für Automation und angewandte Informatik (IAI), Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Abstract (englisch):
In a Hardware-in-the-Loop digital substation, we show that a network attacker can spoof a GOOSE trip to open a breaker. We propose
two detectors—one machine-learning, one rule-based—and illustrate both attack and defense in an interactive demo for awareness.
two detectors—one machine-learning, one rule-based—and illustrate both attack and defense in an interactive demo for awareness.
| Zugehörige Institution(en) am KIT | Institut für Automation und angewandte Informatik (IAI) |
| Publikationstyp | Proceedingsbeitrag |
| Publikationsmonat/-jahr | 06.2025 |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Identifikator | ISBN: 979-8-4007-1125-1 KITopen-ID: 1000182316 |
| HGF-Programm | 46.23.02 (POF IV, LK 01) Engineering Security for Energy Systems |
| Erschienen in | E-ENERGY ’25, Rotterdam, Netherlands |
| Veranstaltung | 16th ACM International Conference on Future and Sustainable Energy Systems (ACM e-Energy 2025), Rotterdam, Niederlande, 17.06.2025 – 20.06.2025 |
| Verlag | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
| Seiten | 1000 - 1001 |
| Schlagwörter | Security, Smart Grid, testbed, IEC 61850, digital substation. |
| Nachgewiesen in | OpenAlex Scopus |